The Wonderful Story of Henry Sugar and Six More by Roald Dahl (1977)

And what marvellous exciting fun it was!
(Lucky Break)

This 1977 collection of Roald Dahl short stories is, as one of his schoolboys might say, a bit of a swizz because, out of the seven texts in this collection only four of are actually short stories – the last two are autobiographical sketches about the war and ‘The Mildenhall Treasure’ is a factual article from way back in 1946, all three of which had been previously published elsewhere.

  1. The Boy Who Talked With Animals (story)
  2. The Hitch-Hiker (story)
  3. The Mildenhall Treasure (article)
  4. The Swan (story)
  5. The Wonderful Story of Henry Sugar (story)
  6. Lucky Break (memoir)
  7. A Piece of Cake (memoir)

They’re all children’s stories, even the war memoirs – not for small children, exactly; probably for younger teens. It’s indicative that the edition I read was published by Puffin, Penguin’s imprint for children. One of aspects of the children-y approach is the gleeful hyperbole found throughout the pieces:

  • As a matter of fact, he told himself he was now almost certainly able to make money faster than any other man in the entire world. (page 144)
  • ‘You will be the richest man on earth.’ (p.156)

Another minor verbal tic which indicates their target audience is the liberal use of Dahl’s favourite words, ‘marvellous’ and ‘fantastic’, both of which, of course, appear in the titles of two of his most popular children’s books.

And now, very quickly, there began to come to him the great and marvellous idea that was to change everything. (Henry Sugar, page 153)

The Boy Who Talked with Animals (23 pages)

A strange and eerie story told by a narrator who’s gone on holiday to Jamaica. The taxi driver taking him to the hotel spooks him with stories of weird voodoo stuff which still goes on in the mountains. Then when he arrives at the hotel it’s perfectly pleasant and yet it gives him a bad vibe. And then the maid tells him all about a guest, a Mr Wasserman who was taking a photo of the sunset from the beach when a huge coconut fell on his head and knocked him dead. Although all this is quite serious it has a comic-book simplicity about it.

Anyway, the main action kicks off when the narrator, idling sitting on his balcony one day, hears a great hubbub from a crown of guests assembling on the beach.

This is a first-person fiction piece of medium-length writing. The narrator, on advice from friends, decides to vacation in Jamaica. One night, a sea turtle, ancient and huge, is caught by a group of fishermen. Rich people want to buy it, while the manager of a nearby hotel wants to make turtle soup out of it, but both plans are foiled when a little boy appears and shames the crowd for their cruelty. His parents explain that he has a deep affinity for animals, and even talks to them. The boy’s father pays off the fisherfolk and hotel manager, and the turtle is set free. The next day, the boy is missing, and the fisherfolk reveal that they have seen the child riding on the back of the sea turtle into the distance.

A turtle has landed on a resort beach in Jamaica and everyone wants to kill it for the meat and its shell. A small boy David becomes hysterical and tries to save the turtle. His parents explain that he is very sensitive to animals and they volunteer to buy the turtle from the resort owner. While they are haggling over the price, David talks to the turtle and tells it to swim away. During the night the boy himself disappears and next day two local fishermen come back with a crazy story – they have seen David riding the turtle out in the middle of the ocean!

The Hitch-Hiker (15 pages)

That rare thing, a Roald Dahl story with a happy ending, no revenge or poisoning or murder in sight.

The narrator is driving up to London in his brand new BMW 3.3 Li when he spots a hitchhiker. As the man gets in the narrator observes his rat-like features and long white hands, his drab grey coat which makes him look even more rattish. They talk about the model of car the narrator’s driving and when the narrator boasts that its top speed is 129 mph, the hitch-hiker encourages him to put the manufacturer’s claims to the test. So the narrator puts his foot down, 80, 90, 100, 105, 110, 115 miles an hour. Just as they get into the 120s they both hear a police siren go off and realise a police motor cycle is after them.

The traffic cop is strict, unbending and sarcastic. He takes his time and is rude and officious to both of them before writing out a ticket and hinting that breaking the limit by such a whopping margin will definitely result in a big fine and maybe even a prison sentence. With that threat he motors off leaving the narrator to resume his journey at a sensible law abiding speed.

The narrator frets over the doom awaiting him and so the hitchhiker sets about cheering him up. He challenges the narrator to guess his true profession. As a clue he starts to reveal various items from the narrator’s person starting off, improbably enough, with his belt, before going on to reveal the narrator’s wallet, watch and even shoelace.

Gobsmacked, the narrator calls the hitchhiker a pickpocket but the latter is a bit miffed and insists on being called a ‘fingersmith’ – just as a goldsmith has mastered gold, so he has mastered the adept use of his long and silky fingers, which he refers to as his ‘fantastic fingers’.

After his initial amazement at his friend’s abilities the narrator relapses back into gloom at the prospect of being charged, fined and maybe even imprisoned for his moment of madness. At which point, in a dazzling conclusion to the story, the hitchhiker reveals that he has stolen both of the police officer’s notebooks, which contain the cop’s copies of the tickets he gave them and the details of their offence.

Delighted, the narrator pulls over and he and the hitchhiker gleefully make a little bonfire of the policeman’s notebooks. A rare example of a Dahl story with a joyful ending.

The Mildenhall Treasure (1946: 27 pages)

Not a short story at all, but a factual article.

A modern preface explains that Dahl was unmarried and living with his mother when he read about the discovery of the Mildenhall treasure. He motored over to interview the hero of the story, Gordon Butcher, a humble ploughman, and this 27-page text is a kind of dramatisation of events.

Put simply, in January 1942 the owner of some farmland in Suffolk contracted one Sydney Ford to plough his fields for him and Ford sub-contracted the job to Gordon Butcher. Butcher was ploughing away when his plough struck something. When he investigated he found the edge of a big metal disc. Not sure what to do he went to see Ford who accompanied him back to the field and the pair dug out over thirty pieces of obviously man-made metal objects. As they did it snow began to fall and eventually the hole was covered in snow and Butcher’s extremities had gone numb with cold so he was happy enough when Ford told him to go home to his wife and a roaring fire and forgot all about it.

Meanwhile Ford took the treasure home in a sack and, over the following weeks and months, used domestic metal cleaner to clean off the tarnish and reveals the objects for what they were, the most impressive hoard of buried Roman treasure ever found in Britain.

Now all this took place during wartime, and from Ford’s house he could hear Allied bombers taking off to pound German cities and many of the norms and conventions of civilian life had been suspended. On the face of it, according to law, Butcher and Ford should have reported the find; it would have been claimed in its entirety by His Majesty’s government but Butcher, as the first finder, would have been eligible for the full market value of the trove, which Dahl gives as over half a million pounds.

But neither man reported it, in breach of English law. The digging in the increasingly heavy snowfall is the first significant or dramatic scene. The next one comes when Dahl describes the mounting excitement of Ford as he uses ordinary domestic cleaner to slowly work off the centuries of grime and reveal the sparkling silver underneath.

The third one comes when Ford has an unexpected visitor, Dr Hugh Alderson Fawcett, a keen and expert archaeologist who used, before the war, to visit Ford once a year to assess whatever finds Ford had made for, as the text explains, old arrowheads and minor historical debris often crop up in the fields of Suffolk which were, in the Dark Ages, the most inhabited part of Britain.

Anyway, by some oversight Ford kept most of the treasure under lock and key but had left out two beautiful silver spoons, which each had the name of a Roman child on them and so were probably Roman Christening spoons. The most dramatic moment in the story comes when Ford welcomes Fawcett into his living room but then realises the spoons are on the mantlepiece, in full sight. He tries to distract the doctor’s attention but eventually Fawcett sees them, asks what they are, and, upon examining them, almost has a heart attack as he realises their cultural importance and immense value.

Ford reluctantly confesses to when he found them and even more reluctantly admits there are more. When he unlocks his cupboard and shows the hoard to Fawcett the latter nearly expires with excitement.

In a way the most interesting moment comes when Dahl, showing the insight of a storyteller, admits that the most interesting part of the tale, all the dramatic bits, are over. Now it’s just the bureaucracy and administration. The hoard is reported to the police and packed off to the British Museum. In July 1946 a hearing is held under the jurisdiction of a coroner but it’s a jury which decides to award both Ford and Butcher £1,000, a lot of money but nowhere near the half million Butcher might have got if Ford had told him to report the find immediately.

You can read up-to-date information about the treasure on the Mildenhall Treasure Wikipedia page, including a reference to what Wikipedia calls Dahl’s ‘partly fictional account’.

The Swan (25 pages)

His lazy truck driver Dad buys thick, loutish Ernie, a .22 rifle for his 15th birthday. He and his mate Raymond go straight out on this fine May morning and start taking potshots at songbirds, stringing their bodies up from a stick Ernie carries over his shoulder. Then they come across school swot, weedy bespectacled 13-year-old Peter Watson.

At which point commences the main body of the story in which these two thugs really seriously bully Peter. First of all they march him to the nearby train line where they truss him hand and foot and then tie him to the sleepers. It is genuinely tense as Peter lies there trying to work out how low a train’s undercarriage is, and systematically moving his head and feet back and forth to try and dig deeper into the gravel. Dahl gives a tremendously vivid description of the express train suddenly appearing like a rocket, and roaring over Peter’s head till he feels like he’s been swallowed by a screaming giant.

But he survives, dazed and in shock. The bullies have watched from the nearby verge and now stroll down and untie Peter but keep his hands trussed. They push him ahead of them as they set off for the lake. Here they spot a duck and, despite Peter’s heartfelt please, shoot it. At which Ernie has the bright idea of treating Peter as their retriever, forcing him to wade into the water and bring back the corpse of the duck.

Next they spot a swan, a beautiful swan sitting regally atop a nest in the reeds. Peter begs them, tells them it’s illegal, tells them that swans are the most protected birds in the country, they’ll be arrested etc, but these guys are idiots as well as hooligans and Ernie raises his gun and shoots the swan dead. Then they threaten to kick and beat Peter unless he wades into the reeds and fetches the body.

It’s at this stage that things start to take a turn for the macabre or gruesome or possibly surreal. Peter loses all restraint and accuses Ernie of being a sadist and a brute at which point Ernie has another of his brainwaves and asks if Peter would like to see the swan come back to life, flying happily over the lake?

Peter asks what the devil he’s talking about, but then Ernie asks Ray for his pocket knife and sets about sawing off one of the swan’s wings. He then cuts six sections from the ball of string he always carries in his jacket and then…tells Peter to stretch out his arm. While Peter says he’s mental, Ernie proceeds to tie the swan’s wing tightly to Peter’s arm. Then he cuts off the other wing and ties it to Peter’s other arm. Now Peter has two swan’s arms attached to his arms.

So far so weird, but now the story moves towards a line or threshold, for Ernie now insists that Peter climbs a weeping willow growing by the lakeside, climbs right to the top and then ‘flies’. Peter seizes the opportunity of escaping from the bullies and makes the best of struggling up through a willow tree while encumbered with two whopping great swan wings, but eventually reaches the highest branch capable of bearing his weight, some 50 feet above the ground.

If he thought he could escape the bullies he was mistaken for they have stepped back to have clear sight of him, and Ernie proceeds to shout at him, telling him to fly. What madness, Peter thinks and doesn’t budge. At which point Ernie tells him he must fly or he will shoot. Peter doesn’t budge. Then Ernie says he’ll count to ten. He gets to ten and fires, deliberately shooting wide, in order to scare Peter who still doesn’t budge. Then, getting cross, Ernie shoots him in the thigh.

Now, at this pivotal moment, Dahl interjects a bit of editorialising. he tells us that there are two kinds of people, people who crumble and collapse under stress, pressure and danger or the smaller number of people who abruptly flourish and triumph. This, we take it, is experience garnered during his service in the war. But it also serves to paper over the crack, the red line, where the narrative crosses over from weird but plausible into wholly new realm of magical realism.

For, transformed by rage and frustration, Peter spreads his swan’s wings and…flies! The bullet in his leg knocked both his feet from under him but instead of plummeting to earth he sees a great white light shining over the lake, beckoning him on, and spreads the great swan wings and goes soaring up into the sky.

The narrative cuts to the eye witnesses in the village who see a boy with swan wings flying overhead and then cuts to Peter’s mother, doing the washing up in the kitchen sink when she sees something big and white and feathered land in her garden and rushes out to find her beloved little boy, to cut him free from the wings and start to tend the wound in his leg.

The transcendence of this, the tying on of wings and a boy’s transformation into a bird, remind me of the several J.G. Ballard short stories which depict men obsessed with flying like birds, in particular the powerful 1966 story Storm-bird, Storm-dreamer.

The Wonderful Story of Henry Sugar (71 pages)

By far the longest of Dahl’s short stories, this tale is more accurately described as a novella, whose length justifies the compilation and naming of the book around it. Having just finished it I can see that it could possibly have been a book in its own right, padded out with illustrations to book length. Instead the publishers padded it out to book length by adding a couple of other stories and some already-published war memoirs.

It’s an odd production, firstly in that it contains lengthy stories nested within each other, as you’ll see. We start with an extended introduction to the character of Henry Sugar who is painted as a thoroughly despicable person. He has inherited great wealth, is lazy and idle and spends most of his time, like many of his class, gambling on anything that moves.

Sugar goes to stay with a posh lord (Sir William Wyndham at his house near Guildford) and when his friends set up a game of canasta he draws the short straw and is the odd man out, so he wanders disconsolately into the library and mooches around till he finds an old exercise book in which is written the second story, the story-within-a-story.

For the exercise book turns out to be an account written by a British doctor in India in 1934. It is titled ‘A Report on an Interview with Imhrat Khan, The Man Who Could See Without Eyes, by Dr John Cartwright, Bombay, India, December 1934’.

This is a long, detailed account in its own right. This Cartwright is sitting with others in the Doctors Rest Room in Bombay Hospital when an Indian comes in. He calmly explains that he can see without using his eyes. After their initial mockery the doctors test him by putting a temporary sealant on his eyes, covering them with bread dough, then cotton wool, then bandaging them thoroughly. But, to their astonishment, the man heads out into the corridor, avoids other people, manages the stairs just fine, walks out the building, gets onto a bicycle and cycles out into the roaring traffic all without the use of his eyes.

It turns out that this fellow makes his living as part of a travelling circus where he’s one among many gifted performers such as a prodigious juggler, a snake charmer and a sword swallower. Dr Cartwright finds this out when he goes to see the circus that evening (at the Royal Palace Hall, Acacia Street). He then goes backstage to Khan’s dressing room and asks if he can interview him about his amazing powers. He will write up the account and try to get it published in something like the British Medical Journal. Khan agrees so Cartwright takes him to a restaurant and over curry Khan tells him his story.

So this is the third account, a story-within-a-story-within-a-story, which switches to a first-person narrative. Khan explains that he had a lifelong fascination with magic. When he was 13 a conjurer came to his school. He was so entranced that he followed him to Lahore where he became his assistant. but is disillusioned when he discovers it is all trickery and not real magic. He learns about the yogi, holy men who develop special skills. While looking for one he joins a travelling theatre company to make a living. Then he learns that the greatest yogi in India is Mr Banerjee, so he sets off to find him. He tracks him down to the jungle outside Rishikesh where he hides and witnesses the great man praying and levitating. When he steps forward to introduce himself Banerjee is furious at being spied on and chases Khan away. But the boy returns day after day and his persistence wears Banerjee down. Eventually he agrees to talk, says he never takes disciples, but recommends a colleague, Mr Hardwar.

Hardwar takes him on and thus begins a series of challenging physical and mental exercises, for three years. Eventually he needs to earn a living and rejoins a travelling show where he performs conjuring tricks. In Dacca he comes across a crowd watching a man walk on fiery coals and, when volunteers are requested, he goes forward and walks on burning coals himself.

He has heard tell that the ultimate test of a yogi’s powers is to see without using your eyes and so sets his heart on achieving this skill. (p.123). Slowly he realises that our senses have two aspects, the outer obvious one, and the inner version of that sense. He cultivates his inner sense of sight and the narrative form allows Dahl to convince us that Khan slowly slowly acquires the ability to see objects with his eyes closed.

By 1933 when he is 28 he can read a book with his eyes closed. He explains to Cartwright that the seeing is now done by any part of his body and demonstrates it by placing himself behind a door except for his hand which he sticks round the door. Then he proceeds to read the first book Cartwright takes off the shelf with his hand. Cartwright is staggered.

It is now late and time for Khan to go to bed. Cartwright thanks him and drives him home, then goes back to his own place but can’t sleep. Surely this is one of the greatest discoveries ever made! If this skill can be taught then the blind could be made to see and the deaf to hear! Cartwright gets a clean notebook and writes down every detail of what Khan has told him.

Next morning Cartwright tells all to a fellow doctor and they agree to go to the performance that evening and afterwards take Khan away from the tacky world of travelling performers and set him up somewhere safe where scientists can study him.

But when they get to the Royal Palace Hall something is wrong, there is no crowd and someone has written ‘Performance cancelled’ across the poster. When Cartwright asks he is told that ‘The man who can see without eyes’ died peacefully in his sleep. At one point in his long narration, Khan had made a point of telling him that a good yogi is sworn to secrecy and is punished for divulging his secrets. Well, this is the handy narrative contrivance Dahl has used to eliminate his wonder-worker. He told his secrets, he died.

Cartwright is devastated, finishes writing up his account with this sad coda, signs it and…40 or so years later, this is the old exercise book which Henry Sugar has just randomly picked up and read in the library of Sir William Wyndham!

Sugar has read it alright but the only thing he took from it was one throwaway remark by Khan that he could read the value of playing cards from behind because he could see through playing cards. As an inveterate gambler Sugar is dazzled by the possibilities of this power. He steals the notebook and sets about copying the exercises detailed in it. Months pass and he thinks he’s beginning to acquire the ability to empty his mind and visualise.

At the end of one year of hard training to focus and visualise Sugar tests himself and discovers that he can see through the back of a playing card to see its value, although it takes about four minutes to do so. A month later he can do it in 90 seconds, six months later he’s got it down to 20 seconds. But thereafter it gets harder, and it takes another eight months before he gets it down to 10 seconds. By now he has developed phenomenal powers of concentration but getting his reading time down to his target of four seconds takes another whole year, making three years and three months in total.

Then commences the real core of the story. In a sense all the preliminary matter about the Indian yogi is so much guff; conceivably it could have been a scientific inventor coming up with the discovery or any other kind of pretext or excuse which gets the protagonist to this point, namely, Being able to see the value of concealed cards at a casino.

For on the evening of the day when he finally visualises a card in 4 seconds, Henry puts on a dinner jacket and catches a cab to one of the most exclusive casinos in London, Lord’s House. Here he discovers he can predict which number is going to come up at roulette, bets £100 and wins at odds of 36 to 1. (I was surprised at this because all the effort of the preceding narrative has been about seeing what’s there with his eyes shut whereas this, his first trick in a casino, is entirely about predicting the future, which is a completely different ability altogether.)

What makes these children’s stories, but very effective children’s stories, is their vivid exaggeration. Everyone and everything is always the best in the world:

[The cashier] had arithmetic in his fingers. But he had more than that. He had arithmetic, trigonometry and calculus and algebra and Euclidean geometry in every nerve of his body. He was a human calculating-machine with a hundred thousand electric wires in his brain. (p.145)

Also the simplicity of the thoughts, and of the layout which emphasises that simplicity. The following should be a paragraph but isn’t, it is laid out like this because it is catering to children:

And what of the future?
What was the next move going to be?
He could make a million in a month.
He could make more if he wanted to.
There was no limit to what he could make.

Anyway, the surprising thing is that Henry is not thrilled by his staggering winnings. A few years earlier such a win would have knocked his socks off and he would have gone somewhere and splashed the cash on champagne and partying. Not now. To his surprise Henry feels gloomy. He is realising the great truth, that ‘nothing is any fun if you can get as much of it as you want’ (p.148).

Bored and a bit depressed Henry stands at the window of his Mayfair flat and, out of boredom, lets one of the £20 notes of his winnings be taken away by the breeze. An old man picks it up. He lets another go and a young couple get it. A crowd begins to form under his window. Eventually Henry throws his entire winnings of thousands of pounds into the street which, predictably, causes a small riot and blocks the traffic.

A few minutes later a very angry policeman knocks on his apartment door and tells him not to be such a blithering idiot. Where did he get the money from etc and Henry gives details of the casino, but what strikes home is the copper says if you want to chuck money away, why not give it to somewhere useful like an orphanage.

This gives Henry a brainwave. After thinking it through a bit he decides he will devote his life to charity. he will move from city to city, fleecing the casinos for huge sums before moving on to the next. And he will use all the money he makes to set up orphanages in each country.

He’ll need someone to handle the money side so he goes to see his accountant, a cautious man named John Winston. Winston doesn’t believe him so Henry a) tells him the values of cards laid face down on his table b) wins a fortune in matchsticks from a little game of blackjack they have in his office c) takes him to a casino that evening (not the Lord’s House) where he wins £17,500.

Winston agrees to be his partner but points out that the kind of revenue he’s suggesting will all be taken by the taxman. He suggests they set up the business in Switzerland so Henry gives him the £17,500 to organise the move, set up a new office, move his wife and children out there.

A year later Henry has sent the company they’ve set up £8 million and John has used it to set up orphanages. Over the next seven years he wins £50 million. Eventually, as in all good stories, things go wrong and trigger the climax. Henry is foolish enough to win $100,000 at three Las Vegas casinos owned by the same mob. Next morning the bellhop arrives to tell him some dodgy men are waiting in the foyer. The bellhop explains that, for a price, he’ll let Henry use his uniform to get away. But he must tie the bellhop up to make it look kosher. This he does, tucks a grand under the carpet as payment, and makes his escape dressed as a bellhop.

He catches a plane to Los Angeles because the use of a disguise has given him an idea. He goes to see the best makeup artist in Hollywood, Max Engelman. He explains his special powers and asks if he wants to earn $100,000 a year. Max joins him and together they travel the casinos of the world appearing at each one in disguise. The story has now become a full-on children’s story, revelling in the sheer pleasure of dressing up in ever-more preposterous identities, using faked passports and id cards.

Eventually the story ends when Henry Sugar dies. The narrator tots up the figures. Henry died aged 63. He had visited 371 major casinos in 21 different countries or islands. During that period he made £144 million which was used to set up 21 well-run orphanages around the world, one in each country he visited.

In the last few pages Dahl gives a children’s style version of how he came to write the book, namely John Winston rang him up, invited him to come and meet him and Max, showed him Cartwright’s notebook, and commissioned him to write a full account. Which is what he’s just done. No matter how absurd and fantastical the story, it is treated with Dahl’s trademark clear, frank limpidity.

Lucky Break

This is a non-fictional account of how Dahl became a writer, condensing material from his two autobiographical books, ‘Boy and ‘Going Solo’. It highlights key events from his childhood, school days and early manhood up to the publication of his first story.

A Piece of Cake (1946)

From Wikipedia:

An autobiographical account of Dahl’s time as a fighter pilot in the Second World War. It describes how Dahl was injured and eventually forced to leave the Mediterranean arena. The original version of the story was written for C. S. Forester so that he could get the gist of Dahl’s story and rewrite it in his own words. Forester was so impressed by the story (Dahl at the time did not believe himself a capable writer) that he sent it without modification to his agent, who had it published (as ‘Shot Down Over Libya’) in The Saturday Evening Post, thereby initiating Dahl’s writing career. It appeared in Dahl’s first short story collection ‘Over to You’, published in 1946.


Credit

The Wonderful Story of Henry Sugar and Six More by Roald Dahl was published by Jonathan Cape in 1977. References are to the 2001 Puffin paperback edition.

Related links

Roald Dahl reviews

Someone Like You by Roald Dahl (1953)

When I’m writing a short story I’m haunted by the thought that I’ve got to hold the reader’s attention for literally every second, otherwise I’m dead.
(Roald Dahl, in the Introduction to the first collection of Tales of the Unexpected)

Someone Like You is a collection of 19 short stories by Roald Dahl, published in 1953. It was only after a bit of poking around that I realised what’s always confused me about Dahl’s short stories is that they a) were mostly published very early on, in the 1940s and 50s b) were subsequently repackaged and published multiple times, in different volumes, with a wide variety of titles, thus muddying the order and leading to a confusing plethora of collections.

Take the volume which I associated with Dahl as a schoolboy, the first volume of Tales of the Unexpected, published in 1979 to tie in with the ITV dramatisations which were very popular, stories I, not unnaturally, assumed must have been written during the 1970s. Except it turns out that all the stories in it had been previously published in either this 1953 collection, Someone Like You, or in Kiss Kiss, published in 1960. Presented in shiny packaging at the very end of the 1970s, all these stories in fact dated from the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s, a generation earlier.

  1. Man from the South (September 1948)
  2. Taste (December 1951)
  3. The Sound Machine (September 1949)
  4. Poison (June 1950)
  5. Dip in the Pool (January 1952)
  6. Skin (May 1952)
  7. My Lady Love, My Dove (June 1952)
  8. Lamb to the Slaughter (September 1953)
  9. Nunc Dimittis (September 1953)
  10. Edward the Conqueror (October 1953)
  11. Galloping Foxley (November 1953)
  12. Neck (1953)
  13. The Wish (1953)
  14. The soldier (1953)
  15. The Great Automatic Grammatizator (1953)
  16. Claud’s Dog (1953)
    • The Ratcatcher
    • Rummins
    • Mr. Hoddy
    • Mr Feasey

Man from the South (September 1948)

Two things are made perfectly plain in this first story: It is a gruesome story, which raises the central question, whether Dahl realised early on that the gruesome, macabre and sadistic would sell. And it is written with great clarity and limpidness, plain and open.

There are at least two consequences: one is that he places you in the situation, in the mise en scène, with tremendous speed and efficiency. Witness the first sentence:

It was getting on towards six o’clock so I thought I’d buy myself a beer and go out and sit in a deckchair by the swimming pool and have a little evening sun.

The story is a first-person narrative told by the male narrator who goes down to the pool, orders a beer and sits on a lounger and is watching the guys and girls playing in the pool when the action begins. The stripped-back style acts as a foil to set off the gruesomeness of the central premise. In this case, a middle-aged fully clothed man comes and sits near the narrator, engages him in conversation speaking with an indeterminate accent, maybe Italian maybe Spanish.

They chat a bit, then one of the fit young men from the pool comes splashing out and sits nearby with his girl. He goes to light a cigarette, the man from the South admires his lighter, yes, the Yank says, It lights every time. Every time? asks the man from the South. And then quickly, with an eerie believability, he escalates the conversation, asking the Yank if he wants to bet: why sure, why not, says the young man.

The man from the south escalates it further, saying he’ll bet his car that the Yank’s cigarette lighter won’t light ten times in a row, and not just any old car but a Cadillac. The American’s eyes light up at the prospect of winning a car, but then the man from the South makes his demand…He insists that he takes from the American something he doesn’t need, something like…his little finger! From this point onwards the story becomes not only macabre but actively gripping.

Obviously the girl the American has picked up, and the sensible narrator, are scandalised by the man’s proposition and tell the Yank not to do it…But the man from the South works on him, telling him that if he’s right about his lighter, then he stands to win a Cadillac, until the young man, in a burst of boyish bravado, agrees! At which point they all go to the man’s hotel room where he tells his servant to go and get: string, a hammer, nails and a hand axe.

With these he proceeds to tie the American’s left hand to a table, splayed open in such a way that the little finger is isolated, all of which the American agrees to, and the narrator watches with horrified fascination. Then he instructs the American to start firing his lighter, whilst holding the small axe poised over the American’s finger. One light works. Then number two. Then three.

The reader is, by now, on the edge of their seat. From nowhere (lounging by the pool) this has developed into a heart-stopping thriller. The count gets up to seven successful fires when…the door opens and…the man from the South’s wife storms in.

She immediately puts a stop to everything, pushing him and the axe away, making him put the axe down, untying the American’s hand, saying the whole thing is null and void. She changes the whole mood and context of events by explaining that her husband has a psychiatric disorder, a compulsion to gamble mixed with sadism, ‘they’ have tried repeatedly to stop him. They eventually managed although at some cost and the narrator suddenly notices, as the woman swiftly unties the American’s hand, that she only has the thumb and one finger remaining on her right hand. Gruesome.

Taste (December 1951)

At a posh dinner party a City broker seeks to impress a famous epicure who he’s invited. This posh fellow ignores his food and the extremely expensive wine put in front of him in order to chat up the host’s 18-year-old daughter. Whereupon the banker-host proposes a bet that the Epicure can’t identify the rare red wine he’s just served. The stakes between the two blowhards escalate until the Epicure says that if he wins, if he identifies the wine correctly, he wants the host’s daughter as his winnings. He’ll stake his house in the country, in fact his town and country houses. The wife intervenes, the daughter screams ‘No’ but the obsessed banker-father insists.

There follow several pages in which the Epicure makes a great show of tasting the wine and forensically deducing which vineyard it came from until he announces the correct vineyard and vintage. The banker turns white and asks if they can go to another room for a private talk. Things threaten to turn nasty when the maid, an old woman nearer 70 than 60, steps forward to hand the Epicure his glasses, quietly pointing out that he left them in the study when he popped in there for a few moments just after arriving. The study where he and the host had agreed was the best place to leave opened bottles of wine to air! In other words, he cheated. The expression on the banker’s face hardens as a vast fury grows inside him, and at that moment the narrative ends, leaving us to imagine the rest. Silly but hugely effective.

The Sound Machine (September 1949)

This story has an amateur inventor, H.G. Wells vibe about it. Klausner is an inventor who works in a shed at the bottom of his garden and is putting the finishing touches to a new device. It’s like a miniature coffin filled with wiring, with knobs on the front – amateur inventor stuff.

In a first passage of exposition, Klausner explains what it’s for to Dr Scott. Humans can only hear a subset of the audible spectrum. It’s well know that dogs, for example, or bats, can hear frequencies we can’t. Therefore, he’s built a device which can detect these higher frequencies and convert them into sounds hearable by human beings.

Next day he goes out into his garden, puts on the headphones, turns it on and the, over the background hum, he suddenly hears an intense piercing scream of a sound. He’s still reeling when he hears another one. Suddenly he realises it’s his next door neighbour, Mrs Saunders, cutting yellow roses in her garden.

Klausner leans over the fence, interrupts her horticulture and asks if she can snip one more. She does so and he hears the ‘scream’ at exactly that moment. He can hear plants scream.

Bright and early next morning Klausner carries the machine over to his local park along with an axe. He sets it up by a tree and takes a swing, embedding his axe in the bark. At that exact moment he hears a deep groaning sound. Trees feel pain and trees express it through sound, in this case a deep powerful moaning. He looks at the gash he’s made in the tree with horror and remorse.

Now it becomes clear why the narrative introduced Dr Scott at the beginning because Klausner rushes home and phones the doctor, hurriedly telling him he must must must come over, despite the good doctor complaining that it’s 6.30 in the morning.

But drive round he does, and Klausner hustles him into the park where he insists that the doctor a) puts on the headphones and b) takes the axe and strikes the tree, and so become a witness of his great scientific breakthrough.

Against his better instinct the doctor hits the tree with the axe but, in the seconds before, Klausner realises that one of the tree’s enormous branches is working loose, it bends and snaps at the exact moment Dr Scott’s axe blow hits the tree. The doctor pushes Klausner to safety and they both watch the branch fall on and crush the sound machine.

Feverishly Klausner asks the doctor whether he heard the tree cry out, did he, did he? No, he didn’t. At which point Klausner topples over into madness and asks the doctor to stitch the axe gash in the tree. When the Dr says that’s ridiculous Klausner brandishes the axe menacingly and orders the doctor to paint the wound with iodine i.e. to sterilise it and prevent it becoming infected.

Poison (June 1950)

First-person narrative told by Timber Woods. We’re in India. It’s evening. Woods drives up to the house he shares with Harry Pope. He finds Pope in bed, sweating, absolutely stationary and whispering. He tells Woods there is a krait, a lethal snake, coiled on his chest; it crawled up his leg and across his body while he was lying on his back reading. Now he daren’t move. He’s been lying in an unmoving rictus of terror for hours.

Woods realises it’s an emergency, makes a couple of not very sensible suggestions, then phones Dr Ganderbai, a small Indian Hindu doctor, who comes right round. He brings some anti-venom serum and, after some thought, gets Woods to drive to his clinic and get some choloroform. Once it’s fetched, he rigs up a funnel and long flexible tube and spends fifteen or more minutes very carefully pushing it under the bedsheet to where Harry whispers that the krait is located. Then he pours the cold liquid down the tube so that it slowly spreads over Harry’s tummy, making the narrator, Woods, feel woozy.

The upshot is that after all the doctor’s scrupulous care, when he and the narrator slowly pull the sheet back, there is no snake! Maybe there never was one. As soon as this is confirmed Pope leaps up and dances with horror on the bed and starts ranting and raving. In his release from terror he abuses Dr Ganderbai in insulting racist language. The narrator tries to shut him up and then accompanies the poor abused doctor to his car and tries to apologise and say how much he appreciates all his efforts.

So there are two focuses of interest; for almost the entire story it’s the very tense situation with the supposed fatal snake which has a kind of horror/melodrama vibe; but right at the end it completely switches to being much more human and literary, as Dahl records Pope’s unforgivable racist rant against the doctor and Wood’s embarrassment and attempts to redress the balance by profusely thanking him. The last page where this happens seems like it comes from a different aesthetic and moral universe to everything which preceded it, and it has tremendous understated power.

Dip in the Pool (January 1952)

A gruesome black comedy. We’re aboard an ocean liner. Apparently, in the old days, they bet on what distance the ship would cover in the next 24 hour period. The captain gives his best guess and then gambling-minded passengers buy, at auction, a range of hours either longer or shorter than the captain’s prediction i.e. bet on whether the ship covers a greater or lesser distance than the captain predicted.

Mr William Bonibot is a small earnest American married to frequently cross and critical Ethel. He wants to impress her by returning from his cruise with a fortune. He wants to win the daily sailing auction so, in the middle of a storm, when the ship is forced to slow down, he buys the slowest speed, paying for it with his entire life savings of £200 (British currency on a British ship). The total pool which he stands to win is £2,100 or about $6,000.

Trouble is, the next day the sea is flat and calm and the ship picks up speed so Bonibot is set to lose his life savings. Into his head pops the mad idea of jumping overboard to delay the ship and win the auction.

When he goes up on deck to put his mad plan into action, there’s only one person on deck, an elderly woman. Good – he mustn’t be seen to be deliberately jumping overboard, but, on the other hand, he needs someone to raise the alarm.

It occurs to him that she might have poor eyesight or be deaf so he calls her, at which she a) turns and b) sees him and c) engages in a little conversation. Good. She can hear and see and talk, so she’ll report man overboard alright. So Bonibot takes his courage in his hands, steps onto the rail, shouts out HELP loudly to catch the woman’s attention, and jumps out and away from the ship.

She watches astonished as she sees a dressed man plummet into the ocean far below, his head reappearing after a few seconds in the ship’s wake. For a few seconds she has a little panic wondering what she’s meant to do, throw a lifebelt, run and fetch help, shout and yell. But it passes and she returns to leaning over the railing watching the tiny head dwindle into the distance and then disappear.

Some time later her minder appears, a hard-looking spinster. The elderly lady begins to explain that she saw a man jump off the ship but the spinster cuts across her, telling her not to talk such nonsense, also telling her she knows she’s not meant to go off alone without supervision, before leading her away by the hand.

Thus, in a few quick strokes, we realise that she is certainly not blind or deaf or mute as Bonibot ascertained. But he hadn’t bargained for a witness who was simple, touched in the head, not all there. And so the old lady and her minder walk away from the rail and both forget about Bonibot as if he’d never existed.

Obviously, considered rationally, the plot is ridiculous and contrived. But the feeling behind it is eminently believable, the sense of the teeth-gnashing frustration, the sense of the universe’s absolute indifference to us and our feeble plans, or, worse, that the universe is actively malevolent, teasing us and torturing us. These are childish feelings, suppressed but lurking beneath the rational adult, which Dahl’s gruesome tales reignite.

(Also, in the first part, the auction for speeds/times, Dahl conveys very well indeed the feverish, sweating excitement of real gambling, the white knuckles and small intense eyes. So these are stories designed to appeal to our irrational obsessive drives…)

Skin (May 1952)

Imagine one of the great modernist painters, living in an attic before he was famous, has a little celebration with his friend the tattooist, whose wife he fancies and paints over and over. Imagine the tattooist adores his work so much that, once they’re plastered, he suggests the artist paints a portrait of his wife on his back. In fact, why stop there? Why not get him to paint the portrait and then show him how to convert it into a tattoo?

That was back in 1913, the Paris atelier years, the early years. Then imagine that two world wars later, the old tattooist, long parted from his wife who died in the second war, is walking the streets of Paris, poor, shabby and hungry. And walks by an art gallery which is having a special private showing of an exhibition by the very same painter whose works are now worth millions. And he not only refuses to leave when politely asked to, but makes a scene, yelling how much he loved the artist and then tears his coat and shirt off and reduces the haute bourgeoisie to stunned silence, when they see the tattoo on his back, unmistakably by the master, and even signed by him.

So the artist is (the real-life artist) Chaim Soutine, the tattooist is named Drioli and now, in the present, he finds two men fighting over the work of art on his back. The gallery owner offers to pay him a fortune in exchange for which he’ll have Paris’s leading plastic surgeon cut the entire tattoo off his back and give him a skin graft to replace it. But standing behind Drioli is a tall suave man wearing lemon-yellow gloves.

This fellow claims to be the owner of the Hotel Bristol in Cannes and offers to keep Drioli in a life of luxury for the rest of his natural life – fancy food, private rooms, tailored suits, young women doing his nails – as long as, at the end of it, Drioli legally gifts him his back.

Yellow gloves wins. His offer to buy the starving old man roast duck and chambertin right now trumps all the old man’s reservations.

The story concludes with the information that just a few weeks later a dramatic new work by Soutine arrives on the market, slightly unusual portrait, stretched and varnished and framed, in Bueno Aires (i.e. far from the gallery incident). The narrator lugubriously comments that he hopes Drioli is safe and sound somewhere, being pampered in expensive suits. But the strong implication is that he isn’t. The implication is that he’s dead, murdered for the work of art on his back.

Regarding Soutine, I wrote a review of an exhibition of his paintings in 2017 at the Courtauld Gallery:

My Lady Love, My Dove (June 1952)

The story rotates around the hen-pecked character of the first-person narrator, Arthur Beauchamp, a short man who is bullied and hectored by his large, domineering wife, Pamela. The catch is he can’t leave or even criticise her because she’s rich, comes from a titled family, and he married her for her money. So he lives the life of Riley in a big house with orchards and full-time gardeners etc, tinkering with his precious butterfly collection, seething with barely suppressed discontent (like so many married couples in Dahl).

They have invited a couple, the Snapes (Henry and Sally), to come and stay although, in the way of the English upper-middle-classes – at least in stories like this – they cordially dislike and despise the couple and are wondering why the devil they invited them. It is, in fact, because the wife in particular is potty about bridge and the couple are the best bridge players they’ve ever met.

Anyway, out of nowhere the overbearing wife suggests, well, orders the husband eavesdrop on the couple by installing a microphone in their room. He makes loads of objections (it’s like spying through a keyhole) but she rather oddly replies that they’re both complete stinkers already and they might as well be honest about it.

So Arthur finds a microphone and a load of wiring (in his workshop), goes into the room where the visiting couple are due to stay, ponders a number of places to hide the microphone and settles on the sofa, slits the undercovering, fixes it in place, and begins laying the wiring under the carpet, to the door and out into the corridor.

As he goes through all these processes I was wondering two things: 1) if you bug a couple’s private room you are liable to hear things you didn’t want to, the obvious one is sexual byplay or actual sex; or, less prurient, people burping, farting or going to the loo; 2) the more likely outcomes, especially if you embed the mic in a sofa, is that it simply doesn’t work, is smothered, and doesn’t pick up anything.

The reason they’d invited this couple they despise is because they play a good game of bridge, which our couple are particularly keen on. There’s a bit of tension/excitement when the couple arrive, knocking on the front door before the narrator has finished laying the wire as unobtrusively as he can along the top of the skirting board from the guest room to the master bedroom, and it crossed my mind that this would be a funny outcome, that the guest couple spot the wire, find the mic, and then play up to the situation, concocting and acting out who knows what outrageous scenario to punish their sneaky hosts.

In the event none of these things happen. The invited couple settle in, unpack, dress for dinner, don’t notice the mystery wire, and they all have a very civilised dinner served by servants. Henry is tall and went to Eton and knows about wine. Arthur is attracted by the bright young wife but after a while begins to sense that she is slightly brow-beaten by her husband. Then they settle down for an evening of bridge, which is described in some detail. Long story short, the guests lose because the wife makes an unwise bid at the contract stage of the game.

Finally the game ends about midnight and everyone retires to bed. The narrator and his bossy wife gather round the loudspeaker connected to the microphone. And what they hear is…the couple transformed. The husband is livid with the wife for making that mistake which cost them making any profit on the evening. It turns out that they are using a complicated system of cheating whereby the precise tone of his voice and position of his fingers indicates precisely what cards he is holding so that the wife’s bidding can be exact. And this is because they make a living by cheating rich people at bridge. He reminds her they are playing different people every night the following week and insists that they stay up for a few hours now practicing till she has it off perfect, despite her tearful refusal.

And the story ends with Arthur’s domineering wife suddenly insisting that they devise a similar form of cheating, too, and drives him off to get a pack of cards, so they can start right now!

Lamb to the Slaughter (September 1953)

Maloney, a big senior policeman comes home to his loving wife, six months pregnant, who’s ready to do anything for him, pours him a Scotch with ice and prepares to make him dinner. That’s when he sits her down and tells her he’s leaving her. She gets up dazed and insists on going down to the freezer in the cellar to get a joint of something to cook for his dinner. The first thing that comes to hand is a leg of lamb frozen solid, which she carries back up from the cellar, walks into the front room where her husband is staring out of the window and brings it down on h is head with the force of an axe. He falls dead.

She wonders what to do then dresses and walks to the local grocer. Here she buys some peas, potatoes and nice cheesecake, making a big deal of describing cooking for her husband. In fact she does such a good job convincing herself of her normality that when she returns to the house and discovers her husband’s body, she is genuinely shocked and distraught.

In this state she calls the police who flock round (given that the dead man is one of them), question her, carry out forensic procedures, interview the neighbours and even the grocer who vouches for Mrs Maloney.

oney’s normality. They come to the conclusion (a bit stupidly) that Maloney was killed by a single blow to the head by person unknown.

Since they’re there, and Mrs Maloney is has cooked the joint and had put the vegetables on…she invites the detectives to eat the roast dinner. They hesitate and say it wouldn’t be respectful but she wins them round by saying it’s what her husband would have wanted. So eventually they all sit down at table and she serves up the very leg of lamb she used to murder her husband and the story ends with some of them wondering where the murder implement can have ended up…Probably right under their noses, one of them jokes, as he raises his fork of lamb to his mouth.

And the story ends with a quietly macabre note as Mary Maloney, in the kitchen, listens to the big strong clever men tucking into the lamb, and starts to giggle…

Nunc Dimittis (September 1953)

An exercise in a style quite different from anything else in the collection, this is a first-person narrative which is deliberately different from the practical, clear, Hemingway tone of ‘the Man from the South’ or ‘Poison’. Here’s the first sentence of ‘Poison’:

It must have been around midnight when I drove home, and as I approached the gates of the bungalow I switched off the headlamps of the car so the beam wouldn’t swing in through the window of the side bedroom and wake Harry Pope.

Quick, direct, to the point. Now here’s the opening of ‘Nunc Dimittis’:

It is nearly midnight, and I can see that if I don’t make a start with writing this story now, I never shall. All evening I have been sitting here trying to force myself to begin, but the more I have thought about it, the more appalled and ashamed and distressed I have become by the whole thing.

We are inside the fevered mind of Lionel Lampson. He is a wealthy middle-aged bachelor, art collector and all round connoisseur (cf the wine connoisseurship evinced by the narrator of ‘My Lady Love, My Dove’), ‘a person of some consequence in society’ (p.385).

One evening after a drinks party he accompanies short gossipy Gladys Ponsonby back to her place and she asks him in for a drink.

Obviously flirting, she starts off by telling him about the portrait hanging in her living room. She’s just had it done by the fashionable painter, John Royden. She explains that Royden has a special technique. He only does portraits of women (Society ladies) and he insists, by way of preparation, of painting them nude, so as to fully understand the frame, the scaffold, the chassis of the dressed person. First he paints them naked, then paints on the underwear, then paints on the final clothing. When Lampson goes up close to Gladys’s painting he sees this is true because the paint of her dress is significantly raised above the surface of the canvas.

Anyway, as she continues to drink freely Gladys becomes a bit malicious and tells Lionel that his (Lionel’s) young girlfriend, Janet de Pelagia is slagging him off behind his back. Specifically, Janet freely refers to him as that ‘crashing bore’ (p.382). Lionel is very upset and goes home crushed and depressed.

Next day he conceives his revenge (on Janet). He rings this painter, John Royden, gets him round and asks him to do an unusual commission. He’ll pay for a portrait of Janet de Pelagia but doesn’t want her to know. He wants Royden to bump into her at a party somewhere and exclaim that she has exactly the figure and face he wants to paint and he’ll do her for free. She’ll be flattered. Royden can do the portrait, exhibit it at the Royal Academy, safe in the knowledge that Lampson will pay full whack and buy it off him. Deal?

Deal. For a 5 foot by 3 foot full-length portrait. Now he has to be patient and, to pass the time, goes off on holiday to Italy for four months. He returns in July just as the Royal Academy Summer Exhibition is opening. Royden’s portrait of Janet has been much admired but the painter has refused to sell it. When the exhibition closes the portrait is delivered to Lampson’s house.

At this point he reveals the rather contrived fact that he is not only a connoisseur but a picture restorer complete with all the equipment. So now he sets about carefully rubbing the surface layer off to reveal Janet standing in her bra and corset and suspenders, the corset indicating how fat she is, and the surprising revelation that she’s noticeably bow-legged. As the narrator drolly comments, ‘One lives and learns’ (p.392).

This done, he invites a dozen or so of society’s upper crust (‘the most distinguished men, the most brilliant and influential women in the top crust of our society’) to an elite dinner at his place, service by candlelight so in deep gloom. As the meal is ending the candles have guttered right down, Lampson order his servant to turn on the electric lights which reveal… the portrait of Janet in her underwear, trussed and contained in her stays, legs bowed like a jockey’s. Lampson doesn’t loiter to see the effect but is exiting the room as the lights go on, just long enough to hear the uproar as the assembled guests catch sight of the portrait and, above all, the sight of Janet de Pelagia like someone who’s been shot through the heart and freezes for a moment before collapsing.

At that point Lampson flees his London home, getting his chauffeur to drive him to his country house to rejoice in his revenge. After a few days Gladys phones him and gleefully tells him how he is being criticised and ostracised for this beastly treatment of Janet, rejected by his entire social circle. She (Gladys) on the other hand is only too glad to come down to his country house and ‘comfort’ him i.e. sex. But Lampson is too upset and slams the phone down.

And this is where the narrative began, with Lampson fussily aware of having been ostracised by polite society and all his ‘friends’. And here’s where we come to the sting in the tail, though, which is he says he’s had a letter from Janet which completely forgives him, tells him she understands it was a joke, assures him she still loves him. And it was accompanied by a gift, a large jar of caviar, his favourite food which he has just wolfed down. And now…he is starting to feel a bit unwell, really rather ill…

So the story ends with the strong implication that the caviar was poisoned and the narrator is dying. Upper class bitchiness turned fatal.

Edward the Conqueror (October 1953)

Third person story about a middle-aged, middle-class couple, Edward and Louisa, living in a big house without kids. He’s gardening and has made a big fire when she goes out into the garden, calls him to lunch and spots a funny-looking cat by the fire. The cat follows them indoors and she gives it a bowl of milk. After lunch Louisa sits down to play some piano. She’s a fair pianist and goes through classical numbers by Schubert and the like but notices that when she plays a piece by famous Hungarian composer Franz Liszt (1811 to 1886), the cat suddenly sits up and becomes attentive. Slowly, carefully, Dahl describes a number of further incidents or details which convince Louisa that the cat is the reincarnation of Franz Liszt. It sounds bonkers writing it down in black and white which is precisely why you have to read the story and enter into the mindset of Louisa as she plays different pieces and notes the cat’s responses in ever-greater detail. She even pops out to the local library to borrow a book about reincarnation, some of which the story summarises.

Anyway, by the time her husband comes in from an arduous afternoon’s gardening, Louisa has convinced herself that the cat is the reincarnation of Franz Liszt and proceeds to tell her husband that she is going to invite the world’s leading composers to come and meet him! She also says she needs to cook him special food appropriate for such a genius and goes into the kitchen to make the cat her best soufflé.

When she returns to the living room the cat has gone and her husband is just coming back in from the garden, sweating a bit and acting suspiciously. When she looks closely she notices a raw scratch across his hand. He tries to persuade her that it was one of the beastly brambles he’s been clearing, but she, and the reader, know better. Without being told we know he’s done away with the wondercat.

Galloping Foxley (November 1953)

A very charged story with a twist in the very last line.

The narrator is a small-minded punctilious worker in the City of London named Perkins. A big deal is made of how much he loves commuting to work on exactly the same train every morning, the 8.12. He’s been doing it five days a week for 36 years. In fact he had composed a little memo about the pleasures of the day and its predictable routine when everything is disturbed by the arrival of a new man on the station platform, a bounder with oiled hair, a white silk scarf, and twirling a cane. Worst of all, the chap insists in getting into the same train carriage as Perkins and smoking a filthy pipe.

Not just once but several days in a row. And slowly Perkins realises that this fellow was the head of his house at public school, a beast named ‘Galloping’ Foxley, and this releases a flood of memories of how he was relentlessly bullied and beaten by this sadistic, taunting bully. The details of all the trivial transgressions he could beaten for and the experience of the beatings are dwelt on with excruciating vividness.

Eventually Perkins can bear it no longer and decides to confront his old bully, who has shown no flicker of recognition. It takes quite a bit of bravery to nerve himself to confront his old persecutor but one morning he politely leans forward and introduces himself, explaining that he was at Repton in 1907, expecting the bounder to agree that he, also, was at Repton, and then to recognise the poor little boy whose life he made a misery.

By this stage the reader, like the character, is quite wound up and tense and anxious about what will happen. But the twist is that the bounder with the pipe quite simply replies, ‘I’m glad to meet you, Mine’s Fortescue, Jocelyn Fortescue, Eton 1916.’

Perkins is completely, wildly mistaken about the other man’s identity. And all it has done is reveal just how very deeply wounded he was by his schoolboy experiences, and how little it takes to bring them all flooding back.

Neck (1953)

Weird and creepy. A rich bitch gets her come-uppance when she gets head stuck in a Henry Moore sculpture.

The first-person narrator is the writer of a daily column in an evening paper, presumably of society gossip for that is the subject of this story (p.449). It’s about a chap named Basil Turton who, when his father died, inherited the Turton Press which, for the purposes of the story, is a Fleet Street newspaper company. The point is that when he inherited the title and the fortune people like the author, Society gossips and commentators all drolly speculated who the lucky young woman would be who would bag this husband and his fortune. To everyone’s surprise it was a young beauty who swept in from the Continent, Natalia something from Yugoslavia or somewhere, and led young Turton up the altar before he realised what was going on.

Six years go by and Lady Turton now has her husband wrapped round her little finger, is running the newspaper and is a power in the land. The narrator finds himself seated next to her at a dinner and very off-handedly she invites him to come and stay at her country house, anytime. Being a gossip columnist the narrator leaps at the chance and motors down to this worthy pile, a great Tudor mansion with 47 bedrooms and an awesome garden, full of topiary and rather unexpected modern sculptures.

But something is very off. The creepy butler, Jelks, speaks about his own employer with a sneer and explains that instead of a tip (which is usual) he would like a third of the narrator’s winnings, which he thinks is both steep and forward.

At dinner it becomes obvious that the wife despises little Lord Turton, and has the bold dashing Major Haddock sat on one side of her and mannish, horsey Carmen La Rosa on the other. As in previous stories, we are in the world of upper-class bitchiness. When the table is brought to play cards Lady Turton cold shoulders her husband and insists on playing a four with Haddock, Carmen and the narrator. Around 11 she dismisses her husband and the butler and the narrator who goes to be thinking it’s a most unpleasant household.

Next morning the narrator comes down to find the butler serving Sir Basil breakfast, they get chatting, and after eating he takes our man on a grand tour of the amazing gardens. After some time they stop to sit on a bench by a carp pool and have a sensitive conversation about the history of the garden and the art pieces.

Then the narrator becomes aware of two figures some distance away, just about discernible as a man and a woman, presumably unpleasant Lady Turton and her lover Haddock. He and Sir Basil carry on chatting but in reality both are watching the progress of the couple who are gallivanting about the gardens then come to one of the Henry Moore sculptures.

Even from a distance it’s clear that they are mocking it, with the woman adopting ridiculous poses while the man photographs her and they both shriek with laughter, by implication mocking and belittling the taste of much-wronged Sir Basil. Eventually the woman sticks her head through one of the characteristic holes in the sculpture and the man takes a few more snaps before bending forward and obviously kissing her a few times. The narrator feels Sir Basil stiffen next to him. But then something goes wrong. She can’t get her head out of the hole. The man puts down his camera and tries to help her.

The charge of the story doesn’t come from the scenario itself but the uneasy way the narrator, very much an outsider and almost neglected guest, uneasily observes the reaction of Sir Basil to all this, obviously deeply hurt, trying to pass it off.

Eventually he says they probably ought to go down and help. They appear through an arch in the hedging and obviously surprise Natalia and Haddock, who quickly recovers and is all British, saying the lady needs help to get her head out of the hole. Sir Basil very calmly says are you asking me to cut a section out of my Henry Moore and his wife starts flinging filthy insults at him.

Out of nowhere appears the sly repellent butler, Jelks, appears out of nowhere and Sir Basil instructs him to fetch tools. And there follows the pregnant, powerful, disturbing climax of the story. For Jelks returns with an ax and a saw. As the narrator watches he sees Jelks very slightly proffer the axe which Sir Basil takes.

And then Dahl has the narrator very powerfully say that it’s like watching a child run out into the road just as a car rushes along, it’s like watching a car crash in slow motion, as Sir Basil takes the axe and he sees Lady Turton’s head helplessly caught in the hole of the sculpture and the narrator has such a vivid premonition of what will happen next that he closes his eyes. Obviously he, like all the other participants, suddenly realise that Sir Basil in his cold fury will behead his wife.

This possibility is imprinted in our minds for half a page and then the narrator opens his eyes and sees calm dignified Sir Basil reprimanding Jelks for handing him such a dangerous tool, and instead requesting the saw, before setting about the careful procedure of cutting his wife free.

But the narrator sees Lady Turton’s face has turned grey and she is opening and closing her mouth making a horrible gurgling sound. She had had the same premonition as everyone else, and had died in her imagination. And just visible on Sir Basil’s face the narrator sees two warm red spots on his cheeks at, at his eyes, the tiny wrinkles of a smile.

A fantastically weird and powerful story.

The Wish (1953)

Short hallucinatory story about a boy who has to cross the enormous carpet in the hall of his big country house, just sticking to the yellow parts of the pattern and avoiding like death the dark red and black patches. The way the story is situated entirely inside the mind of the terrified boy reminded me of the more psychotic of J.G. Ballard’s short stories, not the science fiction ones, the ones set in the contemporary world inside the minds of people going mad.

The soldier (1953)

And this is similar, a terrifying depiction of a soldier (as we know from the title) who has obviously been psychologically wrecked by the war and is experiencing extreme psychosis, hallucinating, convinced ‘they’ are changing all the fixtures of his house around when his back is turned, climaxing when he returns from walking the dog and appears in the bedroom of his sleeping wife holding a knife, demanding to know what she’s done with his wife.

Both of these stories depicting mental illness are effective but I think the subject as a whole has dated badly, with hundreds of other stories about psychotics exploding all over the 1960s and 70s till the topic became a cliché.

The Great Automatic Grammatizator (1953)

A gleeful satire on the whole business of writing.

Adolph Knipe is a lanky young fellow who invents a great automatic calculating machine, a computer which can do sums millions of times faster than any human, to the joy of his employer, Mr John Bohlen, head of a firm of electrical engineers.

But one morning he has a brainwave. If most human calculations can be broken down into smaller units which can be calculated automatically, could the same thing be done with language? Could a machine learn to break language down into its smallest components, and then build them up phrase by phrase, into sentences, paragraphs. He sets to work to build one.

His boss is sceptical until Knipe finally delivers it and explains the rationale: it can write stories. He has broken stories down into component parts (plot, setting, characters, excitement, romance etc) which the machine can now put together at the will of the programmer. In other words, it is a machine to automatically generate stories.

Dahl then sets about having gleeful boyish fun fleshing out the details of the machine, the backend fills an entire building with cables and valves and rods and levers and whatnot, and the front end is like an organ with a keyboard. You select the style of one of the popular magazines, an approach or treatment, a theme, the number of character and desired length, press all these buttons then keep your foot on the Passion Pedal and, within a few minutes, a full story is produced.

Knipe and Bohlen send the first few off to magazines and they are soon accepted. They set up a literary agency and cook up names of authors who they attribute the stories to but in reality they’re all being churned out by the machine.

Then they get ambitious and there’s comedy about Mr Bohlen’s first attempt to control the machine long enough to create a novel. He panics and puts the passion pedal to the floor with the result that the first attempt is far too rude to publish. Next time he exercises greater restraint, the novel is run off in fifteen minutes, sold to a publisher the same day, and becomes a runaway bestseller.

It’s sort of on a serious subject but the entire treatment reeks of Willy Wonka and the Chocolate Factory. In the middle there’s some satire about America, which was undergoing its great postwar boom and had become the world centre of consumer capitalism:

‘Nowadays, Mr Bohlen, the handmade article hasn’t a hope. It can’t possibly compete with mass-production, especially in this country you know that. Carpets… chairs… shoes… bricks… crockery… anything you like to mention they’re all made by machinery now. The quality may be inferior, but that doesn’t matter. It’s the cost of production that counts. And stories – well – they’re just another product, like carpets and chairs, and no one cares how you produce them so
long as you deliver the goods. We’ll sell them wholesale, Mr Bohlen! We’ll undercut every writer in the country! We’ll corner the market!’ (p.500)

The fact that is appears in what is more or less a children’s story suggests how inane and clichéd this level of criticism of consumer capitalism was even back in the 1950s.

Claud’s Dog (1953)

This is the umbrella title for four related tales which feature the character Claud Cubbage who lives in a filling station in Buckinghamshire.

The Ratcatcher

This is possibly the best ‘story’ in the book, for a number of reasons. Number one, it is not a ‘story’ at all, more an incident or anecdote. It just describes what happened when a rat-catcher was sent by the local council to the land next to the filling station (or petrol station) where the boy Claud lives and how the creepy rat-catcher proceeds to show them some tricks of the trade.

The power of it really comes from what a repulsive, physically repellent and creepy character the catcher is. For the first time, in these four stories, the physical presence of the characters becomes really central or dominant.

The man was lean and brown with a sharp face and two long sulphur-coloured teeth that protruded from the upper jaw, overlapping the lower lip, pressing it inward. The ears were thin and pointed and set far back on the head, near the nape of the neck. The eyes were almost black, but when they looked at you there was a flash of yellow somewhere inside them.

How they look, and how they sound:

‘Now, where’s them rats?’ The word “rats” came out of his mouth soft and throaty, with a rich fruity relish as though he were gargling with melted butter. ‘Let’s take a look at them rraats.’

And again:

His voice had the soft throaty sound of a croaking frog and he seemed to speak all his words with an immense wet-lipped relish, as though they tasted good on the tongue. The accent was similar to Claud’s, the broad soft accent of the Buckinghamshire countryside, but his voice was more throaty, the words more fruity in his mouth.

This is a child’s point of view. In adult fiction you tend to get one pen portrait of a character’s appearance and then their appearance, their physical presence, is forgotten about, because in adult fiction what counts is what they say and do, the matrix of dialogue and action and relationships which adults operate in. Unencumbered by all this complicated stuff, children notoriously notice first and foremost people’s appearances (and often, smell).

But the ‘grip’ of the story also comes from fantastic amount of information the catcher knows about rats, the creepy way he tells Claud and Gordon all about it, and then the uncanny way he actually produces rats from his pockets and proceeds to demonstrate gruesome tricks with them.

Rummins

Feels like an exercise in a certain aspect of Hemingway but without the logic.

Rummins is a mean dwarfish man who owns the farm opposite the filling station owned by Claud’s friend Gordon, who narrates this story. After the visit of the ratcatcher they mention the number of rats in the big hayrick he made last year to Rummins who, a few days later, turns up with his son, Bert, to dismantle it.

The narrator’s memory goes back to the previous summer, to a sweltering day in June when they’d built the big hayrick, himself, Claud, Rummins and his son Bert, Wilson the soldier and Ole Tommy. There’s a bit of Ole Tommy’s backstory, how he was chosen by the council to supervise the kids’ playground. Now he helps out on this day and when they stop for lunch turns out to have brought no food but six pint bottles of beer which he generously hands round. After a while the narrator goes back to his filling station to serve customers and when he comes back the hayrick is more or less built but Ole Tommy’s disappeared, leaving his bag behind which is unlike him. When asked, stumpy little Rummins shrugs and says he must have gone home.

That was all a flashback to last summer. The story cuts back to the present and the narrator and Claud are helping Rummins and Bert dismantle the hayrick in part to get rid of all the rats it’s hiding. Up on top of the rick, Bert is cutting through the string and then the hay itself to create chunks, like a cake, which he peels away down to his dad who loads them into a cart.

At one point the big knife he’s using encounters an obstruction. This is where things turn very weird. the narrator becomes aware that Rummins is scared. Bert is puzzled at meeting something hard in what’s meant to be a building of straw. It’s at this moment the narrator has his flashback to the hot summer’s day when they built it.

Rummins yells at his son to persist and cut through the obstacle which he does. Then he cuts the other angles of the straw and dislodges a segment to fall to the ground for his dad. But when he steps back he sees what has been revealed by his work. The narrator describes all this in a moment which has become supercharged with horror. He describes Rummins jumping down off the rick and running for his farm, just as Bert starts to scream. That’s it, the end.

Now there’s no denying the intensity of the story and the luminous details Dahl picks out to really make it come alive, all the way through, in all aspects. The only problem is it doesn’t make sense. Is he saying Rummins for some reason murdered Ole Tommy? Why on earth do that, and there would be no opportunity because the soldier Wilson was working on the rick. But anyway, why? Is he saying Rummins murdered Ole Tommy and placed his body high up in the rick? No way he could have done that without anyone noticing, not least his own son. And if Bert was in on it, how come he is staggered to screaming pitch when he’s seen what he’s cut through (presumably Ole Tommy’s corpse). Above all, if Rummy knows the body is there, why on earth does he let his son go up and start slicing up the rick, and why does he tell him to persist when he encounters the obstacle? Maybe I’m missing something but none of it makes any sense. Which doesn’t stop it, nonetheless, being eerie and intense.

Mr. Hoddy

Claud is taken by his girlfriend, Clarice, to meet her father, the self-important village grocer’s assistant, Mr Hoddy, with a view to asking him for her hand in marriage. Mr Hoddy persists in wanting to know what Claud’s plans are. Claud despises Mr Hoddy and all the small-minded men of his ilk, and would really like to come clean and explain that he and and friend are planning to pull a con involving two identical-looking greyhounds, but of course he can’t. Instead he makes up on the spot a ridiculous scheme about setting up a maggot factory, insisting despite Mr Hoddy’s scepticism that there’s a massive market for maggots among anglers and the like, and how his factory would mass produce them in old oil drums full of rotting meat before packing them into glass bottles and posting them to subscribers.

So carried away does Claud become that he doesn’t notice the look on Mr Hoddy’s face until it’s too late, realises he’s gone too far – although I wasn’t sure whether this was because Hoddy, as a greengrocer, was disgusted by the notion of maggots and took it as a sly insult to his trade (i.e. dealing in fresh, unmaggoty fruit and veg); or whether Hoddy at some point realises Claud is making it all up and the realisation makes him furious.

Mr Feasey

A really gripping tale, by far the longest of the lot, in which Claud and his partner Gordon (owner of the filling station) concoct and bring to fruition their plan to fiddle a dog race. Claud has acquired two whippets, both identical in shape and colouring. One is slow, one is fast. The plan is to take the slow one to a country dog race, and enter him there for a string of races in which he will predictably come last then, once his identity is established and the odds are long, to make heavy bets on him (small best across all 17 bookies at the race) at long odds, and then enter the superfast dog for this race, thus winning all the bests at long odds.

The story is so long because it contains an immense amount of lore about how dog owners cheat, a quite staggering range of fixes which make dogs slow or fast, and all the ways to fix the races. The effect of all this lore and the intense anxiousness of Gordon and Claud as they lock up the garage and drive to the pivotal race is to have the reader on absolute tenterhooks as to the outcome.

Thoughts

Vivid

Obviously the core of a story is the plot, the series of events. And the ability to handle dialogue convincingly over long stretches is important. But what makes Dahl’s stories so effective, for me, is the tremendous limpidity and clarity of the prose and the completeness with which he describes the actions he describes. He describes them fully and pedantically so you can feel yourself doing them, whether it’s teetering on the railings of an ocean liner or hurriedly laying a cable along a corridor, you can feel yourself doing it. Amazingly vivid.

Height

How many of Dahl’s rather pathetic male characters are short. He is always very aware of height. The painter John Royden is a small neat man (p.385). The purser is small and fat and red (p.298). The owner of the art gallery is plump and short (p.327). Basil Turton is ‘a little chap’, ‘a small man’ (p.446). Adolph Knipe’s boss, Mr Bohlen, is ‘a fat little man’ (p.510). Rummins is ‘short and squat like a frog’ (p.537). When his big wife leans over him, Arthur Beaufort feels surrounded, almost enveloped by her:

as though she were a great tub of cream and I’d fallen in. (p.341)

Gladys Ponsonby is so short that she gives Lionel Lampson, looming over her:

the comic, wobbly feeling that I am standing on a chair. (p.372)

One imagines that, at 6 foot 6, Dahl had that feeling when standing next to more or less anybody.

Gambling

The intense sweaty thrill of it, as in ‘Man from the South’, ‘Taste’ and ‘Dip in the Pool’, the central subject of his novella ‘The Wonderful Story of Henry Sugar’, the competitive bridge in ‘My Lady Love, My Dove’, the game of bridge in ‘Nunc Dimittis’. Gambling is a central obsession of Dahl’s.

Class and 50s manners

Some of these characters are very nobby (Arthur Beaufort’s wife from a titled family and their guest was educated at Eton), Lionel Lampson moves in titled circles, the narrator of ‘Neck’ is a High Society gossip columnist. I think there are two aspects of this: 1) There’s an element of voyeurism in witnessing the bitchiness, spite and malevolence of posh, upper class people. It has an extra relish, for some reason. 2) It points to a broader truth which is how very dated all the stories feel.

They’re set in the early to mid-1950s, still very much in the backwash of the war, waaaay before the doors were blown off conventional morality in the 1960s. My point being that several of the scenes only make sense in a milieu of upper-class gentility which has all but vanished today. For example, the eavesdropping on a young couple would surely, nowadays, need something salacious to make it really hit home, whereas for Dahl and his audience, the most shocking thing he could imagine was their being card cheats! Similarly, the society lady who is revealed in her underwear leads to scandal and murder in ‘Nunc Dimittis’ but would barely wake anybody up in the 1990s of paparazzi and Wonderbras, and we’re 30 years beyond even that now, into Naked Attraction and Love Island, a world of plastic surgery and male depilation.

The mating game

Amazing how the simple process of human beings seeking the perfect mate, pairing off, reproducing and then trying to put up with each other for the rest of our lives, is at the heart of so much fiction – as an evolutionary interpretation of literature would expect.

Mind you, having just written that down makes you realise how few of them are actually love stories  at all, in fact most of them are ‘out of love’ stories about the frictions and resentments of long-married couples – ‘Taste’, ‘A Dip in the Pool’, ‘Lamb to the Slaughter’, ‘My Lady Love, My Dove’, ‘Edward the Conqueror’, ‘Nunc Dimittis’.

And, oddly for a man who became really famous for his children’s stories, there are no children in any of them, apart from the distinctly unchildish ‘The Wish’. Although, despite the ostensible subjects often being cruel or macabre, there is something profoundly childish about the simple glee and vengefulness of many of them. They’re obviously not children’s stories and yet they’re not quite, totally, for adults either…


Credit

References are to the versions of the stories published in Roald Dahl: The Complete Short Stories Volume Two published by Penguin in 2013.

Related links

Roald Dahl reviews

Freud on art and literature

Note: to avoid misunderstanding, I believe Freud is a figure of huge cultural and historical importance, and I sympathise with his project of trying to devise a completely secular psychology building on Darwinian premises. Many of his ideas about sexuality as a central motive force, about the role of the unconscious in every aspect of mental life, how repressing instinctual drives can lie behind certain types of mental illness, his development of the talking cure, these and numerous other ideas have become part of the culture and underlie the way many people live and think about themselves today. However, I strongly disapprove of Freud’s gender stereotyping of men and women, his systematic sexism, his occasional slurs against gays, lesbian or bisexuals and so on. Despite the revolutionary impact of his thought, Freud carried a lot of Victorian assumptions into his theory. He left a huge and complicated legacy which needs to be examined and picked through with care. My aim in these reviews is not to endorse his opinions but to summarise his writings, adding my own thoughts and comments as they arise.

***

In the realm of fiction we find the plurality of lives which we need.
(Thoughts on War and Death, Pelican Freud Library volume 12, page 79)

Introduction

Volume 14 of the Freud Pelican Library pulls together all of Sigmund Freud’s essays on art and literature.

From my point of view, as a one-time student of literature, one of the most obvious things about all Freud’s writings, even the most ostensibly ‘scientific’, is that he relies far more on forms of literature – novels, folk tales, plays or writers’ lives – than on scientific data, data from studies or experiments, to support and elaborate his theories.

In my day job I do web analytics, cross-referencing quantitative data from various sources, crunching numbers, using formulae in spreadsheets, and assigning numerical values to qualitative data so that it, too, can be analysed in numerical terms, converted into tables of data or graphical representation, analysed for trends, supplying evidence for conclusions, decisions and so on.

So far as I can tell, none of this is present at all in Freud’s writings. A handful of diagrams exist, scattered sparsely through the complete works to indicate the relationship of superego, ego and id, or representing the transformation mechanisms of wishes which take place when they’re converted into dream images, repressed, go on to form the basis of compromise formations, and so on. But most of Freud is void of the kind of data and statistics I associate with scientific writing or analysis.

Instead Freud relies very heavily indeed on works of fiction and literature, folk tales and fairy tales, the myths and legends of Greece and Rome, anecdotes and incidents in the lives of great writers or artists (Goethe, Leonardo).

Right from the start Freud’s writings provided a new model for literary, artistic and biographical interpretation and so it’s no surprise that psychoanalytical theory caught on very quickly in the artistic and literary communities, and then spread to the academic teaching of literature and art where it thrives, through various reversionings and rewritings (Lacan, feminist theory) to this day.

It’s probably too simplistic to say psychoanalysis was never a serious scientific endeavour; but seems fair to say that, in Freud’s hands, it was always an extremely literary one.

What follows is my notes on some, not all, of the essays contained in Volume 14 of the Freud Pelican Library.

1. Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s ‘Gradiva’ (1907)

It was Jung, a recent convert to psychoanalysis, who brought this novel, Gradiva, by the German novelist Wilhelm Jensen, published 1903, to Freud’s attention. It is the story of an archaeologist, Norbert Hanold, who comes across an ancient bas-relief of a girl who is walking with a distinctive high-footed step. He names her ‘Gradiva’, which is Latin for ‘light-tripping’, and becomes obsessed with the image.

Cast relief of ‘Gradiva’​ (​1908​), which, as a result of Freud’s essay on the novel, he bought and hung on his study wall

It comes into Hanold’s head that the relief is from Pompeii and that he will somehow meet the girl who is the model for it if he goes there. So off to Pompeii he goes and, one summer day, walking among the ruins, comes across an apparition, a hallucination, of the self-same girl!

They talk briefly and then she disappears among the ruins but not before displaying the unique walk depicted in the frieze. A second time he meets her and their talk clears his muddled mind. Over subsequent meetings and conversations it becomes clear that she is the girl who lives across the road from him in Berlin, named Zoe Bertgang, and whom he loved playing with as a boy.

What happened is that, at puberty, Hanold became obsessed with archaeology and, in his pursuit of it, rejected normal social activity, including with the opposite sex. He repressed and forgot his childhood love for Zoe, redirecting his energies, sublimating them, into an abstract love of Science. But, despite the best efforts, the repressed material returned, but in a garbled censored form, as his irrational unaccountable obsession with this carving.

Over the course of their meetings, Zoe slowly pulls him out of what is clearly some kind of nervous breakdown, eliminating all the voodoo and hallucinatory significances which he had accumulated around the relief; makes him realise she is just an ordinary girl, but one he has continued to be in love with.

Through her long and patient conversations, through talking through his odd symptoms and obsessions, he is slowly returned to ‘normality’, ‘reality’, and to a conventional loving relationship with a young woman. And so they get engaged.

This novel could almost have been written expressly to allow Freud to deploy his favourite themes. For a start it contains many of Hanold’s, dreams which Freud elaborately decodes, thus reaffirming the doctrine that dreams are ‘the royal road to the unconscious’. Confirming the theories put forward in The Interpretation of Dreams that during sleep the censorship of feelings and complexes which are rigorously repressed during conscious waking life, is relaxed, allowing deep wishes to enter the mind, albeit displaced and distorted into often fantastical imagery.

It allows Freud to reiterate his theory that the mind is comprised of two equal and opposite forces which are continually in conflict – the Pleasure Principle which wants, wishes and fantasises about our deepest desires coming true, sometimes in dreams, sometimes in daydreams or fantasies, sometimes in neurotic symptoms and mental disturbances – because it is continually struggling to get past the repressing force of the Reality Principle.

Dreams, like the symptoms of the neurotic and obsessive patients Freud had been treating since the 1980s, are compromises between these two forces. Thus the hero of the novel, Norbert Hanold, is a timid man whose profession of archaeologist has cut him off from the flesh and blood world of real men and women.

This division between imagination and intellect destined him to become an artist or a neurotic; he was one of those whose kingdom was not of this world.

But, in Freudian theory, the unconscious wishes often return from the place where they are most repressed, at the point of maximum defence. Hence it was precisely – and only – from the dry-as-dust, academic world of archaeology, where he had fled from the real world, that the repressed feelings could return in the form of a two thousand year-old relief – that Hanold’s real passion for the flesh-and-blood girl who lives across the road, can emerge.

There is a kind of forgetting which is distinguished by the difficulty with which the memory is awakened even by a powerful external summons, as though some internal resistance were struggling against its revival. A forgetting of this type has been given the name of repression in psychopathology.

Norbert seeks for Gradiva in Pompeii, driven there by increasingly delusive fantasies. Freud explains these as the last desperate attempts of the Censor to flee the unconscious wish to sexually possess the girl he has loved since his childhood, but, fearing her sexuality, fearing his own untrammeled sexuality, has blocked, repressed and sublimated into a love for his passionless, ‘scientific’ profession’, archaeology. The repressed always returns. You can run but you can’t hide.

It is an event of daily occurrence for a person – even a healthy person – to deceive himself over the motives for an action and to become conscious of them only after the event…

[Hanold]’s flight to Pompeii was a result of his resistance gathering new strength after the surge forward of his erotic desires in the dreams [Norbert is plagued by obscure passionate dreams which Freud analyses as sex-dreams]. It was an attempt at flight from the physical presence of the girl he loved. In a practical sense, it meant a victory for repression…

Except that it is precisely in Pompeii, with a kind of dreamy, Expressionistic logic, that Hanold runs into the very girl he’s gone all that way to escape, and who initially presents herself as the living incarnation of the 2,000 year-old relief.

Only slowly does the truth dawn on Norbert (and the reader) and his secret desires become revealed to him, even as he slowly realises this is a real flesh-and-blood girl and not some spirit, a girl who reveals her name to be Zoe, Greek for ‘life’.

The entire novel turns, in Freud’s hands, into another one of his case studies: Hanold is an obsessive neurotic suffering from bad dreams and delusions; Zoe is in the unique position of being both his repressed love-object and his psychoanalyst. She practises the ultimate ‘cure through love’ by tenderly returning Hanold to a correct understanding of Reality, of who he is, who she is, and the true nature of his feelings for her.

How was Hanold able to go along in the grip of his powerful delusions for so long?

It is explained by the ease with which our intellect is prepared to accept something absurd provided it satisfies powerful emotional impulses

After all, Freud writes, in one of the many, many comparisons with religious beliefs and ways of thinking which litter his writings:

It must be remembered too that the belief in spirits and ghosts and the return of the dead which finds so much support in the religions to which we have all been attached, at least in our childhood, is far from having disappeared among educated people, and that many who are sensible in other respects find it possible to combine spiritualism with reason.

The Gradiva story allows Freud to elaborate on the link between but contrast between belief and delusion:

If a patient believes in his delusion so firmly, this is not because his faculty of judgement has been overturned and does not arise from what is false in the delusion. On the contrary there is a grain of truth concealed in every delusion, there is something in it which really deserves belief, and this is the source of the patient’s conviction, which is therefore to this extent justified.

This true element, however, has long been repressed. If eventually it is able to penetrate into consciousness, this time in a distorted form, the sense of conviction attaching to it is overintensified as though by way of compensation and is now attached to the distorted substitute for the repressed truth, and protects it from any critical attacks.

The conviction is displaced, as it were, from the unconscious truth on to the conscious error that is linked to it, and remains fixated there precisely as a result of this displacement.

The method described here whereby conviction arises in the case of a delusion does not differ fundamentally from the method by which a conviction is formed in normal cases. We all attach our conviction to thought-contents in which truth is combined with error and let it extend from the former over into the latter. It becomes diffused, as it were, from the original truth over onto the error associated with it, and protects the latter.

So in Gravida the dry, repressed Norbert is awakened from his dream-delusion of worship for a stone relief he has named Gradiva, into the reality of his long-lost childhood love for the flesh-and-blood woman Zoe:

The process of cure is accomplished in a relapse into love, if we combine all the many components of the sexual instinct under the term ‘love’; and such a relapse is indispensable, for the symptoms on account of which the treatment has been undertaken are nothing other than the precipitates of earlier struggles connected with repression or the return of the repressed, and they can only be resolved and washed away by a fresh high tide of the same passions. Every psychoanalytic treatment is an attempt at liberating repressed love which has found a meagre outlet in the compromise of a symptom.

So influential was Freud’s essay on Gradiva as suggesting and exemplifying a whole new way of reading and thinking about literature, that it became a cult, many of the early psychoanalysts carried round small models of the Gradiva relief and Freud had a full-scale replica hanging in his office (still viewable at the Freud Museum).

2. Psychopathic stage characters (1906)

Art allows for the vicarious participation of the spectator. When we read a poem we feel spiritually richer, subtler, nobler than we are. When we watch a play we escape from the confines of our dull cramped lives into a heroic career, defying the gods and doing great deeds. The work of art allows the spectator an increase, a raising of psychic power.

Lyric poetry serves the purpose of giving vent to intense feelings of many sorts – just as was once the case with dancing. Epic poetry aims chiefly at making it possible to feel the enjoyment of a great heroic character in his hour of triumph. But drama seeks to explore emotional possibilities more deeply and to give an enjoyable shape even to forebodings of misfortune; for this reason it depicts the hero in his struggles and, with masochistic satisfaction, in his defeats.

For Freud, crucially, human nature is based on rebellion:

[Drama] appeases, as it were, a rising rebellion against the divine regulation of the universe, which is responsible for the existence of suffering. Heroes are first and foremost rebels against God or against something divine.

We like to watch the hero rise, as a thrilling personification of the resentment we all feel against the limitations of Fate – and then to fall, after a brief heroic career, because their fall restores order and justifies our own craven supineness in relation to the world.

Freud likes the Greek dramatists because they openly understood and acknowledged the power of this: life is a tragic rebellion against Fate. The Greek view of life, essentially tragic – from Homer to Aeschylus – contrasted with the essentially rounded, optimistic view of the theisms, Judaism and Christianity, in which suffering may be pushed to its limit – Job, Jesus – but brings with its new understanding and even salvation.

Christianity takes an essentially comic, non-tragic view of the world; Jesus came to save us, to fulfil the Law, and in his torture, crucifixion and death we partake of a Divine Comedy of despair and renewal. With his resurrection the circle is complete. But there is no renewal in Greek tragedy. Neither Oedipus nor Thebes are renewed or improved.

The two worldviews deal with the same subject matter, and overlap in the middle, but from fundamentally opposed viewpoints.

Freud likes the Greeks because of their acknowledgment of the tragic fate of man: his later writings are loaded with references to Ananke and Logos, the twin gods of Necessity and Reason by which we must lead our lives.

Freud dislikes Christianity because it sets out to conceal this truth, to offer redemption, eternal life, Heaven, the punishment of the guilty and the salvation of the Good. It offers all the infantile compensations and illusions he associates with the weakest of his patients. It is intellectually and emotionally dishonest. It says the greatest strength is in submission to the Will of God, turning the other cheek, loving your neighbour as yourself.

As a good Darwinian Freud acknowledges that these standards may be morally admirable but, alas, unattainable for most, if not all of us mortals. In his view Christianity forced its adherents into guilt-ridden misery or to blatant hypocrisy. (Interestingly, it was actually Jung who, in their correspondence, called the Church ‘the Misery Institute’.)

Freud moves on to outline an interesting declension in the subject matter of drama:

Greek tragedy must be an event involving conflict and it must include an effort of will together with resistance. This precondition finds its first and grandest fulfilment in the struggle against divinity. A tragedy of this sort is one of rebellion, in which the dramatist and the audience takes the side of the rebel.

The less belief there comes to be in divinity, the more important becomes the human regulation of affairs; and it is this which, with increasing insight, comes to be held responsible for suffering. Thus the hero’s next struggle is against human society and here we have the class of social tragedies.

Yet another fulfilment of the necessary precondition is to be found in a struggle between individual men. Such are tragedies of character which display all the excitement of a conflict and are best played out between outstanding characters who have freed themselves from the bond of human institutions….

After religious drama, social drama and the drama of character we can follow the course of drama into the realm of psychological drama. Here the struggle that causes the suffering is fought out in the hero’s mind itself – a struggle between different impulses which have their end not in the extermination of the hero but in the victory of one of the impulses; it must end, that is to say, in renunciation…

For the progression religious drama, social drama, drama of character and psychological drama comes to a conclusion with psychopathological drama, hence the title of the essay. Psychological drama is where the protagonist struggles in his mind with conflicting goals, desires, often his personal love clashing with social values etc. Psychopathological drama is one step further, where the conflict takes place within the hero’s mind, but one side or aspect or impulse is repressed. It is the drama of the repressed motive, in which the protagonist demonstrates the symptoms Freud had written about in neurotic, namely that they are in the grip of fierce compulsions or anxieties but don’t know why.

The first of these modern dramas is Hamlet in which a man who has hitherto been normal becomes neurotic owing to the peculiar nature of the task by which he is faced, a man, that is, in whom an impulse that has been hitherto successfully repressed endeavours to make its way into action [the Oedipus impulse].

The essay repeats the interpretation Freud first gave of Hamlet in The Interpretation of Dreams, namely that the reason for Hamlet’s long delay in carrying out vengeance against his uncle is because his uncle has acted out Hamlet’s Oedipal dream – he has murdered his (Hamlet’s) father and bedded his (Hamlet’s) mother. This is the deep sexual fantasy which Freud posits at the core of the development of small boys and labelled the Oedipus complex, and Claudius has done it for Hamlet; he has lived out Hamlet’s deeply repressed Oedipal fantasy, and this is why Hamlet can’t bring himself to carry out the revenge on his uncle which his conscious mind knows to be just and demanded by social convention: it’s because his uncle has carried out Hamlet’s repressed Oedipal fantasy so completely as to have become Hamlet, on the voodoo level of the unconscious to be Hamlet. To kill his uncle would be to kill the oldest, most deeply felt, most deeply part of his childhood fantasy. And so he can’t do it.

I studied Hamlet at A-level and so know it well and know that Freud’s interpretation, although it initially sounds cranky and quite a bit too simplistic and glib – still, it’s one of the cleverest and most compelling interpretations ever made of the play.

Anyway, in this theoretical category of psychopathological drama, the appeal to the audience is that they, too, understand, if dimly, the unexpressed, repressed material which the protagonist is battling with. If in the tragic drama of the ancients the hero battles against the gods, at this other end of the spectrum, in modern psychopathological drama, the hero fights against the unexpressed, unexpressible, repressed wishes, urges, desires, buried beyond recall in his own unconscious.

3. Creative writers and daydreams (1907)

In this notorious essay Freud tries to psychoanalyse the foundation of creative writing but he’s notably hesitant. It’s a big subject and easy to look foolish next to professional critics and scholars. Hence Freud emphasises that he is only dealing with the writers of romances and thrillers i.e. anything with a simple hero or heroine or, to put it another way, which are simple enough for his psychoanalytical interpretation to be easily applied.

So: A piece of creative writing is a continuation into adulthood of childhood play. (The English reader may be reminded of Coleridge’s comment that the True Poet, as exemplified by his friend Wordsworth, is one who carries the perceptions of childhood into the strength of maturity.)

A piece of creative writing, like a day-dream, is a continuation of, and a substitute for, what was once the play of childhood.

Children play by recombining elements of the outside world into forms and narratives which suit their needs. As we grow up we stop overtly playing but Freud suggests that we never give up a pleasure once experienced and so we replace physically real playing with a non-physical, purely psychical equivalent, namely fantasising.

Childhood play is public and open but most people fantasise in private, in fact they’re more willing to admit to doing wrong than to confessing their fantasies. The child more often than not wants to be ‘grown up’; whereas many adults’ fantasies are childish in content or expression.

Now Freud steps up a gear and begins to treat fantasies as if they were dreams, in that he insists that ‘every single fantasy is the fulfilment of a wish, a correction of unsatisfying reality’. Each fantasy refers back to a childhood wish, attaches it to images or experiences in the present, and projects it into a future where it is fulfilled.

A work of art gathers its creative strength from the power of childhood recollections, for example Gradiva, centred on dreams and delusions powered by childhood erotic experiences.

At about this point it becomes clear that these ‘fantasies’ have a very similar structure to the dreams which Freud devoted such vast effort to interpreting in his book of the same title. Which is why everyday language in its wisdom also calls fantasies ‘day dreams’. So ‘day’ dreams and ‘night’ dreams are very similar in using imagery provide by the events of the day to ‘front up’ unexpressed, often repressed wishes.

Thoughts

The big flaw in this theory is, How do you deal with the fact that most of the literature of the ancients and of the Middle Ages consists of recycled stories, metaphors, even repeated lines i.e. are not the packaging of anyone’s childhood recollections but traditional narratives?

Freud says:

  1. the artist still makes decisions about how to order his material and these decisions are susceptible to psychoanalysis
  2. folk tales and myths i.e. recurrent stories, may themselves be seen as the wishful fantasies or the distorted childhood reminiscences of entire nations and peoples and be psychoanalysed accordingly

(Regarding the origin of myths, in a letter to his confidant Wilhelm Fliess, in 1897, Freud had written: ‘Can you imagine what endopsychic myths are? They are the offspring of my mental labours. The dim inner perception of one’s own psychical apparatus stimulates illusions of thought, which are naturally projected outwards and characteristically onto the future and the world beyond. Immortality, retribution, life after death, are all reflections of our inner psyche… psychomythology.)

The ‘voyeuristic theory’ outlined by Freud in Psychopathic Stage Characters, and this essay, would say the libidinal satisfaction to be achieved through watching or reading the literary work remains the same – the vested interest of the reader\spectator in vicariously rising above their dull every day lives – regardless of formal considerations. But there’s still a substantial objection which is, Why do we prefer some versions of a traditional story over others?

Freud is forced to concede the existence of a ‘purely formal – that is, aesthetic – yield of pleasure’ about which psychoanalysis can say little in itself.

The writer softens the character of his egoistic daydreams by altering and disguising it, and he bribes us by the purely formal – that is, aesthetic – yield of pleasure which he offers us in the presentation of his phantasies. We give the name of fore-pleasure to a yield of pleasure such as this which is offered to us so as to make possible the release of still greater pleasure arising from deeper psychic sources.

In my opinion all the aesthetic pleasure which a creative writer affords us has the character of a fore-pleasure of this kind, and our actual enjoyment of an imaginative work proceeds from a liberation of tensions in our minds.

Thus he has divided literary pleasure into two parts:

  • fore-pleasure ‘of a purely formal kind’, ‘aesthetics’
  • the deeper pleasure of psychic release, the cathartic release of libidinal energy

This is very similar in structure to his theory of jokes (as laid out in the 1905 work ‘Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious’). In this aesthetic, formal fore-pleasure – the structure of a limerick, the shape of a joke – is a pretext for the joke’s real work – the release of frustration, pent-up pressure, libido.

Critics argue that claiming the core purpose of art to be libidinal release – if the basic point of all art is some kind of psychosexual release – fails to acknowledge that the main thing people talk about when they discuss art or plays or books, the plot and characters and language, are secondary ‘aesthetic’ aspects. It is precisely the artfulness, the creative use the writer makes of traditional material, which is of interest to the critic and to the informed reader, upon which we judge the author, and it is this very artfulness which Freud’s theory leaves untouched. Which is to say that Freudianism has little to do with pure literary criticism.

Freudian defenders would reply that psychoanalysis helps the critic to elucidate and clarify the patterns of symbolism and imagery, the obsessions and ideas, which are crafted into the work of art. This clearly applies most to modern artists who think they have a personal psychopathology to clarify (unlike, say, Chaucer or Shakespeare, who focused on reworking their traditional material).

In practice, literary critics, undergraduates and graduate students by the millions have, since the publication of this essay, gone on to apply Freudian interpretations to every work of art or literature ever created, precisely be applying Freudian decoding to the formal elements of narratives which Freud himself, in his own essays, largely overlooked.

4. Leonardo da Vinci and a memory of his childhood (1910)

Leonardo could never finish anything. Freud says this was because he was illegitimate i.e. abandoned by his rich father and left with his peasant mother for years. This prompted two things: a sublime sense of the total possession of his mother without the rivalry of Daddy which is captured in his best art, for example the Mona Lisa; and a restless curiosity about where he came from.

These latter childhood sexual enquiries were sublimated into his scientific work, into his wonderful studies of Nature and its workings. But also explains why ,whenever he tried to do a painting, he ended up trying to solve all the technical problems it raised, and these problems raised others, and so on.

A good example is his trying to devise a way of doing frescoes with oil. It was his botched technical experiments in this medium which means the famous Last Supper has slowly fallen to pieces.

Observation of men’s daily lives shows us that most people succeed in directing very considerable portions of their sexual instinctual forces to their professional activity. The sexual instinct is particularly well-fitted to make contributions of this kind since it is endowed with a capacity for sublimation: that is, it has the power to replace its immediate aim by other aims which may be valued more highly and which are not sexual.

Freud turns Leonardo into a paradigmatic homosexual: a boy abandoned by his father and left too long under the influence of his mother who, in repressing his love for his mother, takes her part, introjects her into his psyche, identifies wholly with her and comes to look upon love-objects as his mother would i.e. looks for young boys whom he can love as his mother loved him. In a sense a return to auto-eroticism or narcissism.

Freud then uses his theory of Leonardo’s homosexuality to interpret the later figures in his paintings (for example, John the Baptist) as triumphs of androgyny, reconciling the male and female principles in a smile of blissful self-satisfaction.

Freud speculates that Mona Lisa re-awakened in Leonardo the memory of his single mother, hence the ineffable mystery of her smile – and Leonardo’s inability to finish the painting, which was never delivered to the patron, Mona’s husband, and so he ended up taking to the French court, where it was bought by King Francis I which is why it ended up hanging in the Louvre.

So Leonardo’s actual artistic technique, the extraordinary skill which produced the Mona Lisa smile, is merely a fore-pleasure, a pretext, a tool to draw us into what Freud sees as the real purpose of art, the libidinal release, in this case drawing us into sharing the same infantile memory of erotic bliss, of total possession of mummy, that Leonardo was expressing.

At the heart of this long essay is a dream Leonardo recorded in a notebook.

Leonardo dreamed that a vulture came into his room when he was a child and stuck its tail into his mouth. Freud says Leonardo would have known that the vulture was the Egyptian hieroglyph for ‘Mother’ and so the dream represents a deep memory of his infantile happiness at the total possession of his Mummy.

The only problem with this, as Peter Gay and the editors of the Freud Library point out, is that the word ‘vulture’ is a mistranslation in the edition of Leonardo’s notebooks which Freud read; the original Italian word means kite, a completely different kind of bird.

So a central plank on which Freud had rested a lot of his argument in this long essay is destroyed in one blow. But Freud never acknowledged the mistake or changed the passage and so it’s hard to avoid the conclusion that this is simple charlatanry, that Freud, here as in many other places, could not change mistakes because they were vital means which enabled him to project the powerful personal obsession which he called psychoanalysis out onto the real world. That, somehow, it was all or nothing. No gaps or retractions were possible lest the entire edifice start to crumble.

Leonardo is important to Freud because he was the first natural scientist since the Greeks. If Authority is the Father and Nature the Mother, then his peculiar fatherless upbringing also helps to explain Leonardo’s refusal to rely on ‘authorities’, and his determination to wrest the mysteries of Nature for himself, a rebellion against father and quest for total possession of mother which has clear Oedipal origins.

His later scientific research with all its boldness and independence presupposed the existence of infantile sexual researches uninhibited by the father…

This is an illuminating insight. But when, a few pages later, Freud says dreams of flying are all connected with having good sex, and Leonardo was obsessed with birds and flying machines because scientific enquiry stems from our infantile sexual researches, you begin to feel Freud is twisting the material to suit his ends.

This is even more the case in Freud’s treatment of Leonardo’s father. First we are told that not having a Dad helped Leonardo develop a scientific wish for investigation; then that having a father was vital to his Oedipal ‘overthrowing’ of Authority and received wisdom; then that Leonardo both overcame his father who was absent in his infancy and became like him insofar as he tended to abandon his artistic creations half-finished, just like Ser Piero (his dad) had abandoned him.

Freud is trying to have it all ways at once. A feeling compounded by moments of plain silliness: for example when Freud claims his friend Oskar Pfister found the outline of a vulture in the painting of St Ann with Jesus, or when Freud points out that a sketch of a pregnant woman from the notebook has wrong-way round feet, thus suggesting… homosexuality! In the notes we are told the feet look odd because they were, in fact, added in by a later artist. The net result of all these errors and distortions is that, by now, Freud is looking like a fool and a charlatan. The whole thing is riddled with errors.

Conclusion

Freud is like a novelist who scatters insights around him concerning the tangles, complexities, repressions and repetitions of human life with which we are all familiar – now that Freud has pointed them out to us. But whenever he tries to get more systematic, more ‘scientific’, he gets more improbable.

The insights into Leonardo’s psychology are just that, scattered insights. But when he tries to get systematic about infantile sexual inquiry or the origins of homosexuality, you feel credulity stretched until it snaps. It comes as no surprise to learn that the whole extended vulture-dream argument, which reeks of false scholarship and cardboard schematicism, has been shown to be completely wrong.

All the same, no less an authority than art historian Kenneth Clark said that, despite its scholarly errors, Freud’s essay was useful in highlighting the difference, the weirdness of Leonardo. This is the eerie thing about Freud: even when he’s talking bollocks, even when he’s caught out lying, his insights and his entire angle of vision, carry such power, ring bells or force you to rethink things from new angles, and shed fresh light.

5. The theme of the three caskets (1913)

This is an odd little essay on the three-choices theme found in many folk-tales, myths and legends. Freud concentrates on its manifestation in the Shakespeare plays, The Merchant of Venice and King Lear.

The Prince in Merchant wisely picks lead, rather than silver or gold, and thus wins the hand of Portia. Lear foolishly picks worldly things – Goneril and Regan’s sycophancy – and rejects Cordelia’s true love.

What Freud can now ‘reveal’ is that Cordelia and Lear really symbolise DEATH! By refusing his own death – i.e. his inevitable fate – Lear wreaks havoc on the natural order: a man must accept his death.

For the three caskets are symbols of the fundamental three sisters, the Norns of Norse, and the Fates of Greek mythology. The third Fate is Atropos or Death and so picking the third, the least attractive of three choices, is, in fact, to pick death.

Hang on, though: what about the classical story of the judgement of Paris? Paris gives the apple to Aphrodite, goddess of Love. Freud raises this objection only to smoothly deal with it: it’s because Man’s imagination, in rebellion against Fate, converts, in the Paris-myth, the goddess of Death into the goddess of Love, unconsciously turning the most hateful thing into the most loveful thing: it is one more example of the unconscious reversing polarities and making opposites meet.

The Fates were created as a result of the discovery that warned man that he too is a part of nature and therefore subject to the immutable law of death. Something in man was bound to struggle against this subjection, for it is only with extreme unwillingness that he gives up his claim to an exceptional position.

Man, as we know, makes use of his imaginative activity in order to satisfy the wishes that reality does not satisfy. So his imagination rebelled against the recognition of the truth embodied in the myth of the Fates and constructed instead, the myth derived from it, in which the goddess of Death is replaced by the goddess of Love.

This essay is a brilliant example of the weird, perverse persuasiveness of Freud’s imagination and a deliberate addition to the variety of strategies psychoanalysis has for literature:

  • to the psychoanalysis of plot: Gradiva
  • the psychoanalysis of artist’s character: Leonardo (above), Dostoyevsky (below)
  • the psychoanalysis of myth-symbolism: the three caskets
  • the psychoanalysis of the act of creation itself, what it does, what it’s for: Creative Writers and Daydreaming
  • the psychoanalysis of the history of a genre: Psychopathic stage characters (above)

When you list them like this you realise the justice of Freud’s self-description as a conquistador. He deliberately set out to conquer all aspects of all the human sciences – art, literature, anthropology, sociology, history – to which his invention could possibly be applied, and he was successful.

6. The Moses of Michelangelo (1914)

It has traditionally been thought that Michelangelo’s imposing statue of Moses in the church of San Pietro in Vincoli depicts the leader of the Israelites having come down from the mountain with the tablets of the commandments only to see the Israelites dancing round the Golden Calf and to be about to leap up in wrath.

Michelangelo’s statue of Moses in the church of St Peter In Chains in Rome

Freud completely reverses this view. Freud turns this Moses into a model of Freud’s idea of self-overcoming or the Mastery of Instinct:

The giant figure with its tremendous physical power becomes only a concrete expression of the highest mental achievement that is possible in a man, that of struggling successfully against an inward passion for the sake of a cause to which he has devoted himself.

This essay was written in 1914 just after the split with Freud’s disciples, Carl Jung and Alfred Adler, leaving Freud feeling bitter and angry. They thought they were rebelling against a stifling father figure who insisted on blind obedience to his theory and diktats. He thought he had given them a world of new insights, as well as personal help and support, only to watch them distort and pervert his findings for their own ends, to further their own careers.

You don’t have to be a qualified psychiatrist to speculate that there might be a teeny-weeny bit of self-portraiture in Freud’s interpretation of Moses: a heroic passionate man, founder of a whole new way of seeing the world, much-wronged by those he cared for, heroically stifling his justifiable feelings of anger and revenge. There is much in Moses for Freud to identify with.

Overcoming, this is Freud’s perennial theme: civilised man’s continual attempt to master his animal nature. It’s at its clearest here in his interpretation of Moses’ superhuman restraint but it runs like a scarlet thread through his work, eventually blossoming into full view in Civilisation and Its Discontents.

On the way to achieving the heroic self-denial which we call ‘civilisation’ the poor human animal takes many wrong turns and false steps: these are the illnesses, the neuroses, the hysterias and perversions which Freud spent the early part of his career discussing (see in particular, Three Essays On Sexuality 1905).

But even when you have achieved self-mastery, even if your development works out well and you rid yourself of your neuroses and arrive at a mature, adult morality, disenchanted from willful illusions like religious belief and personal superstition, all this heroic self-mastery only brings you face-to-face with a bigger problem: Fate and Death. How can you cope with this final insult to the narcissistic self-love which, despite all your conscious better intentions, nonetheless guides your actions?

Freud suggests a variety of strategies:

  1. falling ill: the ‘flight into illness’ identified as early as 1895 in his book on hysteria
  2. killing yourself: the superego’s rage against the failure of the ego to master reality
  3. rebellion against fate: as epitomised by all the heroes of myth and legend, which Freud identifies the core subject of heroic (Greek) tragedy
  4. sublimating unconscious panic-fear into its opposite, exaggerated submission and masochistic greeting of the blows of Fate (as in some types of submissive religious belief)
  5. outstaring Death with a calm rational stoicism (Freud’s view of himself)

But art, too, has a place among these responses. Art either:

  • provides parables and models which help us come to terms with illness and death and Fate (as Gradiva is a model of the psychoanalytic cure; the three caskets are fairy tales which help us, unconsciously, to accept the inevitable)
  • or helps us to rise emotionally above our narrow, cramped lives (as explained in Creative Writers and Psychopathic stage characters)

Or:

  • is the product of compulsions, obsessions and neuroses on the part of the artist (for example, Leonardo) for whom art acts as therapy and whose purely personal solutions to these problems may appeal to our own situation, and in some way reconcile us to our own fate
  • or simply evoke pleasant unconscious memories, for example the blissful mood conveyed by the smiles of the Mona Lisa or St John the Baptist

Art may leave us with a tantalising sense of mystery and transcendence; or it may thrill us with the spectacle of an artist grappling with feelings he barely understands, feelings and struggle which the art work makes us feel and sympathise with.

9. A childhood recollection from Dichtung Und Wahrheit (1917)

Dichtung Und Wahrheit was the title of the autobiography of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, the great German poet, playwright, novelist, scientist, statesman, theatre director, and critic. Goethe was Freud’s lifelong favourite writer and Freud is liable to drop a Goethe quote into any of his essays at the drop of a hat.

One of the first anecdotes in Goethe’s autobiography describes the little poet, aged about three, throwing all the crockery in the house out into the street and chuckling as it smashed.

Freud shows, by citing comparable stories told by his patients, that this was an expression of Goethe’s jealousy and hatred of his new young brother who had just been born and threatened to supplant him in his mother’s affections. The brother later died and Goethe was, unconsciously, happy. So, in Freud’s hands, this inconsequential anecdote turns out to be a vital key to Goethe’s personality:

I raged for sole possession of my mother – and achieved it!

As with Moses, the autobiographical element in Freud is large. As he says in his own autobiography:

A man who has been the indisputable favourite of his mother keeps for life the feeling of a conqueror, that confidence of success which often induces real success.

Compare with the way the ‘secret’ of Leonardo turned out to be the unquenchable if unconscious bliss he kept all his life of having possessed his mother’s love, undiluted by the absent father. The fact that so many of Freud’s insights turn out so nakedly to be repetitions of key aspects of his own personality prompts the $64,000 question: Are Freud’s insights into human nature the revelation of universal laws? Or a mammoth projection onto all mankind of his own idiosyncratic upbringing and personality?

10. The Uncanny (1919)

This is the first of these essays to be written under the influence of Freud’s second, post-Great War, theory of psychoanalysis. The new improved version was a great deal more complicated than earlier efforts.

This essay is an attempt to apply the symbolic mode of interpretation to the E.T.A Hoffman story of ‘Olympia and the Sandman’ in which several ‘doubles’ appear, creating an ‘uncanny’ effect.

For post-war Freud the human psyche is dominated by a compulsion to repeat: this is the secret of the anxiety dreams of shell-shock victims, or of the child’s repetitive games, discussed at such length in Beyond The Pleasure Principle, 1920.

An aspect of this profound human tendency to repeat is the idea of ‘doubles’. Beginning with the notion of the ‘soul’ – the Christian idea that we are made of two things, a body and a soul – doubles in various forms litter human culture.

Freud speculates that the role of doubles is to:

  • stave off death: you have a secret double fighting on your behalf, a good fairy, a good angel etc
  • underpin ideas of free will, of alternative actions which you could, but didn’t take
  • become, by reversal, objects of aggression and fear, doubles which return as harbingers of doom in fairy stories and in neurotic hallucinations

After this little detour Freud gets to the point: the uncanny is the feeling prompted by the return of the childish belief in the omnipotence of thoughts.

For example, you think of someone and the next minute the phone rings and it’s them on the line. You experience an ‘uncanny’ sensation because, for a moment, you are back in the three year old’s narcissistic belief that the universe runs according to your wishes.

And the eruption into your tamed adult conscious of this primitive, long-repressed idea prompts a feeling of being ‘spooked’, unsettled – the Uncanny.

When someone has an ‘uncanny’ knack of doing something it’s the same: it makes us feel weird because their consistent success reminds us of our infantile fantasies of immediate wish-fulfilment and gratification; the powerful wish to be able to do something effortlessly and easily which possessed us as children but which we had to painfully smother and put behind us in order to cope with the crushingly ungratifying nature of reality.

In the broadest sense the uncanny is the return of the repressed: the Oedipus Complex, the omnipotence of thoughts, the obsession with doubles, even return to the womb feelings: they are strange, disturbing, but ultimately not terrifying because we have felt them before.

11. A seventeenth century demonological neurosis (1923)

Freud’s interest in witchcraft, possession and allied phenomena was of longstanding, possibly stimulated by his trip to the Salpetriere Hospital to study under Charcot in 1885.

Freud’s ‘Report’ on his trip mentions that Charcot paid a great deal of attention to the historical aspects of neuroses i.e. to tales of possession and so on.

The series of lectures of Charcot’s which Freud translated into German includes discussion of the hysterical nature of medieval ‘demono-manias’ and an account of a sixteenth century case of demonic possession.

It is recorded that in 1909 Freud spoke at length to the Vienna Society on the History of the Devil and of the psychological composition of belief in the Devil.

In mentioning ‘the compulsion to repeat’ in The Uncanny (a phenomenon dealt with at length in Beyond The Pleasure Principle and vitally important for understanding Freud’s later theory) Freud says:

It is possible to recognise the dominance in the unconscious mind of a ‘compulsion to repeat’ proceeding from the instinctual impulses and probably inherent in the very nature of the instincts – a compulsion powerful enough to overcome the pleasure principle, lending to certain aspects of the mind their demonic character, and still very clearly expressed in the impulses of young children, a compulsion too which is responsible for the course taken by the analyses of neurotic patients.’

Here we have the first glimmerings of the set of ideas which were to crystallise around the new concept of the superego, namely that it is the agent of the death drive, the fundamental wish of all organisms to return to an inorganic state of rest.

The superego channels this drive through the introjection (or internalisation) of the infantile image of our demanding parents, who continue to demand impossible standards all our lives and, when we fail to live up to them, harry us, persecute us, make us feel guilty, anxious, or depressed, filled with self-hatred and self-loathing.

One aspect of this is what earlier ages called ‘possession’, when people heard voices or seemed impelled to do what they didn’t want to. This impelling comes from the id, from our dumb, voiceless instincts – but the self-reproaches for having stepped out of line come from the superego, which, in some circumstances, exaggerates the fairly common guilt at our ‘sinfulness’ into florid ideas of demonic possession.

The essay is a psychoanalysis, using these new concepts, of the historical case of one Christopher Haizmann, a painter in the seventeenth century who fell into a melancholy at the death of his father and then claimed to the authorities that he had signed a pact with the Devil. The historical sequence of events is that he eventually renounced his pact and was looked after for a while by the Christian Brothers.

Freud diagnoses Haizmann as Grade A neurotic. Upon his father’s death he was prompted to review his life and realised he was a failure, a good-for-nothing. The pacts he reports himself as making, bizarrely, ask the Devil to take him as His son. Haizmann is transparently looking for a father-substitute who will punish him for his perceived failure.

More subtly, then, Haizmann is inflating the punitive superego (based on infantile memories of his father) into the grand figure of Devil, the bad or punitive father.

Unfortunately, upon re-entering the world, Haizmann suffered a relapse. He claimed to be the victim of an earlier pact he signed with the Devil and, for some reason, forgot about. Once more he renounced it upon being readmitted to life with the Christian Brothers, but this time he renounced the world also and spent the rest of his life with them.

The devil is the bad side of the father i.e. the child’s projection of his ambivalent feelings onto an ego-ideal. Sociologically speaking, in the history of religion, ‘devils’ were old gods who we have overcome and onto whom we then project all our suppressed lust and violence. So Baal was a perfectly decent Canaanite god until the Israelites overthrew the Canaanites in the name of their god, Yahweh, at which point the Israelites projected onto Baal him all the wickedness and lust in their own hearts. Satan, in Christian doctrine, was originally the brightest and best of God’s angels, before a similar process of overthrow and then being scapegoated with all our worst imaginings. So the devil is the father-figure we have overcome in fantasy, but onto whom we then project all the vilest wickedness in our own rotten hearts.

12. Humour (1927)

By the early 1920s Freud had devised a radical new tripartite picture of the psyche as consisting of the ego, id and superego, and had posited the existence in the psyche of a powerful death drive. He had done this in order to explain the compulsion to repeat which he saw enacted in situations as varied as shell-shocked soldiers obsessively repeating their dreams of war and a young child’s game of repeatedly throwing a toy away and reclaiming it.

Freud was in a position to apply his new structure and psychology to various literary and psychological phenomena.

Different from jokes or wit, ‘humour’ is what we call irony and is endemic among the British. When the condemned man is walking towards the gallows and he looks up at the sunshine and remarks, ‘Well, the week’s certainly getting off to a pleasant start’ it is his superego making light of the dire situation his ego finds itself in.

Like neuroses or drugs, humour is a way of dealing with the harsh reality we find ourselves in. It is like our parents reassuring us how silly and inconsequential is the big sports game we’ve just lost is, so it doesn’t matter anyway.

As you might expect if you’ve read this far and have been noticing the key themes which emerge in Freud, it turns out that humour, like tragedy, like so much else in Freud, is an act of rebellion:

Humour is not resigned; it is rebellious.

Once again the image of rebellion, whether it’s in art, or vis-a-vis the authorities, or against the smothering restrictions of religion, or, most fundamentally, against the dictates of fate and death themselves, God-less Man’s fundamental posture is one of rebellion and revolt. This feels to me close if not identical to the position of the secular humanist, Camus.

In this brief, good-humoured essay the superego appears in a good light for once, as an enlightening and ennobling faculty, instead of the punitive father-imago which he elsewhere claims underlies secular guilt and depression.

13. Dostoyevsky and parricide (1928)

Which is how he appears here. Burdened with an unnaturally powerful, bisexual ambivalence towards his sadistic father, Dostoyevsky never recovered from the crushing sense of guilt when his unconscious hatred and death-wishes against his father were fulfilled when his father was murdered in a street when Fyodor was 18.

Dostoyevsky’s fanatical gambling and spiritual masochism were aspects of his need to punish himself for his suppressed parricidal death-wishes…which came true!

Freud claims that another aspect of Dostoyevsky’s self-punishment were his epileptic attacks. When he managed to get sent to a prison-camp in Siberia i.e. was sufficiently punished by the outside world, his attacks stopped. He had managed to make the father-substitute, the Czar, punish him in reality, and therefore the attacks from inside his own mind, the psychosomatic epilepsy, could cease.

In amongst these psychological speculations comes Freud’s final word on the individual work of literature which, above all others, was crucial to his philosophy:

It can scarcely be owing to chance that three of the masterpieces of literature of all time – the Oedipus Rex of Sophocles, Shakespeare’s Hamlet and Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov – should all deal with the same subject, parricide. In all three, moreover, the motive for the deed, sexual rivalry for a woman, is laid bare.

He goes on to say that the essence of this master plot has been attenuated as civilisation has done its repressive work to try and conceal it, i.e. what Oedipus does openly and explicitly (murder his father and sleep with his mother) is later carried out by unconsciously envied representatives (by Claudius in Hamlet). But the continuity is certainly suggestive…

And it is in the course of this essay that Freud makes the key remark that the essence of morality is renunciation, the closest he comes to talk about the content of ‘morality’ in the conventional sense, as opposed to a technical approach to its psychological origins and development.

One conclusion among many

If you’ve read through all of this you’ll maybe agree that Freud’s way of seeing things was so distinctive and powerful that, even though much of his claims and arguments may be factually disproved, even if he can be shown to be actively lying about some things, nonetheless, in a strange, uncanny way, it doesn’t stop you beginning to see the world as he does. It’s a kind of psychological infection; or a process of being moved into an entirely new worldview.

Hence the strong feeling he and his followers generated that the psychoanalytic movement he founded wasn’t just a new branch of psychology but an entirely new way of seeing the world, a worldview which gave rise to ‘disciples’ and ‘followers’ in a sense more associated with a religious movement than a simple scientific ‘school’.

Freud was so obsessed with religions because he was founding a new one, and so obsessed with Moses because he identified with him as a fellow founder of a new belief system.


Credit

The history of the translation of Freud’s many works into English forms a complicated subject in its own right. The works in this review were translated into English between 1959 and 1961 as part of The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. All references in this blog post are to the versions collected into Volume 14 of the Pelican Freud Library, ‘Art and Literature’, published in 1985.

More Freud reviews

Irrationality: The Enemy Within by Stuart Sutherland (1992)

The only way to substantiate a belief is to try to disprove it.
(Irrationality: The Enemy Within, page 48)

Sutherland was 65 when he wrote this book, and nearing the end of a prestigious career in psychology research. His aim was to lay out, in 23 themed chapters, all the psychological and sociological research data from hundreds of experiments, which show just how vulnerable the human mind is to a plethora of unconscious biases, prejudices, errors, mistakes, misinterpretations and so on – the whole panoply of ways in which supposedly ‘rational’ human beings can end up making grotesque mistakes.

By the end of the book, Sutherland claims to have defined and demonstrated over 100 distinct cognitive errors humans are prone to (p.309).

I first read this book in 2000 and it made a big impact on me because I didn’t really know that this entire area of study existed, and had certainly never read such a compendium of sociology and psychology experiments before.

I found the naming of the various errors particularly powerful. They reminded me of the lists of weird and wonderful Christian heresies I was familiar with from years of of reading early Christians history. And, after all, the two have a lot in common, both being lists of ‘errors’ which the human mind can make as it falls short of a) orthodox theology and b) optimally rational thinking, the great shibboleths of the Middle Ages and of the Modern World, respectively.

Rereading Irrationality now, 20 years later, after having brought up two children, and worked in big government departments, I am a lot less shocked and amazed. I have witnessed at first hand the utter irrationality of small and medium-sized children; and I have seen so many examples of corporate conformity, the avoidance of embarrassment, unwillingness to speak up, deferral to authority, and general mismanagement in the civil service that, upon rereading the book, hardly any of it came as a surprise.

But to have all these errors so carefully named and defined and worked through in a structured way, with so many experiments giving such vivid proof of how useless humans are at even basic logic, was still very enjoyable.

What is rationality?

You can’t define irrationality without first defining what you mean by rationality:

Rational thinking is most likely to lead to the conclusion that is correct, given the information available at the time (with the obvious rider that, as new information comes to light, you should be prepared to change your mind).

Rational action is that which is most likely to achieve your goals. But in order to achieve this, you have to have clearly defined goals. Not only that but, since most people have multiple goals, you must clearly prioritise your goals.

Few people think hard about their goals and even fewer think hard about the many possible consequences of their actions. (p.129)

Cognitive biases contrasted with logical fallacies

Before proceeding it’s important to point out that there is a wholly separate subject of logical fallacies. As part of his Philosophy A-Level my son was given a useful handout with a list of about fifty logical fallacies i.e. errors in thinking. But logical fallacies are not the same as cognitive biases.

A logical fallacy stems from an error in a logical argument; it is specific and easy to identify and correct. Cognitive bias derives from deep-rooted, thought-processing errors which themselves stem from problems with memory, attention, self-awareness, mental strategy and other mental mistakes.

Cognitive biases are, in most cases, far harder to acknowledge and often very difficult to correct.

Fundamentals of irrationality

1. Innumeracy One of the largest causes of all irrational behaviour is that people by and large don’t understand statistics or maths. Thus most people are not intellectually equipped to understand the most reliable type of information available to human beings – data in the form of numbers. Instead they tend to make decisions based on a wide range of faulty and irrational psychological biases.

2. Physiology People are often influenced by physiological factors. Apart from obvious ones like tiredness or hunger, which are universally known to affect people’s cognitive abilities, there are also a) drives (direct and primal) like hunger, thirst, sex, and b) emotions (powerful but sometimes controllable) like love, jealousy, fear and – especially relevant – embarrassment, specifically, the acute reluctance to acknowledge limits to your own knowledge or that you’ve made a mistake.

At a more disruptive level, people might be alcoholics, drug addicts, or prey to a range of other obsessive behaviours, not to mention suffering from a wide range of mental illnesses or conditions which undermine any attempt at rational decision-making, such as stress, anxiety or, at the other end of the spectrum, depression and loss of interest.

3. The functional limits of consciousness Numerous experiments have shown that human beings have a limited capacity to process information. Given that people rarely have a) a sufficient understanding of the relevant statistical data to begin with, and b) lack the RAM capacity to process all the data required to make the optimum decision, it is no surprise that most of us fall back on all manner of more limited, non-statistical biases and prejudices when it comes to making decisions.

The wish to feel good The world is threatening, dangerous and competitive. Humans want to feel safe, secure, calm, and in control. This is fair enough, but it does mean that people have a way of blocking out any kind of information which threatens them. Most people irrationally believe that they are cleverer than they in fact are, are qualified in areas of activity of knowledge where they aren’t, people stick to bad decisions for fear of being embarrassed or humiliated, and for the same reason reject new evidence which contradicts their position.

Named types of error and bias

Jumping to conclusions

Sutherland tricks the reader on page one, by asking a series of questions and then pointing out that, if you tried to answer about half of them, you are a fool since the questions didn’t contain enough information to arrive at any sort of solution. Jumping to conclusions before we have enough evidence is a basic and universal error. One way round this is to habitually use a pen and paper to set out the pros and cons of any decision, which also helps highlight areas where you realise you don’t have enough information.

The availability error

All the evidence is that the conscious mind can only hold a small number of data or impressions at any one time (near the end of the book, Sutherland claims the maximum is seven items, p.319). Many errors are due to people reaching for the most available explanation, using the first thing that comes to mind, and not taking the time to investigate further and make a proper, rational survey of the information.

Many experiments show that you can unconsciously bias people by planting ideas, words or images in their minds which then directly affect decisions they take hours later about supposedly unconnected issues.

Studies show that doctors who have seen a run of a certain condition among their patients become more likely to diagnose it in new patients, who don’t have it. Because the erroneous diagnosis is more ‘available’.

The news media is hard-wired to publicise shocking and startling stories which leads to the permanent misleading of the reading public. One tourist eaten by a shark in Australia eclipses the fact that you are far more likely to die in a car crash than be eaten by a shark.

Thus ‘availability’ is also affected by impact or prominence. Experimenters read out a list of men and women to two groups without telling them that there are exactly 25 men and 25 women, and asked them to guess the ratio of the sexes. If the list included some famous men, the group was influenced to think there were more men, if the list included famous women, the group thought there are more women than men. The prominence effect.

The entire advertising industry is based on the availability error in the way it invents straplines, catchphrases and jingles designed to pop to the front of your mind when you consider any type of product, making those products – in other words – super available.

I liked the attribution of the well-known fact that retailers price goods at just under the nearest pound, to the availability error. Most of us find £5.95 much more attractive than £6. It’s because we only process the initial 5, the first digit. It is more available.

Numerous studies have shown that the availability error is hugely increased under stress. Under stressful situations – in an accident – people fixate on the first solution that comes to mind and refuse to budge.

The primacy effect

First impressions. Interviewers make up their minds about a candidate for a job in the first minute of an interview and then spend the rest of the time collecting data to confirm that first impression.

The anchor effect

In picking a number people tend to choose one close to any number they’ve recently been presented with. Two groups were asked to estimate whether the population of Turkey was a) bigger than 5 million b) less than 65 million, and what it was. The group who’d had 5 million planted in their mind hovered around 15 million, the group who’d had 65 million hovered around 35 million. They were both wrong. It is 80 million.

The halo effect

People extrapolate the nature of the whole from just one quality e.g. in tests, people think attractive people must be above average in personality and intelligence although, of course, there is no reason why they should be. Hence this error’s alternative name, the ‘physical attractiveness stereotype’. The halo effect is fundamental to advertising, which seeks to associate images of beautiful men, women, smiling children, sunlit countryside etc with the product being marketed.

The existence of the halo effect and primacy effect are both reasons why interviews are a poor way to assess candidates for jobs or places.

The devil effect

Opposite of the above: extrapolating from negative appearances to the whole. This is why it’s important to dress smartly for an interview or court appearance, it really does influence people. In an experiment examiners were given identical answers, but some in terrible handwriting, some in beautifully clear handwriting. The samples with clear handwriting consistently scored higher marks, despite the identical factual content of the scripts.

Illusory correlation

People find links between disparate phenomena which simply don’t exist, thus:

  • people exaggerate the qualities of people or things which stand out from their environments
  • people associate rare qualities with rare things

This explains a good deal of racial prejudice: a) immigrants stand out b) a handful of immigrants commit egregious behaviour – therefore it is a classic example of illusory correlation to associate the two. What is missing is taking into account all the negative examples i.e. the millions of immigrants who make no egregious behaviour and whose inclusion would give you a more accurate statistical picture. Pay attention to negative cases.

Stereotypes

  1. People tend to notice anything which supports their existing opinions.
  2. We notice the actions of ‘minorities’ much more than the actions of the invisible majority.

Projection

People project onto neutral phenomena, patterns and meanings they are familiar with or which bolster their beliefs. This is compounded by –

Obstinacy

Sticking to personal opinions (often made in haste / first impressions / despite all evidence to the contrary) aka The boomerang effect When someone’s opinions are challenged, they just become more obstinate about it. Aka Belief persistence. Aka pig-headedness. And this is axacerbated by –

Group think

People associate with others like themselves, which makes them feel safe by a) confirming their beliefs and b) letting them hide in a crowd. Experiments have shown how people in self-supporting groups are liable to become more extreme in their views. Also – and I’ve seen this myself – groups will take decisions that almost everyone in the group, as individuals, know to be wrong – but no-one is prepared to risk the embarrassment or humiliation of pointing it out. The Emperor’s New Clothes. Groups are more likely to make irrational decisions than individuals are.

Confirmation bias

The tendency to search for, interpret, favour, and recall information in a way that confirms one’s pre-existing beliefs or hypotheses. In an experiment people were read out a series of statements about a named person, who had a stated profession and then two adjectives describing them, one that you’d expect, the other less predictable. ‘Carol, a librarian, is attractive and serious’. When asked to do a quiz at the end of the session, participants showed a marked tendency to remember the expected adjective, and forget the unexpected one. Everyone remembered that the air stewardess was ‘attractive’ but remembered the librarian for being ‘serious’.

We remember what we expect to hear. (p.76)

Or: we remember what we remember in line with pre-existing habits of thought, values etc.

We marry people who share our opinions, we have friends with people who share our opinions, we agree with everyone in our circle on Facebook.

Self-serving biases

When things go well, people take the credit, when things go badly, people blame external circumstances.

Avoiding embarrassment

People obey, especially in a group situation, bad orders because they don’t want to stick out. People go along with bad decisions because they don’t want to stick out. People don’t want to admit they’ve made a mistake, in front of others, or even to themselves.

Avoiding humiliation

People are reluctant to admit mistakes in front of others. And rather than make a mistake in front of others, people would rather keep quiet and say nothing (in a meeting situation) or do nothing, if everyone else is doing nothing (in an action situation). Both of these avoidances feed into –

Obedience

The Milgram experiment proved that people will carry out any kind of atrocity for an authoritative man in a white coat. All of his students agreed to inflict life-threatening levels of electric shock on the victim, supposedly wired up in the next door room and emitting blood curdling (faked) screams of pain. 72% of Senior House Officers wouldn’t question the decision of a consultant, even if they thought he was wrong.

Conformity

Everyone else is saying or doing it, so you say or do it so as not to stick out / risk ridicule.

Obedience is behaving in a way ordered by an authority figure. Conformity is behaving in a way dictated by your peers.

The wrong length lines experiment

You’re put in a room with half a dozen stooges, and shown a piece of card with a line on it and then another piece of card with three lines of different length on it, and asked which of the lines on card B is the same length as the line on card A. To your amazement, everyone else in the room chooses a line which is obviously wildly wrong. In experiments up to 75% of people in this situation go along with the crowd and choose the line which they are sure, can see and know is wrong – because everyone else did.

Sunk costs fallacy

The belief that you have to continue wasting time and money on a project because you’ve invested x amount of time and money to date. Or ‘throwing good money after bad’.

Sutherland keeps cycling round the same nexus of issues, which is that people jump to conclusions – based on availability, stereotypes, the halo and anchor effects – and then refuse to change their minds, twisting existing evidence to suit them, ignoring contradictory evidence.

Misplaced consistency & distorting the evidence

Nobody likes to admit (especially to themselves) that they are wrong. Nobody likes to admit (especially to themselves) that they are useless at taking decisions.

Our inability to acknowledge our own errors even to ourselves is one of the most fundamental causes of irrationality. (p.100)

And so:

  • people consistently avoid exposing themselves to evidence that might disprove their beliefs
  • on being faced with evidence that disproves their beliefs, they ignore it
  • or they twist new evidence so as to confirm to their existing beliefs
  • people selectively remember their own experiences, or misremember the evidence they were using at the time, in order to validate their current decisions and beliefs
  • people will go to great lengths to protect their self-esteem

Sutherland says the best cleanser / solution / strategy to fixed and obstinate ideas is:

  1. to make the time to gather as much evidence as possible and
  2. to try to disprove your own position.

The best solution will be the one you have tried to demolish with all the evidence you have and still remains standing.

People tend to seek confirmation of their current hypothesis, whereas they should be trying to disconfirm it. (p.138)

Fundamental attribution error

Ascribing other people’s behaviour to their character or disposition rather than to their situation. Subjects in an experiment watched two people holding an informal quiz: the first person made up questions (based on what he knew) and asked the second person who, naturally enough, hardly got any of them right. Observers consistently credited the quizzer with higher intelligence than the answerer, completely ignoring the in-built bias of the situation, and instead ascribing the difference to character.

We are quick to personalise and blame in a bid to turn others into monolithic entities which we can then define and control – this saves time and effort, and makes us feel safer and secure – whereas the evidence is that all people are capable of a wide range of behaviours depending on the context and situation.

Once you’ve pigeon-holed someone, you will tend to notice aspects of their behaviour which confirm your view – confirmation bias and/or illusory correlation and a version of the halo/devil effect. One attribute colours your view of a more complex whole.

Actor-Observer Bias

Variation on the above: when we screw up we find all kinds of reasons in the situation to exonerate ourselves: we performed badly because we’re ill, jet-lagged, grandma died, reasons that are external to us. If someone else screws up, it is because they just are thick, lazy, useless. I.e. we think of ourselves as complex entities subject to multiple influences, and others as monolithic types.

False Consensus Effect

Over-confidence that other people think and feel like us, that our beliefs and values are the norm – in my view one of the profound cultural errors of our time.

It is a variation of the ever-present Availability Error because when we stop to think about any value or belief we will tend to conjure up images of our family and friends, maybe workmates, the guys we went to college with, and so on: in other words, the people available to memory – simply ignoring the fact that these people are a drop in the ocean of the 65 million people in the UK. See Facebubble.

The False Consensus Effect reassures us that we are normal, our values are the values, we’re the normal ones: it’s everyone else who is wrong, deluded, racist, sexist, whatever we don’t approve of.

Elsewhere, I’ve discovered some commentators naming this the Liberal fallacy:

For liberals, the correctness of their opinions – on universal health care, on Sarah Palin, on gay marriage – is self-evident. Anyone who has tried to argue the merits of such issues with liberals will surely recognize this attitude. Liberals are pleased with themselves for thinking the way they do. In their view, the way they think is the way all right-thinking people should think. Thus, ‘the liberal fallacy’: Liberals imagine that everyone should share their opinions, and if others do not, there is something wrong with them. On matters of books and movies, they may give an inch, but if people have contrary opinions on political and social matters, it follows that the fault is with the others. (Commentary magazine)

Self-Serving Bias

People tend to give themselves credit for successes but lay the blame for failures on outside causes. If the project is a success, it was all due to my hard work and leadership. If it’s a failure, it’s due to circumstances beyond my control, other people not pulling their weight etc.

Preserving one’s self-esteem 

These three errors are all aspects of preserving our self-esteem. You can see why this has an important evolutionary and psychological purpose. In order to live, we must believe in ourselves, our purposes and capacities, believe our values are normal and correct, believe we make a difference, that our efforts bring results. No doubt it is a necessary belief and a collapse of confidence and self-belief can lead to depression and possibly despair. But that doesn’t make it true.

People should learn the difference between having self-belief to motivate themselves, and developing the techniques to gather the full range of evidence – including the evidence against your own opinions and beliefs – which will enable them to make correct decisions.

Representative error

People estimate the likelihood of an event by comparing it to an existing prototype / stereotype that already exists in our minds. Our prototype is what we think is the most relevant or typical example of a particular event or object. This often happens around notions of randomness: people have a notion of what randomness should look like i.e. utterly scrambled. But in fact plenty of random events or sequences arrange themselves into patterns we find meaningful. So we dismiss them as not really random.  I.e. we have judged them against our preconception of what random ought to look like.

Ask a selection of people which of these three sets of six coin tosses where H stands for heads, T for tails is random.

  1. TTTTTT
  2. TTTHHH
  3. THHTTH

Most people will choose 3 because it feels random. But of course all three are equally likely or unlikely.

Hindsight

In numerous experiments people have been asked to predict the outcome of an event, then after the event questioned about their predictions. Most people forget their inaccurate predictions and misremember that they were accurate.

Overconfidence

Most professionals have been shown to overvalue their expertise i.e. exaggerate their success rates.


Statistics

A problem with Irrationality and with John Allen Paulos’s book about Innumeracy is that they mix up cognitive biases and statistics, Now, statistics is a completely separate and distinct area from errors of thought and cognitive biases. You can imagine someone who avoids all of the cognitive and psychological errors named above, but still makes howlers when it comes to statistics simply because they’re not very good at it.

This is because the twin areas of Probability and Statistics are absolutely fraught with difficulty. Either you have been taught the correct techniques, and understand them, and practice them regularly (and both books demonstrate that even experts make terrible mistakes in the handling of statistics and probability) or, like most of us, you have not and do not.

As Sutherland points out, most people’s knowledge of statistics is non-existent. Since we live in a society whose public discourse i.e. politics, is ever more dominated by statistics, there is a simple conclusion: most of us have little or no understanding of the principles and values which underpin modern society.

Errors in estimating probability or misunderstanding samples, opinion polls and so on, are probably a big part of irrationality, but I felt that they are so distinct from the psychological biases discussed above, that they almost require a separate volume, or a separate ‘part’ of this volume.

Briefly, common statistical mistakes are:

  • too small a sample size
  • biased sample
  • not understanding that any combination of probabilities is less likely than either on their own, which requires an understanding of base rate or a priori probability
  • the law of large numbers – the more a probabilistic event takes place, the more likely the result will move towards the theoretical probability
  • be aware of the law of regression to the mean
  • be aware of the law of large numbers

Gambling

My suggestion that mistakes in handling statistics are not really the same as unconscious cognitive biases, applies even more to the world of gambling. Gambling is a highly specialised and advanced form of probability applied to games. The subject has been pored over by very clever people for centuries. It’s not a question of a few general principles, this is a vast, book-length subject in its own right. A practical point that emerges from Sutherland’s examples is:

  • always work out the expected value of a bet i.e. the amount to be won times the probability of winning it

The two-by-two box

It’s taken me some time to understand this principle which is given in both Paulos and Sutherland.

When two elements with a yes/no result are combined, people tend to look at the most striking correlation and fixate on it. The only way to avoid the false conclusions that follow from that is to draw a 2 x 2 box and work through the figures.

Here is a table of 1,000 women who had a mammogram because their doctors thought they had symptoms of breast cancer.

Women with cancer Women with no cancer Total
Women with positive mammography 74 110 184
Women with negative mammography 6 810 816
80 920 1000

Bearing in mind that a conditional probability is saying that if X and Y are linked, then the chances of X, if Y, are so and so – i.e. the probability of X is conditional on the probability of Y – this table allows us to work out the following conditional probabilities:

1. The probability of getting a positive mammogram or test result, if you do actually have cancer, is 74 out of 80 = .92 (out of the 80 women with cancer, 74 were picked up by the test)

2. The probability of getting a negative mammogram or test result and not having cancer, is 810 out of 920 = .88

3. The probability of having cancer if you test positive, is 74 out of 184 = .40

4. The probability of having cancer if you test negative, is 6 out of 816 = .01

So 92% of women of women with cancer were picked up by the test. BUT Sutherland quotes a study which showed that a shocking 95% of doctors thought that this figure – 92% – was also the probability of a patient who tested positive having the disease. By far the majority of US doctors thought that, if you tested positive, you had a 92% chance of having cancer. They fixated on the 92% figure and transposed it from one outcome to the other, confusing the two. But this is wrong. The probability of a woman testing positive actually having cancer is given in conclusion 3: 74 out of 184 = 40%. This is because 110 out of the total 184 women tested positive, but did not have cancer.

So if a woman tested positive for breast cancer, the chances of her actually having it are 40%, not 92%. Quite a big difference (and quite an indictment of the test, by the way). And yet 95% of doctors thought that if a woman tested positive she had a 92% likelihood of having cancer.

Sutherland goes on to quote a long list of other situations where doctors and others have comprehensively misinterpreted the results of studies like this, with sometimes very negative consequences.

The moral of the story is if you want to determine whether one event is associated with another, never attempt to keep the co-occurrence of events in your head. It’s just too complicated. Maintain a written tally of the four possible outcomes and refer to these.


Deep causes

Sutherland concludes the book by speculating that all the hundred or so types of irrationality he has documented can be attributed to five fundamental causes:

  1. Evolution We evolved to make snap decisions, we are brilliant at processing visual information and responding before we’re even aware of it. Conscious thought is slower, and the conscious application of statistics, probability, regression analysis and so on, is slowest of all. Most people never acquire it.
  2. Brain structure As soon as we start perceiving, learning and remembering the world around us our brain cells make connections. The more the experience is repeated, the stronger the connections become. Routines and ruts form, which are hard to budge.
  3. Heuristics Everyone develops mental short-cuts, techniques to help make quick decisions. Not many people bother with the laborious statistical techniques for assessing relative benefits which Sutherland describes.
  4. Failure to use elementary probability and elementary statistics Ignorance is another way of describing this, mass ignorance. Sutherland (being an academic) blames the education system. I, being a pessimist, attribute it to basic human nature. Lots of people just are lazy, lots of people just are stupid, lots of people just are incurious.
  5. Self-serving bias In countless ways people are self-centred, overvalue their judgement and intelligence, overvalue the beliefs of their in-group, refuse to accept it when they’re wrong, refuse to make a fool of themselves in front of others by confessing error or pointing out errors in others (especially the boss) and so on.

I would add two more:

Suggestibility

Humans are just tremendously suggestible. Say a bunch of positive words to test subjects, then ask them questions on an unrelated topic: they’ll answer positively. Take a different representative sample of subjects and run a bunch of negative words past them, then ask them the same unrelated questions, and their answers will be measurably more negative. Everyone is easily suggestible.

Ask subjects how they get a party started and they will talk and behave in an extrovert manner to the questioner. Ask them how they cope with feeling shy and ill at ease at parties, and they will tend to act shy and speak quieter. Same people, but their thought patterns have been completely determined by the questions asked: the initial terms or anchor defines the ensuing conversation.

In one experiment a set of subjects were shown one photo of a car crash. Half were asked to describe what they think happened when one car hit another; the other half were asked to describe what they thought happened when one car smashed into the other. The ones given the word ‘smashed’ gave much more melodramatic accounts. Followed up a week later, the subjects were asked to describe what they remembered of the photo. The subjects given the word ‘hit’ fairly accurately described it, whereas the subjects given the word ‘smashed’ invented all kinds of details, like a sea of broken glass around the vehicles which simply wasn’t there, which their imaginations had invented, all at the prompting of one word.

Many of the experiments Sutherland quotes demonstrate what you might call higher-level biases: but underlying many of them is this simple-or-garden observation: that people are tremendously easily swayed, by both external and internal causes, away from the line of cold logic.

Anthropomorphism 

Another big underlying cause is anthropomorphism, namely the attribution of human characteristics to objects, events, chances, odds and so on. In other words, people really struggle to accept the high incidence of random accidents. Almost everyone attributes a purpose or intention to almost everything that happens. This means our perceptions of almost everything in life are skewed from the start.

During the war Londoners devised innumerable theories about the pattern of German bombing. After the war, when Luftwaffe records were analysed, it showed the bombing was more or less at random.

The human desire to make sense of things – to see patterns where none exists or to concoct theories… can lead people badly astray. (p.267)

Suspending judgement is about the last thing people are capable of. People are extremely uneasy if things are left unexplained. Most people rush to judgement like water into a sinking ship.

Cures

  • keep an open mind
  • reach a conclusion only after reviewing all the possible evidence
  • it is a sign of strength to change one’s mind
  • seek out evidence which disproves your beliefs
  • do not ignore or distort evidence which disproves your beliefs
  • never make decisions in a hurry or under stress
  • where the evidence points to no obvious decision, don’t take one
  • learn basic statistics and probability
  • substitute mathematical methods (cost-benefit analysis, regression analysis, utility theory) for intuition and subjective judgement

Comments on the book

Out of date

Irrationality was first published in 1992 and this makes the book dated in several ways (maybe this is why the first paperback edition was published by upmarket mass publisher Penguin, whereas the most recent edition was published by the considerably more niche publisher, Pinter & Martin).

In the chapter about irrational business behaviour Sutherland quotes quite a few examples from the 1970s and the oil crisis of 1974. These and other examples – such as the long passage about how inefficient the civil service was in the early 1970s – feel incredibly dated now.

And the whole thing was conceived, researched and written before there was an internet or any of the digital technology we take for granted nowadays. Can’t help wondering whether the digital age has solved, or merely added to the long list of biases, prejudices and faulty thinking which Sutherland catalogues, and what errors of reason have emerged specific to our fabulous digital technology.

On the other hand, out of date though the book in many ways is, it’s surprising to see how some hot button issues haven’t changed at all. In the passage about the Prisoners’ Dilemma, Sutherland takes as a real life example the problem the nations of the world were having in 1992 in agreeing to cut back carbon dioxide emissions. Sound familiar? He states that the single biggest factor undermining international co-operation against climate change was America’s refusal to sign global treaties to limit global warming. In 1992! Plus ça change.

Grumpy

The books also has passages where Sutherland gives his personal opinions about things and some of these sound more like the grousing of a grumpy old man than anything based on evidence.

Thus Sutherland whole-heartedly disapproves of ‘American’ health fads, dismisses health foods as masochistic fashion and is particularly scathing about jogging.

He thinks ‘fashion’ in any sphere of life is ludicrously irrational. He is dismissive of doctors as a profession, who he accuses of rejecting statistical evidence, refusing to share information with patients, and wildly over-estimating their own diagnostic abilities.

Sutherland thinks the publishers of learned scientific journals are more interested in making money out of scientists than in ‘forwarding the progress of science’ (p.185).

He thinks the higher average pay that university graduates tend to get is unrelated to their attendance at university and more to do with having well connected middle- and upper-middle-class parents, and thus considers the efforts of successive Education Secretaries to introduce student loans to be unscientific and innumerate (p.186).

Surprisingly, he criticises Which consumer magazine for using too small samples in its testing (p.215).

In an extended passage he summarises Leslie Chapman’s blistering (and very out of date) critique of the civil service, Your Disobedient Servant published in 1978 (pp.69-75).

Sutherland really has it in for psychoanalysis, which he accuses of all sorts of irrational thinking such as projecting, false association, refusal to investigate negative instances, failing to take into account the likelihood that the patient would have improved anyway, and so on. Half-way through the book he gives a thumbnail summary:

Self-deceit exists on a massive scale: Freud was right about that. Where he went wrong was in attributing it all to the libido, the underlying sex drive. (p.197)

In other words, the book is liberally sprinkled with Sutherland’s own grumpy personal opinions, which sometimes risk giving it a crankish feel.

Against stupidity the gods themselves contend in vain

Neither this nor John Allen Paulos’s books take into account the obvious fact that lots of people are, how shall we put it, of low educational achievement. They begin with poor genetic material, are raised in families where no-one cares about education, are let down by poor schools, and are excluded or otherwise demotivated by the whole educational experience, with the result that :

  • the average reading age in the UK is 9
  • about one in five Britons (over ten million) are functionally illiterate, and probably about the same rate innumerate

His book, like all books of this type, is targeted at a relatively small proportion of the population, the well-educated professional classes. Most people aren’t like that. You want proof? Trump. Brexit. Boris Johnson landslide.

Trying to keep those pesky cognitive errors at bay (in fact The Witch by Pieter Bruegel the Elder)

Trying to keep those cognitive errors at bay (otherwise known as The Witch by Pieter Bruegel the Elder)


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Alex’s Adventures In Numberland by Alex Bellos (2010)

Alexander Bellos (born in 1969) is a British writer and broadcaster. He is the author of books about Brazil and mathematics, as well as having a column in The Guardian newspaper. After adventures in Brazil (see his Wikipedia page) he returned to England in 2007 and wrote this, his first book. It spent four months in the Sunday Times bestseller list and led on to five more popular maths books.

It’s a hugely enjoyable read for three reasons:

  1. Bellos immediately establishes a candid, open, good bloke persona, sharing stories from his early job as a reporter on the Brighton Argus, telling some colourful anecdotes about his time in Brazil and then being surprisingly open about the way that, when he moved back to Britain, he had no idea what to do. The tone of the book is immediately modern, accessible and friendly.
  2. However this doesn’t mean he is verbose. The opposite. The book is packed with fascinating information. Every single paragraph, almost every sentence contains a fact or insight which makes you sit up and marvel. It is stufffed with good things.
  3. Lastly, although its central theme is mathematics, it approaches this through a wealth of information from the humanities. There is as much history and psychology and anthropology and cultural studies and philosophy as there is actual maths, and these are all subjects which the average humanities graduate can immediately relate to and assimilate.

Chapter Zero – A Head for Numbers

Alex meets Pierre Pica, a linguist who’s studied the Munduruku people of the Amazon and discovered they have little or no sense of numbers. They only have names for numbers up to five. Also, they cluster numbers together logarithmically i.e. the higher the number, the closer together they clustered them. Same thing is done by kindergarten children who only slowly learn that numbers are evenly spaced, in a linear way.

This may be because small children and the Munduruku don’t count so much as estimate using the ratios between numbers.

It may also be because above a certain number (five) Stone Age man needed to make quick estimates along the lines of, Are there more wild animals / members of the other gang, than us?

Another possibility is that distance appears to us to be logarithmic due to perspective: the first fifty yards we see in close detail, the next fifty yards not so detailed, beyond 100 yards looking smaller, and so on.

It appears that we have to be actively taught when young to overcome our logarithmic instincts, and to apply the rule that each successive whole number is an equal distance from its predecessor and successor i.e. the rational numbers lies along a straight line at regular intervals.

More proof that the logarithmic approach is the deep, hard-wired one is the way most of us revert to its perspective when considering big numbers. As John Allen Paulos laments, people make no end of fuss about discrepancies between 2 or 3 or 4 – but are often merrily oblivious to the difference between a million or a billion, let alone a trillion. For most of us these numbers are just ‘big’.

He goes on to describe experiments done on chimpanzees, monkeys and lions which appear to show that animals have the ability to estimate numbers. And then onto experiments with small babies which appear to show that as soon as they can focus on the outside world, babies can detect changes in number of objects.

And it appears that we also have a further number skill, that guesstimating things – the journey takes 30 or 40 minutes, there were twenty or thirty people at the party, you get a hundred, maybe hundred and fifty peas in a sack. When it comes to these figures almost all of us give rough estimates.

To summarise:

  • we are sensitive to small numbers, acutely so of 1, 2, 3, 4, less so of 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
  • left to our own devices we think logarithmically about larger numbers i.e lose the sense of distinction between them, clump them together
  • we have a good ability to guesstimate medium size numbers – 30, 40, 100

But it was only with the invention of notation, a way of writing numbers down, that we were able to create the linear system of counting (where every number is 1 larger than its predecessor, laid out in a straight line, at regular intervals).

And that this cultural invention enabled human beings to transcend our vague guesstimating abilities, and laid the basis for the systematic manipulation of the world which followed

Chapter One – The Counter Culture

The probable origins of counting lie in stock taking in the early agricultural revolution some 8,000 years ago.

We nowadays count using a number base 10 i.e. the decimal system. But other bases have their virtues, especially base 12. It has more factors i.e. is easier to divide: 12 can be divided neatly by 2, 3, 4 and 6. A quarter of 10 is 2.5 but of 12 is 3. A third of 10 is 3.333 but of 12 is 4. Striking that a version of the duodecimal system (pounds, shillings and pence) hung on in Britain till we finally went metric in the 1970s. There is even a Duodecimal Society of America which still actively campaigns for the superiority of a base 12 counting scheme.

Bellos describes a bewildering variety of other counting systems and bases. In 1716 King Charles XII of Sweden asked Emmanuel Swedenborg to devise a new counting system with a base of 64. The Arara in the Amazon count in pairs, the Renaissance author Luca Paccioli was just one of hundreds who have devised finger-based systems of counting – indeed, the widespread use of base 10 probably stems from the fact that we have ten fingers and toes.

He describes a complicated Chinese system where every part of the hand and fingers has a value which allows you to count up to nearly a billion – on one hand!

The Yupno system which attributes a different value for parts of the body up to its highest number, 33, represented by the penis.

Diagram showing numbers attributed to parts of the body by the Yupno tribe

Diagram showing numbers attributed to parts of the body by the Yupno tribe

There’s another point to make about his whole approach which comes out if we compare him with the popular maths books by John Allen Paulos which I’ve just read.

Paulos clearly sees the need to leaven his explanations of comparative probability and Arrow’s Theorem and so on with lighter material and so his strategy is to chuck into his text things which interest him: corny jokes, anecdotes about baseball, casual random digressions which occur to him in mid-flow. But al his examples clearly 1. emanate from Paulos’s own interests and hobby horses (especially baseball) and 2. they are tacked onto the subjects being discussed.

Bellos, also, has grasped that the general reader needs to be spoonfed maths via generous helpings of other, more easily digestible material. But Bellos’s choice of material arises naturally from the topic under discussion. The humour emerges naturally and easily from the subject matter instead of being tacked on in the form of bad jokes.

You feel yourself in the hands of a master storyteller who has all sorts of wonderful things to explain to you.

In fourth millennium BC, an early counting system was created by pressing a reed into soft clay. By 2700 BC the Sumerians were using cuneiform. And they had number symbols for 1, 10, 60 and 3,600 – a mix of decimal and sexagesimal systems.

Why the Sumerians grouped their numbers in 60s has been described as one of the greatest unresolved mysteries in the history of arithmetic. (p.58)

Measuring in 60s was inherited by the Babylonians, the Egyptians and the Greeks and is why we still measure hours in 60 minutes and the divisions of a circle by 360 degrees.

I didn’t know that after the French Revolution, when the National Convention introduced the decimal system of weights and measures, it also tried to decimalise time, introducing a new system whereby every day would be divided into ten hours, each of a hundred minutes, each divided into 100 seconds. Thus there were a very neat 10 x 100 x 100 = 100,000 seconds in a day. But it failed. An hour of 60 minutes turns out to be a deeply useful division of time, intuitively measurable, and a reasonable amount of time to spend on tasks. The reform was quietly dropped after six months, although revolutionary decimal clocks still exist.

Studies consistently show that Chinese children find it easier to count than European children. This may be because of our system of notation, or the structure of number names. Instead of eleven or twelve, Chinese, Japanese and Koreans say the equivalent of ten one, ten two. 21 and 22 become two ten one and two ten two. It has been shown that this makes it a lot simpler and more intuitive to do basic addition and subtraction.

Bellos goes on to describe the various systems of abacuses which have developed in different cultures, before explaining the phenomenal popularity of abacus counting, abacus clubs, and abacus championships in Japan which helps kids develop the ability to perform anzan, using the mental image of an abacus to help its practitioners to sums at phenomenal speed.

Chapter Two – Behold!

The mystical sense of the deep meaning of numbers, from Pythagoras with his vegetarian religious cult of numbers in 4th century BC Athens to Jerome Carter who advises leading rap stars about the numerological significance of their names.

Euclid and the elegant and pure way he deduced mathematical theorems from a handful of basic axioms.

A description of the basic Platonic shapes leads into the nature of tessalating tiles, and the Arab pioneering of abstract design. The complex designs of the Sierpinski carpet and the Menger sponge. And then the complex and sophisticated world of origami, which has its traditionalists, its pioneers and surprising applications to various fields of advanced science, introducing us to the American guru of modern origami, Robert Lang, and the Japanese rebel, Kazuo Haga, father of Haga’s Theorem.

Chapter Three – Something About Nothing

A bombardment of information about the counting systems of ancient Hindus, Buddhists, about number symbols in Sanskrit, Hebrew, Greek and Latin. How the concept of zero was slowly evolved in India and moved to the Muslim world with the result that the symbols we use nowadays are known as the Arabic numerals.

A digression into ‘a set of arithmetical tricks known as Vedic Mathematics ‘ devised by a young Indian swami at the start of the twentieth century, Bharati Krishna Tirthaji, based on a series of 16 aphorisms which he found in the ancient holy texts known as the Vedas.

Shankaracharya is a commonly used title of heads of monasteries called mathas in the Advaita Vedanta tradition. Tirthaji was the Shankaracharya of the monastery at Puri. Bellos goes to visit the current Shankaracharya who explains the closeness, in fact the identity, of mathematics and Hindu spirituality.

Chapter Four – Life of Pi

An entire chapter about pi which turns out not only to be a fundamental aspect of calculating radiuses and diameters and volumes of circles and cubes, but also to have a long history of mathematicians vying with each other to work out its value to as many decimal places as possible (we currently know the value of pi to 2.7 trillion decimal places) and the surprising history of people who have set records reciting the value if pi.

Thus, in 2006, retired Japanese engineer Akira Haraguchi set a world record for reciting the value of pi to the first 100,000 decimal places from memory! It took 16 hours with five minute beaks every two hours to eat rice balls and drink some water.

There are several types or classes of numbers:

  • natural numbers – 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7…
  • integers – all the natural numbers, but including the negative ones as well – …-3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3…
  • fractions
  • which are also called rational numbers
  • numbers which cannot be written as fractions are called irrational numbers
  • transcendent numbers – ‘a transcendental number is an irrational number that cannot be described by an equation with a finite number of terms’

The qualities of the heptagonal 50p coin and the related qualities of the Reuleux triangle.

Chapter Five – The x-factor

The origin of algebra (in Arab mathematicians).

Bellos makes the big historical point that for the Greeks (Pythagoras, Plato, Euclid) maths was geometric. They thought of maths as being about shapes – circles, triangles, squares and so on. These shapes had hidden properties which maths revealed, thus giving – the Pythagoreans thought – insight into the secret deeper values of the world.

It is only with the introduction of algebra in the 17th century (Bellos attributes its widespread adoption to Descartes’s Method in the 1640s) that it is possible to fly free of shapes into whole new worlds of abstract numbers and formulae.

Logarithms turn the difficult operation of multiplication into the simpler operation of addition. If X x Y = Z, then log X + log Y = log Z. They were invented by a Scottish laird John Napier, and publicised in a huge book of logarithmic tables published in 1614. Englishman Henry Briggs established logarithms to base 10 in 1628. In 1620 Englishman Edmund Gunter marked logarithms on a ruler. Later in the 1620s Englishman William Oughtred placed two logarithmic rulers next to each other to create the slide rule.

Three hundred years of dominance by the slide rule was brought to a screeching halt by the launch of the first pocket calculator in 1972.

Quadratic equations are equations with an x and an x², e.g. 3x² + 2x – 4 = 0. ‘Quadratics have become so crucial to the understanding of the world, that it is no exaggeration to say that they underpin modern science’ (p.200).

Chapter Six – Playtime

Number games. The origin of Sudoku, which is Japanese for ‘the number must appear only once’. There are some 5 billion ways for numbers to be arranged in a table of nine cells so that the sum of any row or column is the same.

There have, apparently, only been four international puzzle crazes with a mathematical slant – the tangram, the Fifteen puzzle, Rubik’s cube and Sudoku – and Bellos describes the origin and nature and solutions to all four. More than 300 million cubes have seen sold since Ernö Rubik came up with the idea in 1974. Bellos gives us the latest records set in the hyper-competitive sport of speedcubing: the current record of restoring a copletely scrambled cube to order (i.e. all the faces of one colour) is 7.08 seconds, a record held by Erik Akkersdijk, a 19-year-old Dutch student.

A visit to the annual Gathering for Gardner, honouring Martin Gardner, one of the greatest popularisers of mathematical games and puzzles who Bellos visits. The origin of the ambigram, and the computer game Tetris.

Chapter Seven – Secrets of Succession

The joy of sequences. Prime numbers.

The fundamental theorem of arithmetic – In number theory, the fundamental theorem of arithmetic, also called the unique factorization theorem or the unique-prime-factorization theorem, states that every integer greater than 1 either is a prime number itself or can be represented as the product of prime numbers.

The Goldbach conjecture – one of the oldest and best-known unsolved problems in number theory and all of mathematics. It states that, Every even integer greater than 2 can be expressed as the sum of two primes. The conjecture has been shown to hold for all integers less than 4 × 1018, but remains unproven despite considerable effort.

Neil Sloane’s idea of persistence – The number of steps it takes to get to a single digit by multiplying all the digits of the preceding number to obtain a second number, then multiplying all the digits of that number to get a third number, and so on until you get down to a single digit. 88 has a persistence of three.

88 → 8 x 8 = 64 → 6 x 4 = 24 → 2 x 4 = 8

John Horton Conway’s idea of the powertrain – For any number abcd its powertrain goes to abcd, in the case of numbers with an odd number of digits the final one has no power, abcde’s powertrain is abcde.

The Recamán sequence Subtract if you can, unless a) it would result in a negative number or b) the number is already in the sequence. The result is:

0, 1, 3, 6, 2, 7, 13, 20, 12, 21, 11….

Gijswijt’s sequence a self-describing sequence where each term counts the maximum number of repeated blocks of numbers in the sequence immediately preceding that term.

1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3, 2, 1, …

Perfect number A perfect number is any number that is equal to the sum of its factors. Thus 6 – its factors (the numbers which divided into it) are 1, 2 and 3. Which also add up to (are the sum of) 6. The next perfect number is 28 because its factors – 1, 2, 4, 7, 14 – add up to 28. And so on.

Amicable numbers A number is amicable if the sum of the factors of the first number equals the second number, and if the sum of the factors of the second number equals the first. The factors of 220 are 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 11, 20, 22, 44, 55 and 110. Added together these make 284. The factors of 284 are 1, 2, 4, 71 and 142. Added together they make 220!

Sociable numbers In 1918 Paul Poulet invented the term sociable numbers. ‘The members of aliquot cycles of length greater than 2 are often called sociable numbers. The smallest two such cycles have length 5 and 28’

Mersenne’s prime A prime number which can be written in the form 2n – 1 a prime number that is one less than a power of two. That is, it is a prime number of the form Mn = 2n − 1 for some integer n. The exponents n which give Mersenne primes are 2, 3, 5, 7, 13, 17, 19, 31, … and the resulting Mersenne primes are 3, 7, 31, 127, 8191, 131071, 524287, 2147483647, …

These and every other sequence ever created by humankind are documented on The On-Line Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences (OEIS), also cited simply as Sloane’s. This is an online database of integer sequences, created and maintained by Neil Sloane while a researcher at AT&T Labs.

Chapter Eight – Gold Finger

The golden section a number found by dividing a line into two parts so that the longer part divided by the smaller part is also equal to the whole length divided by the longer part.

Phi The number is often symbolized using phi, after the 21st letter of the Greek alphabet. In an equation form:

a/b = (a+b)/a = 1.6180339887498948420 …

As with pi (the ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter), the digits go on and on, theoretically into infinity. Phi is usually rounded off to 1.618.

The Fibonnaci sequence Each number in the sequence is the sum of the two numbers that precede it. So the sequence goes: 0, 1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, and so on. The mathematical equation describing it is Xn+2= Xn+1 + Xn.

as the basis of seeds in flowerheads, arrangement of leaves round a stem, design of nautilus shell and much more.

Chapter Nine – Chance Is A Fine Thing

A chapter about probability and gambling.

Impossibility has a value 0, certainty a value 1, everything else is in between. Probabilities can be expressed as fractions e.g. 1/6 chance of rolling a 6 on a die, or as percentages, 16.6%, or as decimals, 0.16…

The probability is something not happening is 1 minus the probability of that thing happening.

Probability was defined and given mathematical form in 17th century. One contribution was the questions the Chevalier de Méré asked the mathematical prodigy Blaise Pascal. Pascal corresponded with his friend, Pierre de Fermat, and they worked out the bases of probability theory.

Expected value is what you can expect to get out of a bet. Bellos takes us on a tour of the usual suspects – rolling dice, tossing coins, and roulette (invented in France).

Payback percentage if you bet £10 at craps, you can expect – over time – to receive an average of about £9.86 back. In other words craps has a payback percentage of 98.6 percent. European roulette has a payback percentage of 97.3 percent. American roulette, 94.7 percent. On other words, gambling is a fancy way of giving your money away. A miserly slot machine has a payback percentage of 85%. The National Lottery has a payback percentage of 50%.

The law of large numbers The more you play a game of chance, the more likely the results will approach the statistical probability. Toss a coin three times, you might get three heads. Toss a coin a thousand times, the chances are you will get very close the statistical probability of 50% heads.

The law of very large numbers With a large enough sample, outrageous coincidences become likely.

The gambler’s fallacy The mistaken belief that, if something happens more frequently than normal during a given period, it will happen less frequently in the future (or vice versa). In other words, that a random process becomes less random, and more predictable, the more it is repeated.

The birthday paradox The probability that, in a set of n randomly chosen people, some pair of them will have the same birthday. By the pigeonhole principle, the probability reaches 100% when the number of people reaches 367 (since there are only 366 possible birthdays, including February 29). However, 99.9% probability is reached with just 70 people, and 50% probability with 23 people. (These conclusions are based on the assumption that each day of the year (excluding February 29) is equally probable for a birthday.) In other words you only need a group of 23 people to have an evens chance that two of them share a birthday.

The drunkard’s walk

The difficulty of attaining true randomness and the human addiction to finding meaning in anything.

The distinction between playing strategy (best strategy to win a game) and betting strategy (best strategy to maximise your winnings), not always the same.

Chapter Ten – Situation Normal

Carl Friedrich Gauss, the bell curve, normal distribution aka Gaussian distribution. Normal or Gaurrian distribution results in a bell curve. Bellos describes the invention and refinement of the bell curve (he explains that ‘the long tail’ results from a mathematician who envisioned a thin bell curve as looking like two kangaroos facing each other with their long tails heading off in opposite directions). And why

Regression to the mean – if the outcome of an event is determined at least in part by random factors, then an extreme event will probably be followed by one that is less extreme. And recent devastating analyses which show how startlingly random sports achievements are, from leading baseball hitters to Simon Kuper and Stefan Szymanski’s analysis of the form of the England soccer team.

Chapter Eleven – The End of the Line

Two breakthroughs which paved the way for modern i.e. 20th century, maths: the invention of non-Euclidean geometry, specifically the concept of hyperbolic geometry. To picture this draw a triangle on a Pringle. it is recognisably a triangle but all its angles do not add up to 180°, therefore it defies, escapes, eludes all the rule of Euclidean geometry, which were designed for flat 2D surfaces.

Bellos introduces us to Daina Taimina, a maths prof at Cornell University, who invented a way of crocheting hyperbolic surfaces. The result looks curly, like curly kale or the surface of coral.

Anyway, the breakaway from flat 2-D Euclidean space led to theories about curved geometry, either convex like a sphere, or hyperbolic like the pringle. It was this notion of curved space, which paved the way for Einstein’s breakthrough ideas in the early 20th century.

The second big breakthrough was Georg Cantor’s discovery that you can have many different types of infinity. Until Cantor the mathematical tradition from the ancient Greeks to Galileo and Newton had fought shy of infinity which threatened to disrupt so many formulae.

Cantor’s breakthrough was to stop thinking about numbers, and instead think of sets. This is demonstrated through the paradoxes of Hilbert’s Hotel. You need to buckle your safety belt to understand it.

Thoughts

This is easily the best book about maths I’ve ever read. It gives you a panoramic history of the subject which starts with innumerate cavemen and takes us to the edge of Einstein’s great discoveries. But Bellos adds to it all kinds of levels and abilities.

He is engaging and candid and funny. He is fantastically authoritative, taking us gently into forests of daunting mathematical theory without placing a foot wrong. He’s a great explainer. He knows a good story when he sees one, and how to tell it engagingly. And in every chapter there is a ‘human angle’ as he describes his own personal meetings and interviews with many of the (living) key players in the world of contemporary maths, games and puzzles.

Like the Ian Stewart book but on a vastly bigger scale, Bellos makes you feel what it is like to be a mathematician, not just interested in nature’s patterns (the basis of Stewart’s book, Nature’s Numbers) but in the beauty of mathematical theories and discoveries for their own sakes. (This comes over very strongly in chapter seven with its description of some of the weirdest and wackiest number sequences dreamed up by the human mind.) I’ve often read scientists describing the beauty of mathematical theories, but Bellos’s book really helps you develop a feel for this kind of beauty.

For me, I think three broad conclusions emerged:

1. Most mathematicians are in it for the fun. Setting yourself, and solving, mathematical puzzles is obviously extremely rewarding. Maths includes the vast territory of puzzles and games, such as the Sudoku and so on he describes in chapter six. Obviously it has all sorts of real-world application in physics, engineering and so on, but Bellos’s book really brings over that a true understanding of maths begins in puzzles, games and patterns, and often remains there for a lifetime. Like everything else maths is no highly professionalised the property of tenured professors in universities; and yet even to this day – as throughout its history – contributions can be made by enthusiastic amateurs.

2. As he points out repeatedly, many insights which started out as the hobby horses of obsessives, or arcane breakthroughs on the borders of our understanding, and which have been airily dismissed by the professionals, often end up being useful, having applications no-one dreamed of. Either they help unravel aspects of the physical universe undreamed of when they were discovered, or have been useful to human artificers. Thus the development of random number sequences seemed utterly pointless in the 19th century, but now underlies much internet security.

On a profounder note, Bellos expresses the eerie, mystical sense many mathematicians have that it seems so strange, so pregnant with meaning, that so many of these arcane numbers end up explaining aspects of the world their inventors knew nothing of. Ian Stewart has an admirably pragmatic explanation for this: he speculates that nature uses everything it can find in order to build efficient life forms. Or, to be less teleological, over the past 3 and a half billion years, every combination of useful patterns has been tried out. Given this length of time, and the incalculable variety of life forms which have evolved on this planet, it would be strange if every number system conceivable by one of those life forms – humankind – had not been tried out at one time or another.

3. My third conclusion is that, despite John Allen Paulos’s and Bellos’s insistence, I do not live in a world ever-more bombarded by maths. I don’t gamble on anything, and I don’t follow sports – the two biggest popular areas where maths is important – and the third is the twin areas of surveys and opinion polls (55% of Americans believe in alien abductions etc etc) and the daily blizzard of reports (for example, I see in today’s paper that the ‘Number of primary school children at referral units soars’).

I register their existence but they don’t impact on me for the simple reason that I don’t believe any of them. In 1992 every opinion poll said John Major would lose the general election, but he won with a thumping majority. Since then I haven’t believed any poll about anything. For example almost all the opinion polls predicted a win for Remain in the Brexit vote. Why does any sane person believe opinion polls?

And ‘new and shocking’ reports come out at the rate of a dozen a day and, on closer examination, lots of them turn out to be recycled information, or much much more mundane releases of data sets from which journalists are paid to draw the most shocking and extreme conclusions. Some may be of fleeting interest but once you really grasp that the people reporting them to you are paid to exaggerate and horrify, you soon learn to ignore them.

If you reject or ignore these areas – sport, gambling and the news (made up of rehashed opinion polls, surveys and reports) – then unless you’re in a profession which actively requires the sophisticated manipulation of figures, I’d speculate that most of the rest of us barely come into contact with numbers from one day to the next.

I think that’s the answer to Paulos and Bellos when they are in their ‘why aren’t more people mathematically numerate?’ mode. It’s because maths is difficult, and counter-intuitive, and hard to understand and follow, it is a lot of work, it does make your head ache. Even trying to solve a simple binomial equation hurt my brain.

But I think the biggest reason that ‘we’ are so innumerate is simply that – beautiful, elegant, satisfying and thought-provoking though maths may be to the professionals – maths is more or less irrelevant to most of our day to day lives, most of the time.


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Innumeracy by John Allen Paulos (1988)

Our innate desire for meaning and pattern can lead us astray… (p.81)

Giving due weight to the fortuitous nature of the world is, I think, a mark of maturity and balance. (p.133)

John Allen Paulos is an American professor of mathematics who won fame beyond his academic milieu with the publication of this short (134-page) but devastating book thirty years ago, the first of a series of books popularising mathematics in a range of spheres from playing the stock market to humour.

As Paulos explains in the introduction, the world is full of humanities graduates who blow a fuse if you misuse ‘infer’ and ‘imply’, or end a sentence with a dangling participle, but are quite happy to believe and repeat the most hair-raising errors in maths, statistics and probability.

The aim of this book was:

  • to lay out examples of classic maths howlers and correct them
  • to teach readers to be more alert when maths, stats and data need to be used
  • and to provide basic rules in order to understand when innumerate journalists, politicians, tax advisors and other crooks are trying to pull the wool over your eyes, or are just plain wrong

There are five chapters:

  1. Examples and principles
  2. Probability and coincidence
  3. Pseudoscience
  4. Whence innumeracy
  5. Statistics, trade-offs and society

Many common themes emerge:

Don’t personalise, numeratise

One contention of this book is that innumerate people characteristically have a strong tendency to personalise – to be misled by their own experiences, or by the media’s focus on individuals and drama… (p.1)

Powers

The first chapter uses lots of staggering statistics to get the reader used to very big and very small numbers, and how to compute them.

1 million seconds is 11 and a half days. 1 billion seconds is 32 years.

He suggests you come up with personal examples of numbers for each power up to 12 or 13 i.e. meaningful embodiments of thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands and so on to help you remember and contextualise them in a hurry.

A snail moves at 0.005 miles an hour, Concorde at 2,000 miles per hour. Escape velocity from earth is about 7 miles per second, or 25,000 miles per hour. The mass of the Earth is 5.98 x 1024 kg

Early on he tells us to get used to the nomenclature of ‘powers’ – using 10 to the power 3 or 10³ instead of 1,000, or 10 to negative powers to express numbers below 1. (In fact, right at this early stage I found myself stumbling because one thousand means more to me that 10³ and a thousandth means more than more 10-3 but if you keep at it, it is a trick you can acquire quite quickly.)

The additive principle

He introduces us to basic ideas like the additive principle (aka the rule of sum), which states that if some choice can be made in M different ways and some subsequent choice can be made in N different ways, then there are M x N different ways these choices can be made in succession – which can be applied to combinations of multiple items of clothes, combinations of dishes on a menu, and so on.

Thus the number of results you get from rolling a die is 6. If you roll two dice, you can now get 6 x 6 = 36 possible numbers. Three numbers = 216. If you want to exclude the number you get on the first dice from the second one, the chances of rolling two different numbers on two dice is 6 x 5, of rolling different numbers on three dice is 6 x 5 x 4, and so on.

Thus: Baskin Robbins advertises 31 different flavours of ice cream. Say you want a triple scoop cone. If you’re happy to have any combination of flavours, including where any 2 or 3 flavours are the same – that’s 31 x 31 x 31 = 29,791. But if you ask how many combinations of flavours there are, without a repetition of the same flavour in any of the cones – that is 31 x 30 x 29 = 26,970 ways of combining.

Probability

I struggled with even the basics of probability. I understand a 1 in five chance of something happening, reasonably understand a 20% chance of something happening, but struggled when probability was expressed as a decimal number e.g. 0.2 as a way of writing a 20 percent or 1 in 5 chance.

With the result that he lost me on page 16 on or about the place where he explained the following example.

Apparently a noted 17th century gambler asked the famous mathematician Pascal which is more likely to occur: obtaining at least one 6 in four rolls of a single die, or obtaining at least one 12 in twenty four rolls of a pair of dice. Here’s the solution:

Since 5/6 is the probability of not rolling a 6 on a single roll of a die, (5/6)is the probability of not rolling a 6 in four rolls of the die. Subtracting this number from 1 gives us the probability that this latter event (no 6s) doesn’t occur; in other words, of there being at least one 6 rolled in four tries: 1 – (5/6)= .52. Likewise, the probability of rolling at least one 12 in twenty-four rolls of a pair of dice is seen to be 1 – (35/36)24 = .49.

a) He loses me in the second sentence which I’ve read half a dozen times and still don’t understand – it’s where he says the chances that this latter event doesn’t occur: something about the phrasing there, about the double negative, loses me completely, with the result that b) I have no idea whether .52 is more likely or less likely than .49.

He goes on to give another example: if 20% of drinks dispensed by a vending machine overflow their cups, what is the probability that exactly three of the next ten will overflow?

The probability that the first three drinks overflow and the next seven do not is (.2)x (.8)7. But there are many different ways for exactly three of the ten cups to overflow, each way having probability (.2)x (.8)7. It may be that only the last three cups overflow, or only the fourth, fifth and ninth cups, and so on. Thus, since there are altogether (10 x 9 x 8) / (3 x 2 x 1) = 120 ways for us to pick three out of the ten cups, the probability of some collection of exactly three cups overflowing is 120 x (.2)x (.8)7.

I didn’t understand the need for the (10 x 9 x 8) / (3 x 2 x 1) equation – I didn’t understand what it was doing, and so didn’t understand what it was measuring, and so didn’t understand the final equation. I didn’t really have a clue what was going on.

In fact, by page 20, he’d done such a good job of bamboozling me with examples like this that I sadly concluded that I must be innumerate.

More than that, I appear to have ‘maths anxiety’ because I began to feel physically unwell as I read that problem paragraph again and again and again and didn’t understand it. I began to feel a tightening of my chest and a choking sensation in my throat. Rereading it now is making it feel like someone is trying to strangle me.

Maybe people don’t like maths because being forced to confront something you don’t understand, but which everyone around you is saying is easy-peasy, makes you feel ill.

2. Probability and coincidence

Having more or less given up on trying to understand Paulos’s maths demonstrations in the first twenty pages, I can at least latch on to his verbal explanations of what he’s driving at, in sentences like these:

A tendency to drastically underestimate the frequency of coincidences is a prime characteristic of innumerates, who generally accord great significance to correspondences of all sorts while attributing too little significance to quite conclusive but less flashy statistical evidence. (p.22)

It would be very unlikely for unlikely events not to occur. (p.24)

There is a strong general tendency to filter out the bad and the failed and to focus on the good and the successful. (p.29)

Belief in the… significance of coincidences is a psychological remnant of our past. It constitutes a kind of psychological illusion to which innumerate people are particularly prone. (p.82)

Slot machines light up and make a racket when people win, there is unnoticed silence for all the failures. Big winners on the lottery are widely publicised, whereas every one of the tens of millions of failures is not.

One result is ‘Golden Age’ thinking when people denigrate today’s sports or arts or political figures, by comparison with one or two super-notable figures from the vast past, Churchill or Shakespeare or Michelangelo, obviously neglecting the fact that there were millions of also-rans and losers in their time as well as ours.

The Expected value of a quality is the average of its values weighted according to their probabilities. I understood these words but I didn’t understand any of the five examples he gave.

The likelihood of probability In many situations, improbability is to be expected. The probability of being dealt a particular hand of 13 cards in bridge is less than 1 in 600 billion. And yet it happens every time someone is dealt a hand in bridge. The improbable can happen. In fact it happens all the time.

The gambler’s fallacy The belief that, because a tossed coin has come up tails for a number of tosses in a row, it becomes steadily more likely that the next toss will be a head.

3. Pseudoscience

Paulos rips into Freudianism and Marxism for the way they can explain away any result counter to their ‘theories’. The patient gets better due to therapy: therapy works. The patient doesn’t get better during therapy, well the patient was resisting, projecting their neuroses on the therapist, any of hundreds of excuses.

But this is just warming up before he rips into a real bugbear of  his, the wrong-headedness of Parapsychology, the Paranormal, Predictive dreams, Astrology, UFOs, Pseudoscience and so on.

As with predictive dreams, winning the lottery or miracle cures, many of these practices continue to flourish because it’s the handful of successes which stand out and grab our attention and not the thousands of negatives.

Probability

As Paulos steams on with examples from tossing coins, rolling dice, playing roulette, or poker, or blackjack, I realise all of them are to do with probability or conditional probability, none of which I understand.

This is why I have never gambled on anything, and can’t play poker. When he explains precisely how accumulating probabilities can help you win at blackjack in a casino, I switch off. I’ve never been to a casino. I don’t play blackjack. I have no intention of ever playing blackjack.

When he says that probability theory began with gambling problems in the seventeenth century, I think, well since I don’t gamble at all, on anything, maybe that’s why so much of this book is gibberish to me.

Medical testing and screening

Apart from gambling the two most ‘real world’ areas where probability is important appear to be medicine and risk and safety assessment. Here’s an extended example he gives of how even doctors make mistakes in the odds.

Assume there is a test for cancer which is 98% accurate i.e. if someone has cancer, the test will be positive 98 percent of the time, and if one doesn’t have it, the test will be negative 98 percent of the time. Assume further that .5 percent – one out of two hundred people – actually have cancer. Now imagine that you’ve taken the test and that your doctor sombrely informs you that you have tested positive. How depressed should you be? The surprising answer is that you should be cautiously optimistic. To find out why, let’s look at the conditional probability of your having cancer, given that you’ve tested positive.

Imagine that 10,000 tests for cancer are administered. Of these, how many are positive? On the average, 50 of these 10,000 people (.5 percent of 10,000) will have cancer, and, so, since 98 percent of them will test positive, we will have 49 positive tests. Of the 9,950 cancerless people, 2 percent of them will test positive, for a total of 199 positive tests (.02 x 9,950 = 199). Thus, of the total of 248 positive tests (199 + 49 = 248), most (199) are false positives, and so the conditional probability of having cancer given that one tests positive is only 49/248, or about 20 percent! (p.64)

I struggled to understand this explanation. I read it four or five times, controlling my sense of panic and did, eventually, I think, follow the argumen.

However, worse in a way, when I think I did finally understand it, I realised I just didn’t care. It’s not just that the examples he gives are hard to follow. It’s that they’re hard to care about.

Whereas his descriptions of human psychology and cognitive errors in human thinking are crystal clear and easy to assimilate:

If we have no direct evidence of theoretical support for a story, we find that detail and vividness vary inversely with likelihood; the more vivid details there are to a story, the less likely the story is to be true. (p.84)

4. Whence innumeracy?

It came as a vast relief when Paulos stopped trying to explain probability and switched to a long chapter puzzling over why innumeracy is so widespread in society, which kicks off by criticising the poor level of teaching of maths in school and university.

This was like the kind of hand-wringing newspaper article you can read any day of the week in a newspaper or online, and so felt reassuringly familiar and easy to assimilate. I stopped feeling so panic-stricken.

This puzzling over the disappointing level of innumeracy goes on for quite a while. Eventually it ends with a digression about what appears to be a pet idea of his: the notion of introducing a safety index for activities and illnesses.

Paulos’s suggestion is that his safety index would be on a logarithmic scale, like the Richter Scale – so straightaway he has to explain what a logarithm is: The logarithm for 100 is 2 because 100 is 102, the logarithm for 1,000 is 3 because 1,000 is 103. I’m with him so far, as he goes on to explain that the logarithm of 700 i.e. between 2 (100) and 3 (1,000) is 2.8. Since 1 in 5,300 Americans die in a car crash each year, the safety index for driving would be 3.7, the logarithm of 5,300. And so on with numerous more examples, whose relative risks or dangers he reduces to figures like 4.3 and 7.1.

I did understand his aim and the maths of this. I just thought it was bonkers:

1. What is the point of introducing a universal index which you would have to explain every time anyone wanted to use it? Either it is designed to be usable by the widest possible number of citizens; or it is a neat exercise on maths to please other mathematicians and statisticians.

2. And here’s the bigger objection – What Paulos, like most of the university-educated, white, liberal intellectuals I read in papers, magazines and books, fails to take into account is that a large proportion of the population is thick.

Up to a fifth of the adult population of the UK is functionally innumerate, that means they don’t know what a ‘25% off’ sign means on a shop window. For me an actual social catastrophe being brought about by this attitude is the introduction of Universal Credit by the Conservative government which, from top to bottom, is designed by middle-class, highly educated people who’ve all got internet accounts and countless apps on their smartphones, and who have shown a breath-taking ignorance about what life is like for the poor, sick, disabled, illiterate and innumerate people who are precisely the people the system is targeted at.

Same with Paulos’s scheme. Smoking is one of the most dangerous and stupid things which any human can do. Packs of cigarettes have for years, now, carried pictures of disgusting cancerous growths and the words SMOKING KILLS. And yet despite this, about a fifth of adults, getting on for 10 million people, still smoke. 🙂

Do you really think that introducing a system using ornate logarithms will get people to make rational assessments of the risks of common activities and habits?

Paulos then goes on to complicate the idea by suggesting that, since the media is always more interested in danger than safety, maybe it would be more effective, instead of creating a safety index, to create a danger index.

You would do this by

  1. working out the risk of an activity (i.e. number of deaths or accidents per person doing the activity)
  2. converting that into a logarithmic value (just to make sure than nobody understands it) and then
  3. subtracting the logarithmic value of the safety index from 10, in order to create a danger index

He goes on to say that driving a car and smoking would have ‘danger indices’ of 3.7 and 2.9, respectively. The trouble was that by this point I had completely ceased to understand what he’s saying. I felt like I’ve stepped off the edge of a tall building into thin air. I began to have that familiar choking sensation, as if someone was squeezing my chest. Maths anxiety.

Under this system being kidnapped would have a safety index of 6.7. Playing Russian roulette once a year would have a safety index of 0.8.

It is symptomatic of the uselessness of the whole idea that Paulos has to remind you what the values mean (‘Remember that the bigger the number, the smaller the risk.’ Really? You expect people to run with this idea?)

Having completed the danger index idea, Paulos returns to his extended lament on why people don’t like maths. He gives a long list of reasons why he thinks people are so innumerate a condition which is, for him, a puzzling mystery.

For me this lament is a classic example of what you could call intellectual out-of-touchness. He is genuinely puzzled why so many of his fellow citizens are innumerate, can’t calculate simple odds and fall for all sorts of paranormal, astrology, snake-oil blether.

He proposes typically academic, university-level explanations for this phenomenon – such as that people find maths too cold and analytical and worry that it prevents them thinking about the big philosophical questions in life. He worries that maths has an image problem.

In other words, he fails to consider the much more obvious explanation that maths, probability and numeracy in general might be a combination of fanciful, irrelevant and deeply, deeply boring.

I use the word ‘fanciful’ deliberately. When he writes that the probability of drawing two aces in succession from a pack of cards is not (4/52 x 4/52) but (4/52 x 3/51) I do actually understand the distinction he’s making (having drawn one ace there are only 3 left and only 52 cards left) – I just couldn’t care less. I really couldn’t care less.

Or take this paragraph:

Several years ago Pete Rose set a National League record by hitting safely in forty-four consecutive games. If we assume for the sake of simplicity that he batted .300 (30 percent of the time he got a hit, 70 percent of the time he didn’t) and that he came to bat four times a game, the chances of his not getting a hit in any given game were, assuming independence, (.7)4 – .24… [at this point Paulos has to explain what ‘independence’ means in a baseball context: I couldn’t care less]… So the probability he would get at least one hit in any game was 1-.24 = .76. Thus, the chances of him getting a hit in any given sequence of forty-four consecutive games were (.76)44 = .0000057, a tiny probability indeed. (p.44)

I did, in fact, understand the maths and the working out in this example. I just don’t care about the problem or the result.

For me this is a – maybe the – major flaw of this book. This is that in the blurbs on the front and back, in the introduction and all the way through the text, Paulos goes on and on about how we as a society need to be mathematically numerate because maths (and particularly probability) impinges on so many areas of our life.

But when he tries to show this – when he gets the opportunity to show us what all these areas of our lives actually are – he completely fails.

Almost all of the examples in the book are not taken from everyday life, they are remote and abstruse problems of gambling or sports statistics.

  • which is more likely: obtaining at least one 6 in four rolls of a single die, or obtaining at least one 12 in twenty four rolls of a pair of dice?
  • if 20% of drinks dispensed by a vending machine overflow their cups, what is the probability that exactly three of the next ten will overflow?
  • Assume there is a test for cancer which is 98% accurate i.e. if someone has cancer, the test will be positive 98 percent of the time, and if one doesn’t have it, the test will be negative 98 percent of the time. Assume further that .5 percent – one out of two hundred people – actually have cancer. Now imagine that you’ve taken the test and that your doctor sombrely informs you that you have tested positive. How depressed should you be?
  • What are the odds on Pete Rose getting a hit in a sequence of forty-four games?

Are these the kinds of problems you are going to encounter today? Or tomorrow? Or ever?

No. The longer the book went on, the more I realised just how little a role maths plays in my everyday life. In fact more or less the only role maths plays in my life is looking at the prices in supermarkets, where I am attracted to goods which have a temporary reduction on them. But I do that because they’re labels are coloured red, not because I calculate the savings. Being aware of the time, so I know when to do household chores or be somewhere punctually. Those are the only times I used numbers today.

5. Statistics, trade-offs and society

This feeling that the abstruseness of the examples utterly contradicts the bold claims that reading the book will help us with everyday experiences was confirmed in the final chapter, which begins with the following example.

Imagine four dice, A, B, C and D, strangely numbered as follows: A has 4 on four faces and 0 on two faces; B has 3s on all six faces; C has four faces with 2 and two faces with 6; and D has 5 on three faces and 1 on three faces…

I struggled to the end of this sentence and just thought: ‘No, no more, I don’t have to make myself feel sick and unhappy any more’ – and skipped the couple of pages detailing the fascinating and unexpected results you can get from rolling such a collection of dice.

This chapter goes on to a passage about the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a well-known problem in logic, which I have read about and instantly forgotten scores of times over the years.

Paulos gives us three or four variations on the idea, including:

  • Imagine you are locked up in prison by a philanthropist with 20 other people.

Or:

  • Imagine you are locked in a dungeon by a sadist with 20 other people.

Or:

  • Imagine you are one of two drug traffickers making a quick transaction on a street corner and forced to make a quick decision.

Or:

  • Imagine you are locked in a prison cell, and another prisoner is locked in an identical cell down the corridor.

Well, I’m not any of these things, I’m never likely to be, and I am not really interested in these fanciful speculations.

Moreover, I am well into middle age, have travelled round the world, had all sorts of jobs in companies small, large and enormous – and I am not aware of having ever been in any situation which remotely resembled any variation of the Prisoner’s Dilemma I’ve ever heard of.

In other words, to me, it is another one of the endless pile of games and puzzles which logicians and mathematicians love to spend all day playing but which have absolutely no impact whatsoever on any aspect of my life.

Pretty much all of his examples conclusively prove how remote mathematical problems and probabilistic calculation is from the everyday lives you and I lead. When he asks:

How many people would there have to be in a group in order for the probability to be half that at least two people in it have the same birthday? (p.23)

Imagine a factory which produces small batteries for toys, and assume the factory is run by a sadistic engineer… (p.117)

It dawns on me that my problem might not be that I’m innumerate, so much as I’m just uninterested in trivial or frivolous mental exercises.

Someone offers you a choice of two envelopes and tells you one has twice as much money in it as the other. (p.127)

Flip a coin continuously until a tail appears for the first time. If this doesn’t happen until the twentieth (or later) flip, you win $1 billion. If the first tail occurs before the twentieth flip, you pay $100. Would you play? (p.128)

No. I’d go and read an interesting book.

Thoughts

If Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and Its Consequences is meant to make its readers more numerate, it failed with me.

This is for a number of reasons:

  1. crucially – because he doesn’t explain maths very well; or, the way he explained probability had lost me by about page 16 – in other words, if this is meant to be a primer for innumerate people it’s a fail
  2. because the longer it goes on, the more convinced I became that I rarely use maths, arithmetic and probability in my day today life: whole days go by when I don’t do a single sum, and so lost all motivation to submit myself to the brain-hurting ordeal of trying to understand his examples

3. Also because the structure and presentation of the book is a mess. The book meanders through a fog of jokes, anecdotes and maths trivia, baseball stories and gossip about American politicians – before suddenly unleashing a fundamental aspect of probability theory on the unwary reader.

I’d have preferred the book to have had a clear, didactic structure, with an introduction and chapter headings explaining just what he was going to do, an explanation, say, of how he was going to take us through some basic concepts of probability one step at a time.

And then for the concepts to have been laid out very clearly and explained very clearly, from a number of angles, giving a variety of different examples until he and we were absolutely confident we’d got it – before we moved on to the next level of complexity.

The book is nothing like this. Instead it sacrifices any attempt at logical sequencing or clarity for anecdotes about Elvis Presley or UFOs, for digressions about Biblical numerology, the silliness of astrology, the long and bewildering digression about introducing a safety index for activities (summarised above), or prolonged analyses of baseball or basketball statistics. Oh, and a steady drizzle of terrible jokes.

Which two sports have face-offs?
Ice hockey and leper boxing.

Half way through the book, Paulos tells us that he struggles to write long texts (‘I have a difficult time writing at extended length about anything’, p.88), and I think it really shows.

It certainly explains why:

  • the blizzard of problems in coin tossing and dice rolling stopped without any warning, as he switched tone copletely, giving us first a long chapter about all the crazy irrational beliefs people hold, and then another chapter listing all the reasons why society is innumerate
  • the last ten pages of the book give up the attempt of trying to be a coherent narrative and disintegrate into a bunch of miscellaneous odds and ends he couldn’t find a place for in the main body of the text

Also, I found that the book was not about numeracy in the broadest sense, but mostly about probability. Again and again he reverted to examples of tossing coins and rolling dice. One enduring effect of reading this book is going to be that, the next time I read a description of someone tossing a coin or rolling a die, I’m just going to skip right over the passage, knowing that if I read it I’ll either be bored to death (if I understand it) or have an unpleasant panic attack (if I don’t).

In fact in the coda at the end of the book Paulos explicitly says it has mostly been about probability – God, I wish he’d explained that at the beginning.

Right at the very, very end he briefly lists key aspects of probability theory which he claims to have explained in the book – but he hasn’t, some of them are only briefly referred to with no explanation at all, including: statistical tests and confidence intervals, cause and correlation, conditional probability, independence, the multiplication principle, the notion of expected value and of probability distribution.

These are now names I have at least read about, but they are all concepts I am nowhere near understanding, and light years away from being able to use in practical life.

Innumeracy – or illogicality?

Also there was an odd disconnect between the broadly psychological and philosophical prose explanations of what makes people so irrational, and the incredibly narrow scope of the coin-tossing, baseball-scoring examples.

What I’m driving at is that, in the long central chapter on Pseudoscience, when he stopped to explain what makes people so credulous, so gullible, he didn’t really use any mathematical examples to disprove Freudianism or astrology or so on: he had to appeal to broad principles of psychology, such as:

  • people are drawn to notable exceptions, instead of considering the entire field of entities i.e.
  • people filter out the bad and the failed and focus on the good and the successful
  • people seize hold of the first available explanation, instead of considering every single possible permutation
  • people humanise and personalise events (‘bloody weather, bloody buses’)
  • people over-value coincidences

My point is that there is a fundamental conceptual confusion in the book which is revealed in the long chapter about pseudoscience which is that his complaint is not, deep down, right at bottom, that people are innumerate; it is that people are hopelessly irrational and illogical.

Now this subject – the fundamental ways in which people are irrational and illogical – is dealt with much better, at much greater length, in a much more thorough, structured and comprehensible way in Stuart Sutherland’s great book, Irrationality, which I’ll be reviewing and summarising later this week.

Innumeracy amounts to random scratches on the surface of the vast iceberg which is the deep human inability to think logically.

Conclusion

In summary, for me at any rate, this was not a good book – badly structured, meandering in direction, unable to explain even basic concepts but packed with digressions, hobby horses and cul-de-sacs, unsure of its real purpose, stopping for a long rant against pseudosciences and an even longer lament on why maths is taught so badly  – it’s a weird curate’s egg of a text.

Its one positive effect was to make me want to track down and read a good book about probability.


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Psychology

Casino Royale by Ian Fleming (1953)

‘It’s not difficult to get a Double O number if you’re prepared to kill people.’ (p.64)

The casino in question is in the fictional French town of Royale-les-Eaux, just north of Dieppe, near the mouth of the river Somme (p.34), based on the holiday resorts of Deaville and Trouville – ie not the sunny south of France

James Bond is an agent for the British Secret Service. Their offices are in a gloomy building overlooking Regents Park. Its head is ‘M’ (p.14) whose personal secretary is Miss Moneypenny (p.23) who ‘would have been desirable but for eyes which were cool and direct and quizzical’. Bond has a Double O number because he has killed in the line of duty: to be precise, a Japanese cipher expert in New York and a Norwegian double agent in Stockholm (p.64 and p. 142).

Bond Biography

Bond lives in a flat in Chelsea. His only personal hobby is ‘one of the last of the 4.5 litre Bentleys with the supercharger by Amherst Villiers’, a battleship convertible coupé which he bought in 1933 (p.36). He is given penetrating awareness of everything around him, especially other people’s appearances, particularly women (eg the page-long description of Vesper Lynd pp.38-39).

Vesper thinks Bond looks like a cold, ruthless version of the popular singer and pianist Hoagy Carmichael (p.40), though when Bond himself looks in the mirror he sees cold grey-blue eyes, and a vertical scar down his right cheek, not much like Carmichael (p.57). Asleep, when the warmth and humour have left his eyes, Bond’s features relapse ‘into a taciturn mask, ironical, brutal, and cold.’ (p.13) He is a ‘harsh, cold’ man (p.151).

Le Chiffre

Bond has been sent to Royale-les-Eaux on a mission. The man known as ‘Le Chiffre’ has risen from being a Displaced Person after the War, to become one of the KGB’s top agents in France and undercover paymaster to the 50,000-strong communist-controlled Trade Union of Workers of Alsace, on the border with Germany and therefore an important fifth column if war with Russia breaks out. He is controlled by KGB ‘Leningrad Section III’.

Le Chiffre is a clever man, a cunning strategist, a cool gambler. But he has made a bad mistake. He embezzled a big sum of funds from the Union – funds ultimately belonging to the Russians. With them he bought a chain of a dozen or so brothels and porn shops. Unfortunately, soon afterwards, the French government passed a law banning both brothels and porn. He lost the lot. In fear of what will happen when his Soviet paymasters find out, le Chiffre travels to Royale-les-Eaux (which has become a notorious high-stakes gambling centre) and, in the time-honoured fashion of embezzlers who need to pay back their funds, is hoping to get lucky in the casino and win back the money.

The mission

Bond’s mission is to beat le Chiffre at the gambling tables. To humiliate a major Soviet agent and the large communist union he manages, probably leading to le Chiffre being eliminated by his own side, an organisational and propaganda victory for our side. The execution would be done by SMERSH, the Soviet execution agency – a word formed by joining two Russian words smyert shpionam Death to spies! (history & overview given on pages 21 and 147).

Bond has been handed a large amount to gamble with and the ‘cover’ of being a playboy millionaire inheritor of a large fortune in Jamaica. He is helped by Mathis, an agent from the French Deuxième Bureau, and Felix Leiter, from the American CIA (full description page 53).

A connoisseur spy

‘I take a ridiculous pleasure in what I eat and drink.’ (p.61)

Bond is a connoisseur of good food and drink, of guns, cars and women. Rereading Casino Royale it struck me that:

  • In previous literature, this level of connoisseurship was restricted to aristocratic characters, and not a usual characteristic of the special agent genre, as embodied by John Buchan, Bulldog Drummond or the ordinary bloke heroes of Eric Ambler. One element of Bond’s success is combining the visceral excitement of the spy thriller – traditionally thought of as a pulpy or low genre – with a level of upper-class connoisseurship previously restricted to more high-brow literature.
  • Bond really enjoys the things he likes, and Fleming manages to convey this enjoyment very powerfully. There are not that many stereotypical thriller scenes (one bomb goes off, there’s a very long card game, a car chase and an extended torture scene). What dominates the text is Bond’s supremely sensual enjoyment of what he likes: food, cigarettes, fast cars, fancy drinks, looking at a beautiful woman in expensive clothes.

Bond’s likes

In fact, the word ‘like’ crops up frequently. ‘Bond liked to make a good breakfast’ (p.28): in this instance, half a pint of iced orange juice, three scrambled eggs and bacon, and a double portion of coffee without sugar, followed by the first cigarette of the day, ‘a Balkan and Turkish mixture made for him by Morlands of Grosvenor Street’.

The pleasure of good food

When he orders paté de foie gras he makes sure it comes with a porcelain pot of very hot water to dip the knife in so it will cut through the paté more easily (p.45). He gives the barman at the casino very precise instructions to make him a cocktail from – three measures of Gordon’s, one of vodka, half a measure of Kina Lillet, shaken very well until it’s ice-cold, then garnished with a large thin slice of lemon-peel. ‘I never have more than one drink before dinner. But I do like that one to be large and very strong and very cold and very well-made.’ (p.51)

He has one large dinner with the woman assigned to assist him on the mission, Vesper Lynd, which is described in loving detail: Vesper orders caviar (Bond ensures it comes with plenty of toast, always the issue with caviar) then plain grilled rognon de veau with pommes soufflés, and for dessert fraises de bois with a lot of cream; while Bond shares the caviar starter before moving on to a very small tournedos, underdone, with sauce Béarnaise and a coeur d’artichaut, and then (surprisingly) half an avocado with a little vinaigrette for dessert. And champagne to drink, Bond thinks the Taittinger 45, though the sommelier tactfully suggests the Blanc de Blanc Brut 1943 might be more appropriate. Wow.

The pleasure of gambling

During the long scene in the casino where Bond battles Le Chiffre at baccarat, Fleming explains the rules with crystal clarity so that even a non-gambler like myself gets drawn into the exciting battle of wills. Not only explains what’s at stake, but conveys the enjoyment.

‘Bond had always been a gambler. He loved the dry riffle of the cards and the constant unemphatic drama of the quiet figures round the green tables. He liked the solid, studied comfort of card-rooms and casinos, the well-padded arms of chairs, the glass of champagne or whisky at the elbow, the quiet unhurried attention of good servants… He liked being an actor and spectator… Above all he liked it that everything was one’s own fault…’ (p.47)

The pleasure of BDSM sex

When, after pages of the very long card sequence, Le Chiffre finally loses all his money (and thus Bond’s mission is complete) Bond is fantastically relieved. He cashes his checks and tokens in at the casino bank, then takes Vesper for a drink. Coming down off the tense high of the card game, he imagines having sex with Vesper, but not vanilla sex; rather, sex which involves domination and pain, tears and ecstasy.

He wanted her cold and arrogant body. He wanted to see tears and desire in her remote blue eyes and to take the ropes of her black hair in his hands and bend her long body back under his. (p.98)

Later, he repeats the same feeling only that, knowing Vesper better, and having become more intrigued by her mystery, he imagines the sexual act with deeper intimacy and fervour.

And now he knew that she was profoundly, excitingly sensual, but that the conquest of her body, because of the central privacy in her, would each time have the sweet tang of rape. Loving her physically would each time be a thrilling voyage without the anticlimax of arrival. She would surrender herself avidly, he thought, and greedily enjoy all the intimacies of the bed without ever allowing herself to be possessed. (p.167)

Where it is clear from the context, and from the descriptions of his deepening feelings for Vesper, that the word ‘rape’ is used in a BDSM context, meaning the agreed, permissive role-playing of violent or aggressive domination and submission, which is designed to take its participants to higher levels of sensuality and intimacy. Emphatically not the backstreet violence, the ugly violation of actual real-world rape.

The pleasure of driving a fast car

But before this can happen, Vesper is kidnapped by Le Chiffre’s people and Bond gives chase in the Bentley. Although there are technical descriptions of rear-wheel drives and superchargers and so on, what comes over most in this car chase is the sheer physical pleasure Bond gets from driving a superbly engineered car with supreme skill.

The baddies wait on a bend and lace the road with anti-tyre nails so that Bond’s lovely Bentley crashes at high speed and he is pulled unconscious from the wreckage, taken in the baddy’s car, along with the unconscious Lynd, to an isolated farmhouse and there tortured by Le Chiffre.

The masochistic pleasure of being tortured

Le Chiffre cuts away the seat of a cane chair and has Bond tied naked to it so his genitals are hanging down through the gap. Le Chiffre then proceeds to beat his genitals very hard with a domestic carpet beater until Bond is unconscious with pain, covered in sweat and there is a pool of blood under the chair from his damaged body. As he does so Le Chiffre’s eyes look at him ‘almost caressingly’ (p.120).

Linked to the S&M vision of sex with Vesper, this gross torture scene is part of the sensual world the book inhabits, a world of physical pleasures and terrifying pains. The horrifying torture is the mirror image of the cold showers, the slick grooming, the smooth shaves and bow ties which precede the fine dinners.

It reaches its climax when Le Chiffre, mock sorrowful that Bond has not revealed to him the location of the vast cheque of his winnings (which, understandably, he wants to steal) takes out a big kitchen knife and advances on Bond to emasculate him. ‘Say goodbye to it, Mr Bond’ (p.127). Presumably this means Le Chiffre is going to cut Bond’s penis off.

Le Chiffre had earlier assured Bond that this wasn’t the kind of ‘romantic adventure’ in which the hero is rescued by magic. But in fact it is. As Le Chiffre advances to castrate Bond, a mysterious voice sounds in the gloom. It is an agent of SMERSH sent to terminate him for his stealing of the KGB funds, which Russia has, after all, found out about. ‘Phut’ goes the silenced gun and Le Chiffre falls dead. The SMERSH agent whispers in Bond’s ear that, unfortunately, he has no orders to kill him, but he sadistically carves the Russian character for the first letter of Spionam into his right hand, and departs.

The pleasure of recovery

Out of a fog of anaesthetics Bond surfaces in a French hospital. The police had found his crashed car, searched nearby houses and discovered him and Vesper with the corpses of Le Chiffre and his henchmen. The doctors are (of course) amazed at Bond’s superhuman powers of endurance and, indeed, recovery. Miraculously ‘he’ will heal – ie his testicles, which you would have thought would have been mashed to pieces, will be restored to good working order. What is more restful and pleasurable than lying in a hospital bed, doped with local anaesthetic, being ordered to do nothing, think of nothing, and just be fed and watered day and night?

Vesper’s betrayal

The novel could have ended about here, when Bond – surprisingly – tells Mathis, who’s come to visit him in hospital, that he’s going to quit his job. In a couple of pages of schoolboy philosophising he says it’s getting harder to tell the good guys from the bad guys. Well, don’t fight for principles, Mathis advises him; fight for the people you love and against the people who are threatening them.

Bond is worried he won’t have healed enough to have sex with Vesper (or anyone) so is sensitive when she visits him in hospital. After visiting every day for a week or more, Vesper says she has found a quiet little boarding house down the coast and arranged for them to stay. They drive there with basic belongings and begin what should be an idyllic beach holiday. There is a sensuous build-up with swimming from the deserted beach, an immaculate home-made French dinner, and then passionate love-making.

But almost immediately Vesper becomes tense and nervous. Next morning Bond catches her making a secretive phone call which she unconvincingly lies about. She is convinced someone has followed them to the boarding house, and when a passing commercial traveller stops for lunch, she tenses with fear.

They continue the days of sunbathing and nights of good food and sex, but Vesper cries half the time and is irreparably sad. There is one last night of love before which Vesper insists on getting tipsy, and then the terrified patron wakes Bond early the next morning (it is the respectable 1950s, so Bond and Vesper had been given separate rooms). Bond rushes down to the hall to find Vesper dead in her bed. She has committed suicide by taking an overdose of sleeping pills.

Next to her is a farewell letter in which she reveals that she has been a double agent working for the Soviet MWD for years, ever since the Russians got hold of her Polish RAF pilot lover. The Russians promised he’d be safe if she spied for them. And so for years – years, Bond reflects bitterly, during which he has been gallivanting round the globe like a schoolboy adventurer bumping off cartoon baddies – the real traitor has been working in the heart of his organisation, quietly copying top secret files and sending their contents to Moscow.

Vesper admits that she betrayed every detail of the Le Chiffre mission to Moscow, including Bond’s cover story and aims. In the casino, she distracted Leiter so Le Chiffre’s would-be assassin could come close to killing Bond, with a silenced concealed gun. And, she reveals, her kidnap by Le Chiffre was all a put-up job to entrap him. Vesper goes on to say she genuinely fell in love with Bond but didn’t want to betray her Polish lover, and when she stopped regularly messaging her Paris contact, she knew they would send someone for her, someone from SMERSH. Which explains her irrational fear of the ‘commercial traveller’. So now she’s taken the only way out of her hopelessly tangled, compromised plight.

The bitch is dead

Bond crumples up the letter, all sentiment for her evaporated. All this time she was a spy doing her country inestimable damage. And he had grand-standed in front of Mathis, saying he was ready to marry Vesper and quit the service because he was all confused about the morality of spying. Not any more.

The novel ends with his determination to combat the fear which stands behind all the Soviet agents, the whip hand of SMERSH itself, the instrument of terror which keeps the whole system running. He phones the hot line to London to leave a coded message, that agent 3030 was a double all along. Yes, he said ‘was’ – because ‘the bitch is dead now.’

If Bond was cold and heartless before, he is even colder and more heartless now. If he was wavering about his job and his role, this mission crystallises his determination to shake himself out of it, and take the fight to the enemy.

Thoughts

This is an excellent kick-start to what turned out to be a never-ending series of fictions about the cold, pitiless, sensual, cruel connoisseur spy. All the key ingredients are here, including the final determination to fight the foe forever. And Bond may indeed go on forever…

This first book establishes the narrative pattern: Bond combats one big, central baddy, preferably in exotic foreign locations, where he displays his connoisseur-like enjoyment of the finer things in life and survives numerous physical attacks, before the plot intensifies, he falls into the baddy’s clutches and endures sadistic levels of punishment, before just about defeating the enemy, all accompanied by a sexy lover whose initial coldness he triumphantly overcomes.


Credit

Casino Royale published in 1953 by Jonathan Cape. All quotes and references are to the 1978 Triad Grafton paperback.

Related links

Other thrillers of 1953

The Bond novels

1953 Casino Royale Bond takes on Russian spy Le Chiffre at baccarat then is gutted to find the beautiful assistant sent by London to help him and who he falls in love with – Vesper Lynd – is herself a Russian double agent.
1954 Live and Let Die Bond is dispatched to find and defeat Mr Big, legendary king of America’s black underworld, who uses Voodoo beliefs to terrify his subordinates, and who is smuggling 17th century pirate treasure from an island off Jamaica to Florida and then on to New York, in fact to finance Soviet spying, for Mr Big is a SMERSH agent. Along the way Bond meets, falls in love with, and saves, the beautiful clairvoyant, Solitaire.
1955 Moonraker An innocent invitation to join M at his club and see whether the famous Sir Hugo Drax really is cheating at cards leads Bond to discover that Drax is in fact a fanatical Nazi determined on taking revenge for the Fatherland by targeting an atom-bomb-tipped missile – the Moonraker – at London.
1956 Diamonds Are Forever Bond’s mission is to trace the route of a diamond smuggling ‘pipeline’, which starts in Africa, comes to London and then to follow it on to New York, and further to the mob-controlled gambling town of Las Vegas, where he wipes out the gang, all the while falling in love with the delectable Tiffany Case.
1957 From Russia, with Love Bond is lured to Istanbul by the promise of a beautiful Russian agent who says she’ll defect and bring along one of the Soviets’ precious Spektor coding machines, but only for Bond in person. The whole thing is an improbable trap concocted by head of SMERSH’S execution department, Rosa Klebb, to not only kill Bond but humiliate him and the Service in a sex-and-murder scandal.
1958 Dr. No Bond is dispatched to Jamaica (again) to investigate the mysterious disappearance of the station head, which leads him to meet up with the fisherman Quarrel (again), do a week’s rigorous training (again) and set off for a mysterious island (Crab Key this time) where he meets the ravishing Honeychile Rider and the villainous Chinaman, Dr No, who sends him through a gruelling tunnel of pain which Bond barely survives, before killing No and triumphantly rescuing the girl.
1959 Goldfinger M tasks Bond with finding out more about Auric Goldfinger, the richest man in England. Bond confirms the Goldfinger is smuggling large amounts of gold out of the UK in his vintage Rolls Royce, to his factory in Switzerland, but then stumbles on a much larger conspiracy to steal the gold from the US Reserve at Fort Knox. Which, of course, Bond foils.
1960 For Your Eyes Only (short stories) Four stories which started life as treatments for a projected US TV series of Bond adventures and so feature exotic settings (Paris, Vermont, the Seychelles, Venice), ogre-ish villains, shootouts and assassinations and scantily-clad women – but the standout story is Quantum of Solace, a conscious homage to the older storytelling style of Somerset Maugham, in which there are none of the above, and which shows what Fleming could do if he gave himself the chance.
1961 Thunderball Introducing Ernst Blofeld and his SPECTRE organisation who have dreamed up a scheme to hijack an RAF plane carrying two atomic bombs, scuttle it in the Caribbean, then blackmail Western governments into coughing up $100,000,000 or get blown up. The full force of every Western security service is thrown into the hunt, but M has a hunch the missing plane headed south towards the Bahamas, so it’s there that he sends his best man, Bond, to hook up with his old pal Felix Leiter, and they are soon on the trail of SPECTRE operative Emilio Largo and his beautiful mistress, Domino.
1962 The Spy Who Loved Me An extraordinary experiment: an account of a Bond adventure told from the point of view of the Bond girl in it, Vivienne ‘Viv’ Michel, which opens with a long sequence devoted entirely to her childhood in Canada and young womanhood in London, before armed hoodlums burst into the motel where she’s working on her own, and then she is rescued by her knight in shining armour, Mr B himself.
1963 On Her Majesty’s Secret Service Back to third-person narrative, and Bond poses as a heraldry expert to penetrate Blofeld’s headquarters on a remote Alpine mountain top, where the swine is carrying out a fiendish plan to use germ warfare to decimate Britain’s agriculture sector. Bond smashes Blofeld’s set-up with the help of the head of the Corsican mafia, Marc-Ange Draco, whose wayward daughter, Tracy, he has fallen in love with, and in fact goes on to marry – making her the one great love of his life – before she is cruelly shot dead by Blofeld, who along with the vile Irma Bunt had managed to escape the destruction of his base.
1964 You Only Live Twice Shattered by the murder of his one-day wife, Bond goes to pieces with heavy drinking and erratic behaviour. After 8 months or so M sends him on a diplomatic mission to persuade the head of the Japanese Secret Service, ‘Tiger’ Tanaka to share top Jap secret info with us Brits. Tiger agrees on condition that Bond undertakes a freelance job for him, and eliminates a troublesome ‘Dr Shatterhand’ who has created a gruesome ‘Garden of Death’ at a remote spot on the Japanese coast. When Bond realises that ‘Shatterhand’ is none other than Blofeld, murderer of his wife, he accepts the mission with gusto.
1965 The Man With The Golden Gun Brainwashed by the KGB, Bond returns from Japan to make an attempt on M’s life. When it fails he is subjected to intense shock therapy at ‘The Park’ before returning fit for duty and being dispatched to the Caribbean to ‘eliminate’ a professional assassin, Scaramanga, who has killed half a dozen of our agents as well as being at the centre of a network of criminal and political subversion. The novel is set in Bond and Fleming’s old stomping ground, Jamaica, where he is helped by his old buddy, Felix Leiter, and his old secretary, Mary Goodnight, and the story hurtles to the old conclusion – Bond is bettered and bruised within inches of his life – but defeats the baddie and ends the book with a merry quip on his lips.
1966 Octopussy Three short stories in which Bond uses the auction of a valuable Fabergé egg to reveal the identity of the Russians’ spy master in London; shoots a Russian sniper before she can kill one of our agents escaping from East Berlin; and confronts a former Security Service officer who has been eaten up with guilt for a wartime murder of what turns out to be Bond’s pre-war ski instructor. This last short story, Octopussy, may be his best.